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I. INTRODUCTION
The potential for attorneys to collude in reaching a settlement
agreement arises in any large-scale aggregation of mass torts. In the
1990s, attorneys settled seventy-four percent of the mass tort cases
consolidated for transfer by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation.' Even though most mass tort litigation settles, the judicial
Copyright 2004, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Attorney, Holland & Knight LLP; Florida State University, J.D., 2004;
Vanderbilt Univ., B.A., English, 2000. I am especially indebted to Dean Paul
LeBel at the University of North Dakota School of Law who shared not only a
wealth of information about tort litigation but also his time, patience, and insight
on earlier versions of this Article. Many thanks also to the editors of the Louisiana
Law Review for their hard work throughout the editing process.
1. Predominant Means of Resolving Mass Tort Multidistrict Litigation
Motions Granted and Denied From 1990-1999.
Predominant Mode of Motion Motion
Resolution Granted Denied Total
Group Settlement, 9 1 10
Outside of Class Actions (29%) (8%) (23%)
2 0 2
Group Settlement and Bankruptcy (6%) (0%) (5%)
12 2 14
Class Action Settlement (39%) (17%) (32%)
8 9 17
Individual Litigation (26%) (75%) (40%)
Deborah R. Hensler, The Role of Multi-Districting in Mass Tort Litigation: An
Empirical Investigation, 31 Seton Hall L. Rev. 883, 902 (2001). This table
indicates that transferee courts dispense with seventy-four percent of multidistrict
litigation through settlements. Hensler's findings are consistent with previous
observations about the remand rate to transferor courts. See Patricia D. Howard,
A Guide to Multidistrict Litigation, 124 F.R.D. 479, 480 (1989) (noting that the
Panel remanded only 2,600 out of 16,700 total actions brought before it in the
1980s); Judith Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and Dismay, 80 Cornell L. Rev.
918,928 (1995). In 1997, Judge Weigel observed that the remand rate to transferor
courts was only five percent. Stanley A. Weigel, The Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation, Transferor Courts and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575,
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system ensures the fairness and integrity of settlements only in the
bankruptcy and class action contexts. Consequently, the fairness of the
settlement can vary depending on how the judicial system aggregates
the claims. 2 Only thirty-nine percent of aggregated claims resulted in
class action settlements.3  Two percent received bankruptcy
protections.4 Approximately forty percent of the mass tort settlements
settled outside the scope of judicial review and received no procedural
assurances of fairness.5
A traditional understanding of mass tort litigation views all
aggregation as class action. As this view holds, class actions deserve
special procedural safeguards because they include absent class
members.6 Other forms of litigation allocate autonomy to the
individual to make decisions about the conduct of litigation, the course
of settlement negotiations, and other decisions conventionally in the
scope of the lawyer-client relationship.7 In non-class litigation, the
conventional view assumes that clients protect their own interests by
monitoring attorney conduct, choosini when and how to settle, and
determining whether to proceed to trial. In class actions, class counsel
has a duty to protect the interests of the class as a whole, and counsel's
decisions bind all class claimants.9 The individual in a class action has
little authority over the conduct of the action, yet remains bound by the
ultimate decision. Therefore, judges must approve settlement terms and
attorneys' fees as well as ensure that attorneys adequately represent
claimants. 10
Although this traditional understanding appropriately
differentiates between class actions and individual representation, it
583 (1978).
2. See generally Howard M. Erichson, Symposium, Multidistrict Litigation
and Aggregation Alternatives, 31 Seton Hall L. Rev. 877, 881 (2001).
3. See Hensler, supra note 1. Thirty-four percent of settlements after
consolidation occurred outside of the class action context.
4. See Hensler, supra note 1.
5. See Hensler, supra note 1. Seventy-four percent of the mass tort litigation
resulted in settlement. Thirty-nine percent of those settlements were not class
actions.
6. Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client
Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 519,
523-24 (2003).
7. See Roger C. Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and "Settlement
Class Actions:" An Introduction, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 811, 822 (1995); Erichson,
supra note 6, at 523.
8. See Cramton, supra note 7, at 822 ("Collective justice also departs from the
normal lawyer-client relationship in which the client makes decisions concerning
objectives and the client's lawyer makes tactical and procedural decisions.").
9. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
10. See id.; see also Cramton, supra note 7, at 822 ("Class action law even




fails to recognize that not all large-scale aggregation satisfies the
requirements for class certification." A fluid ground exists between
individual representation and class actions.2 With the rise of mass
torts, courts aggregate claims through party joinder, 13 statewide
aggregation,14 bankruptcy," consolidation, 16 and federal multidistrict
litigation transfer.17 Yet, because many of the prerequisites tojoinder
require only common facts-not the predominance of common facts
required for Rule 23(b)(3) class status' 8-courts validly aggregate
many claims that fail to meet the requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23.
The concerns and symptoms of settlement collusion in class
actions are nearly identical to those in post-aggregation settlements: 19
a few attorneys who specialize in representing mass tort victims and
defendants have repeated contact with one another and with the
transferee judge who handles the factually similar claims. Allowing
aggregation of these claims in a single forum combined with "repeat
player" attorneys presents opportunities for collusion.20 Also, mass
11. The Supreme Court's decisions inAmchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997), and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119
S. Ct. 2295 (1999), made it more difficult to certify cases for settlement purposes
only. See infra Part V.A.
12. See Judith Resnik, Litigating and Settling Class Actions: The Prerequisites
of Entry and Exit, 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 835, 861 (1997) ("All of us who think
about class actions or other forms of aggregation must confront that aggregates
range in size, in kinds and values of claims, in dimensions of legal and factual
complexity not easily mapped in the current iterations; and moreover the variations
are always and unendingly changing.").
13. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 (third party claims), 19 (compulsory party joinder),
20 (permissive party joinder), 24 (intervention).
14. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 404 (2004) (permitting coordination of cases
containing common questions of fact); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.270 (allowing the court to
consolidate actions involving a common question of law or fact for joint hearings,
trials, or other motions that "may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay"); Ga.
Code Ann. § 9-11-42 (2004) (allowing the court, with party consent, to order a joint
hearing or trial of any or all issues to avoid unnecessary costs or delay).
15. See infra Part V.B.
16. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000). "Multidistrict litigation simply means related
actions pending in more than one district." Howard, supra note 1, at 481.
18. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). See also text accompanying note 167.
19. See Barry F. McNeil & Beth L. Fanscal, Mass Torts and Class Actions:
Facing Increased Scrutiny, 167 F.R.D. 483, 501-02 (1996). The term "post-
aggregation settlements" in this article refers mainly to settlements that occur after
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transfers claims to a transferee court.
20. See generally Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1139 (11th Cir. 1985)
("Because of the potential for a collusive settlement, a sellout of a highly
meritorious claim, or a settlement that ignores the interests of minority class
members, the district judge has a heavy duty to ensure that any settlement is 'fair,
reasonable and adequate' .. . ."); see also infra Part II.B.
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tort claimants have an attenuated attorney-client relationship with
their lawyer and exercise little or no meaningful control over their
case. 2 In any type of aggregated mass tort litigation, federal judges
feel a mounting pressure, be it real or perceived, to efficiently dispose
of the cases, which encourages them not to question the settlement
terms.22 In short, collective representation, without the judicial
supervision incorporated into the class action and bankruptcy
schemes, permits collusion and inequitable settlement allocations that
lead to second-class justice for mass tort claimants.23 Consequently,
the judicial system should permit transferee judges to approve post-
aggregation settlements using some of the same protective
mechanisms contained in Rule 23.
Even though legal literature contains an abundance of information
about class action settlements, the aspect of collusion in non-class
post-aggregation settlements has largely gone unnoticed.24
Accordingly, Part II creates a framework for understanding the
variations between types of mass torts and explains how collusion
can occur within various methods of aggregation. Part II.A defines
the different categories of mass torts and highlights the effects of the
recent Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002 on
single-event mass accidents.25  Because the category of
dispersed/personal injury mass torts has been the most visible, this
article primarily uses those as examples even though the article's
analysis applies to all types of mass torts. Part ll.B pinpoints three
primary conditions that contribute to collusion-repeat attorneys
specializing in mass torts, a single forum, and an overburdened
court-and illustrates how collusion occurs in mass tort settlements
through reverse auctions and issue preclusion. Part II.C considers the
methods for and limits on aggregation, including removal, the All
Writs Act,26 class actions, consolidation, and change of venue. In
discussing the methods for aggregation, this Part incorporates and
analyzes the 2003 amendments to Rule 23. Part HI expands the
initial framework in Part II to include the historical purpose and
function of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (the Panel).
21. Counsel directs his or her loyalty to the group as a whole, not the
individual. Individual consent to the settlement terms is illusory since claimants
must choose between settlement and the costs of funding separate litigation against
defendant corporations.
22. See infra Part III; see also Resnik, supra note 1, at 937-39.
23. See Erichson, supra note 6, at 525.
24. Several commentators have discussed the ethical problems caused by
aggregated settlements. See id. at 519; Paul D. Rheingold, Ethical Constraints on
Aggregated Settlements of Mass Tort Cases, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 395 (1998).
25. Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, 28 U.S.C. § 1369
(2000).
26. See supra note 150.
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By identifying the need to streamline the federal courts' approach to
mass torts as the Panel's primary objective, this Part begins to flesh
out the origins of a push toward expediency without a counterbalance
for fairness.
Part IV develops this impulse toward efficiency by examining
two recent Congressional proposals. Part IV.A analyzes the
Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2004,27 which if passed,
will reverse the Supreme Court's decision in Lexecon v. Milberg
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach.28 The Lexecon Court rejected the
long-standing practice of permitting the transferee court (the court
that would receive mass tort litigation from the Panel) to transfer
jurisdiction to itself for trial purposes. Allowing the transferee court
to retain trial jurisdiction increases the pressure on defendants to
settle, which in turn may inflate the number of inadequate
settlements. Part IV.B explains and questions the Class Action
Fairness Acts,29 which purport to limit the role of the Panel by
preventing it from transferring certain litigation removed from state
courts. Even though the bill limits consolidation of actions that do
not allege class status, nothing in the bill prevents the court from
transferring venue to the court with the majority of similar litigation,
then consolidating the actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
42(a). This aggregation also encourages settlement by threatening
defendants with more claims.
Part V contrasts the mounting pressure by Congress and the lower
courts to streamline mass torts with the Supreme Court's concern
about fairness. Part V.A assesses the Court's recognition of the
potential for collusion in settlements through its rejection of two
asbestos class action settlements, Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor3°
and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.3 This Part argues that had the Court
focused on efficiency, it could have affirmed the settlements and
eradicated much of the asbestos litigation. Yet, the Supreme Court
concentrated not on streamlining cases, but on fairness. Part V.B.
considers the fairness aspects of using bankruptcy as an alternative
to class actions by examining the Dalkon Shield litigation. Part V.C.
raises the concern that aggregation "blackmails" defendants into
settlement and questions whether success is appropriately measured
by settlement. By raising the conflicting goals of the tort system, this
Part emphasizes the need to reach a balance between fairness and
efficiency.
27. H.R. 1768, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (2004).
28. 523 U.S. 26, 118 S. Ct. 956 (1998).
29. S. 2062, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (2004); S. 1751, 108th Cong., 1st Sess.
(2004).
30. 521 U.S. 591, 611, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
31. 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
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Part VI proposes that Congress amend the multidistrict litigation
statute to permit judicial oversight of post-aggregation settlements.
Part VI.A. begins by critiquing past proposals to change the mass tort
system and observes that many of these proposals mirror the urgency
felt by the lower courts and Congress in response to anomalies like
the asbestos litigation. Upon concluding that these proposals do not
recognize or resolve the potential problems with collusion in
aggregated settlements, Part VI.B. recommends that Congress amend
the multidistrict litigation statute to permit the Panel to endow the
transferee court with the power to oversee and authorize settlements
outside the class action mechanism. Part VI.C. identifies features of
a valid non-class aggregated settlement by applying pertinent
characteristics of a legitimate class action settlement and suggesting
factors that probe the fairness of settlements.
I. THE LANDSCAPE OF MASS TORTS AND CONSOLIDATION
Traditional tort law never imagined the possibility of collusion
between attorneys because they argued ardently for their clients and
the system incorporated a balanced method for redressing wrongs
through the dual notions of fairness and efficiency.32 In individual
cases, the traditional adversarial system continues to preserve the
integrity of the tort system. In the mass tort setting, however, the
adversarial system breaks down as collective representation replaces
individual representation and collective settlement replaces trial.33
Attorneys specializing in certain types of mass torts may represent
hundreds of claimants and the attorneys' decisions to settle or litigate
affect all of their clients as well as similarly situated claimants.
Consequently, the notions of fair play and substantial justice
envisioned in the traditional adversarial process-that counsel
prevents coercion and adversaries promote reliability-collapses.
This section begins by describing the differences between categories
of mass torts. It then explains how the complex nature of mass torts
leads to specialization and collusion in settlements. Finally, it
32. Mary J. Davis, Toward the Proper Role for Mass Tort Class Actions, 77
Or. L. Rev. 157,159 (1998); see also Diana E. Murphy, Unified and Consolidated
Complaints in Multidistrict Litigation, 132 F.R.D. 597,598 (1991) (identifying the
promotion of efficiency as one of the most important factors for transferee judges).
33. See Paradise v. Wells, 686 F. Supp. 1442, 1444 (M.D. Ala. 1988) ("It is
equally well established, however, that the settlement process is more susceptible
that [sic] the adversarial process to certain types of abuse and, as a result, a court
has a heavy, independent duty to ensure that the settlement is 'fair, adequate, and
reasonable,' for example, the interests of the class lawyer and the class may
diverge, or a majority of the class may wrongfully compromise, betray, or 'sell-out'
the interests of a minority.").
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illustrates and elaborates on the procedural mechanisms that courts
use to aggregate claims and efficiently handle mass torts.
A. Separating and Defining Mass Torts
Any measured approach to mass torts first requires an
identification and definition of the general term "mass torts," a
calculation of when a tort transforms into a mass tort, and a
classification of the general categories of mass torts. The broad term
mass tort can refer to anything from an airplane crash, to a chemical
spill, to a defective product affecting a considerable number of
people. One definition, proposed by the American Bar Association
(ABA) Commission on Mass Torts, limits "mass tort litigation" to "at
least 100 civil tort actions arising from a single accident or use of or
exposure to the same product or substance, each of which involves a
claim in excess of $50,000 for wrongful death, personal iniury or
physical damage to or destruction of tangible property." ' By
confining the definition of mass torts to an arbitrary number of
claims,3 the ABA unnecessarily excluded accidents typically
considered mass torts, such as hotel fires or airplane crashes with less
than a hundred claimants.36
34. American Bar Association Commission on Mass Torts, Report to the House
of Delegates 12 (1989) [hereinafter ABA Report]. Given that the amount in
controversy requirement increased to $75,000, the ABA probably would amend the
$50,000 to $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000) (requiring at least $75,000).
Paul Rheingold, a dissenting member of the ABA Commission, proposed a
definitional threshold of at least "10,000 present and reasonably to be expected
cases." ABA Report, supra note 34, at 8e.
35. Commentators have argued for numbers anywhere between 50 and 10,000.
See Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules and Working Group on Mass Torts, Report on
Mass Tort Litigation, 10 n. 1, app. D, at 1 (1999), reprinted without appendices in
187 F.R.D. 293 (considering a group of fifty claimants for designation as a "mass
tort") [hereinafter Working Group on Mass Torts].
36. As the Manual for Complex Litigation noted, "Courts have long recognized
the need for special case-management practices in single incident mass torts, such
as a hotel fire, the collapse of a structure, the crash of a commercial airliner, a major
chemical discharge or explosion, or an oil spill." Manual for Complex Litigation
(Fourth) § 22.1, at 343-44 (2004); see also William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial
Federalism: A Proposal to Amend the Multidistrict Litigation Statute to Permit
Discovery Coordination of Large-Scale Litigation Pending in State and Federal
Courts, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1529, 1542 (1995). Litigants often seek to consolidate
these types of claims through multidistrict litigation, even when the accidents
include as few as eleven claims. For example, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation consolidated eleven claims arising out of the 721 Dupont Plaza, Puerto
Rico Fire. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Statistical Analysis of
Multidistrict Litigation, at 2 of the Summary by Docket of Multidistrict Litigation




The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the Working Group
on Mass Torts set forth a better working definition of the broad
category, stating, "Mass tort litigation emerges when an event or
series of related events injure a large number of people or damage
their property."37 Consequently, the general definition of mass torts
need not reach an arbitrary threshold of claimants.38 Instead, the
operational issue is whether a particular group of claims needs
special judicial management.39
The nature and types of claims calling for special judicial
management fall into four rough categories: mass accidents,
dispersed/personal injury mass torts, property damage mass torts, and
economic loss torts. A brief examination of each category and its
unique issues helps explain the failure of sweeping legislative tort
reforms in response to anomalous mass torts with over 1,000 claims
such as asbestos, Agent Orange,4° or Dalkon Shield.41 The distinct
issues of causation and injury that arise in different categories make
it impossible to implement rigid reforms directed toward mass torts
as a general category. Without including flexibility that permits
judges to use judicial discretion in managing a mass tort according to
its unique characteristics, reforms that purport to overhaul the system
of mass torts have not succeeded.42
1. Mass Accidents
One of the most newsworthy categories of mass torts is mass
accidents. 43 Mass accidents, or single incident/single-event mass
37. Working Group on Mass Torts, supra note 35, at 10.
38. Professor Edward H. Cooper noted that the "mass" in mass torts is not so
easily defined. He observed:
It is possible to pick a numerical threshold and that may be desirable for
reform legislation. The number is likely to be rather high. Two hundred
and fifty actions arising from common facts, or one thousand, may be
handled by the collective resources of state and federal courts without
significant disruption. But something more than the impact on the
judicial system must affect the choice of a number. It must also take
account of the impact on the tort claims.
Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation and Settlement of Mass Torts, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1943, 1945 (2000).
39. Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth), supra note 36, § 22.1, at 343.
40. Inre "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993). For
more on the Agent Orange litigation, see Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in
Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 469, 535 (1994). Judge Jack Weinstein
presided over the majority of the Agent Orange litigation.
41. See infra Part IV.A.
42. See infra Part IV.A.
43. For example, the Panel transferred the September 11 terrorist attack
litigation to Judge Richard C. Casey in the Southern District of New York on
2004]
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torts, usually involve one catastrophic event that causes harm to a
readily identifiable group of putative plaintiffs.' As the Working
Group on Mass Torts indicated:
Typically, plaintiffs in a single event mass tort share the
common characteristics of time, place, and cause of injury.
Liability is usually governed by the law of a single forum,
although damages might not be. Issues of science are usually
resolved with existing knowledge and with the kind of expert
testimony conventionally employed in tort litigation. What
is different from the ordinary two-or three-party tort is the
number of people affected and the stakes involved, not the
facts or the law.45
Typical cases involve fires, airplane crashes, or environmental
hazards such as oil spills or major chemical discharges.46
Litigants may aggregate single-event torts in federal court under
the new Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act (MMTJA) of
2002."7 This Act grants federal courts original jurisdiction over "any
civil action involving minimal diversity between adverse parties that
arises from a single accident, where at least 75 natural persons have
died in the accident at a discrete location."48 Minimal diversity exists
"if any party is a citizen of a State and any adverse party is a citizen
of another state ... ,49 Congress created an exception to the removal
of single-event torts that requires federal courts to abstain from
hearing a case in which "(1) the substantial majority of all plaintiffs
are citizens of a single State of which the primary defendants are also
December 9, 2003. See Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, at
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/PendingMDLs/CommonDisaster/MDL-1570/mdl-
1570.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
44. Working Group on Mass Torts, supra note 35, at 10.
45. Id.
46. Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth), supra note 36, § 22.1, at 343-44.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2000). Congress has attempted to pass numerous earlier
versions of this Act. See, e.g., Court Reform and Access to Justice Act of 1987,
H.R. 3152, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act
of 1989, H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., 1st Sess (1989); Multiparty, Multiforum
Jurisdiction Act of 1990, H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); The Multiparty,
Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1991, H.R. 2450, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991);
Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1993, H.R. 1100, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993). For commentary on the 1993 version, see Schwarzer et al., supra note 36,
at 1542-43. "Related multiforum litigation generates duplicative proceedings that
produce great expense and delay, and thus frustrate plaintiffs' recovery of
compensation." William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism in Action:
Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1689, 1692
(1992) (citations omitted).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (2000).
49. Id. § 1369(c)(1).
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citizens; and (2) the claims asserted will be governed primarily by the
laws of that State." 50
The Act defines neither "primary defendant," which could lead to
substantial litigation in the event of an airplane crash involving suits
against both the product manufacturer and the airline, nor "substantial
majority," which leaves courts a wide margin of discretion for either
accepting or declining jurisdiction.51 Presumably, plaintiffs could defeat
minimum diversity and federal jurisdiction by excluding defendants
with their primary place of business in the state of the crash site. This
furthers plaintiffs' current practice of adding non-diverse defendants to
defeat federal jurisdiction and encourages them to add a "substantial
majority" of intrastate defendants should they wish to remain in state
court. The MMTJA requires district courts to notify the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation when a party brings a claim under the Act,
52
and its legislative history specifically exempts mass tort injuries such as
asbestos and breast implants.53
Before the MMTJA and the use of the class action as a procedural
device to aggregate this type of tort, many courts followed the 1966
Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 that
advised courts not to certify mass accidents as class actions because
they may present "significant questions, not only of damages but of
liability and defenses of liability,... [which] affect the individuals in
different ways."54 Until the late 1980s, appellate courts reversed most
district courts that certified mass tort actions.55 Yet, as noted by the
Fifth Circuit, "[t]he courts are now being forced to rethink the
alternatives and priorities by the current volume of litigation and more
frequent mass disasters., 56 In the wake of the asbestos litigation (a type
of dispersed/personal injury mass tort), a number of courts disregarded
the advisory committee's recommendation and certified single-event
mass torts when the common event satisfied Rule 23(b)(3)'s
50. Id. § 1369(b).
51. See Georgene Vairo, Legislation Update, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 16, 2002, at B7.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(e) (2000).
53. H.R. Rep. No. 107-14, at 29 (2001) ("This does not deal with cases like the
asbestos case. This is a single-accident case, again, such as a plane crash or a train
wreck.").
54. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note (citing Pa. R.R. Co. v.
United States, 111 F. Supp. 80 (D.N.J. 1953) (involving a 1950 explosion of freight
cars that carried military explosives and resulted in the death or injury to roughly eight
to ten thousand people)); see, e.g., Harrigan v. United States, 63 F.R.D. 402, 407
(E.D. Pa. 1974) (denying class certification for a putative class consisting of
paralyzed veterans injured by negligent urological surgery); see also Cranton, supra
note 7, at 820.
55. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1343, 1357 (1995).
56. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986).
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predominance requirement.57 Mass accidents present courts with less
variation as to legal claims, which makes class treatment more
appropriate. 58 Even if a judge determined that the single-event claims
did not meet the prerequisites for class certification, the cases may
qualify for federal jurisdiction according to the MMTJA, and then
consolidation pursuant to either the procedures for multidistrict
litigation or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a).59
2. Dispersed/Personal Injury Mass Torts
Dispersed mass torts comprise a middle ground between mass
accidents and mass personal injuries caused by similar products or
exposure to analogous substances.' Commentators often refer to
dispersed mass torts as "personal injury mass torts."61 This type of tort
typically arises from exposure to or use of a certain product or
substance.62 Two kinds of injuries exist within the group of
dispersed/personal injury mass torts: injuries that appear within a year
or two of a product's use and latent injuries that may take decades to
identify. Examples of readily apparent injuries, in which symptoms
appear within a few years of the product's use, include pharmaceutical
drugs or medical devices that the manufacturer may take off the market
57. See, e.g., Sala v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 120 F.R.D. 494 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(certifying a class arising out of a train wreck); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 95
F.R.D. 483 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (certifying an action arising out of the collapse of a hotel
walkway); Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977) (certifying an action
arising out of a nightclub fire); Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation, "54 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 5, 17-19 (1991). The Supreme Court, in Amchem Products, Inc.
v. Windsor, noted, "mass tort cases arising from a common cause or disaster may,
depending upon the circumstances, satisfy the predominance requirement." 521 U.S.
591, 625, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2250 (1997).
58. Coffee, supra note 55, at 1358.
59. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000) (requiring only common questions of fact, not
the predominance of common factual questions).
60. "The common distinction between 'single event' and 'dispersed' mass
torts identifies prototypes, not a neat division that separates mass torts into two
tidy categories that can be managed by distinctive means." Working Group on
Mass Torts, supra note 35, at 11.
61. See, e.g., Anne E. Cohen, Mass Tort Litigation After Amchem, SC57 ALI-
ABA 269, 276 (1998).
62. Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth), supra note 36, § 22.1, at 344;
Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. Rev.
659 (1989); see generally American Law Institute, Complex Litigation: Statutory
Recommendations and Analysis § 6.01, at 340-41 (1994).
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after numerous complaints.63 Litigation examples include the Bayco164
and Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis65 cases.
Latent injury cases, on the other hand, strain current procedural
mechanisms and judicial resources due to the sizable number of
claimants,' uncertain number of future claimants and defendants,
67
inordinate amounts of time before potential claimants ascertain injury
and severity,6 8 lack of awareness about exposure,69 and indefinite
causation.0 The asbestos cases serve as the most prominent example
of latent injury torts.7 l Other examples include Dalkon Shield
intrauterine devices, 72 silicone gel breast implants, 73 and morning
sickness drugs.74 Most efforts to reform the system's handling of
63. The anti-cholesterol drug, MER/29 serves as an example of how the mass
marketing of a prescription drug turned into a mass tort. See Paul D. Rheingold, The
MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 Cal. L. Rev.
116 (1968).
64. In re Baycol Prods. Liab. Litig., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2001); see
also Pennsylvania Judge Certifies Baycol Class for Monitoring, But Rejects Tort
Claim Class, Class Action Litig. Rpt. (BNA), Apr. 9, 2004, at 245.
65. In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Prods. Liab. Litig., 149 F. Supp. 2d 931
(J.P.M.L. 2001).
66. For example, over 600,000 people filed claims for asbestos-related injuries
and named over 6,000 companies as the defendants. Stephen J. Carroll et al.,
Asbestos Litigation Costs and Compensation: An Interim Report vi (2002),
available at http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB397/DB397.pdf.
67. The Fifth Circuit noted, "the universe of potential plaintiffs is unknown and
many times is seemingly unlimited, and the number of potential tortfeasors is
equally obtuse .... " In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1018 (5th Cir.
1997); see also Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73
Tex. L. Rev. 1821, 1839-40 (1995).
68. Some injuries may take decades to recognize. Manual for Complex
Litigation (Fourth), supra note 36, § 22.1, at 344.
69. Id. § 22.1, at 345; Working Group on Mass Torts, supra note 35, at 11. For
example, in the DES cases, babies exposed to the drug in the womb may develop
adenosis. In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552, 558 (E.D.N.Y 1992) (observing that
babies exposed to the drug in the womb may develop diseases late in their adult years);
see generally In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613,643 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that the latency
period for problems with radiation exposure may vary from eight to ten years).
70. Working Group on Mass Torts, supra note 35, at 11.
71. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,598, 117 S. Ct. 2231,
223738 (1997) (quoting Report of The Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on
Asbestos Litigation 2-3 (Mar. 1991)) (observing that a latency period for asbestos
may last as long as forty years).
72. Richard B. Sobol, Bending the Law: The Story of the Dalkon Shield
Bankruptcy 107 (1991) (noting that the discovery of infertility often went
undiscovered until long after doctors removed the device).
73. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 1994 WL 578353, at
*8 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (approving a thirty year compensation program to
address latency concerns).
74. In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552,558 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (observing latent
effects appearing in adult years).
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mass torts begin in response to latent injury cases. However, the
current multidistrict litigation docket reveals that this type of mass tort
comprises only about fifteen percent of total mass tort litigations. 7
3. Property Damage Torts and Economic Loss Torts
Property damage mass torts include compensation claims for
"replacement or repair of allegedly defective products" or parts of
products that failed to perform as the manufacturer intended. Often
the alleged failure causes damage to the product, property, or the
person using the product.77 The school asbestos litigation serves as a
well-known example of property damage mass torts.78
Economic loss mass torts resemble property damage mass torts but
tend to relate more to consumer fraud or warranty actions." Although
the general "economic-loss" rule in torts holds that plaintiffs cannot
sue for purely monetary loss (without physical injury or property
damage) under negligence or strict liability,8 plaintiffs can recover for
pure economic loss in cases of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, or
intentional interference with a contract, breach of contract, and breach
of warranty.8' Consequently, in economic loss mass torts, rather than
alleging an actual product failure or resulting injury, plaintiffs typically
sue under fraud or misrepresentation and allege only that a defect
81exists. 2Common examples include the claims against Firestone for
allegedly defective tires83 and Ford Motor Company for alleged defects
in automobile automatic transmissions.84
B. Mass Torts as Fodder for Collusion in Settlements
Despite significant variations among types, all mass torts share
three key features that contribute to the potential for collusion in
75. See infra note 484, accompanying text, and pie chart.
76. Cohen et al., supra note 61, at 276.
77. Id.
78. In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986).
79. Cohen et al., supra note 61, at 276.
80. Black's Law Dictionary 531 (7th ed. 1999).
81. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858,871,106 S. Ct.
2295, 2302 (1986); In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II Prod. Liab. Litig., 1995 WL
714441, at *5, *7 (E.D. La. Dec. 4, 1995); see also William Powers, Jr. & Margaret
Niver, Negligence, Breach of Contract, and the "Economic Loss" Rule, 23 Tex.
Tech. L. Rev. 477 (1992).
82. Cohen et al., supra note 61, at 276.
83. Feinstein v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 535 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y.
1982).
84. In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II Prod. Liab. Litig., 177 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. La.
1997); Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 130 F.R.D. 260 (D.D.C. 1990).
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settlements: "repeat player" attorneys who routinely represent mass
tort plaintiffs or defendants; aggregation before a single court; and
a judge who wants to dispose of burdensome mass tort litigation.
Due to the cost of developing scientific evidence and skills to
litigate particular types of mass tort cases, most plaintiff attorneys
in the mass tort business specialize. A handful of repeat player law
firms, for both plaintiffs and defendants, handle the majority of mass
tort cases. Because of their specialty and expertise, plaintiff
attorneys accumulate a catalog of claimants with factually similar
claims. In mass settlements, the plaintiffs' counsel can include weak
claims that would not pass muster in a trial and receive a
contingency fee on each individual claim.86 With the rise of
technology, the Internet, and nationwide law firms, plaintiffs'
attorneys in New York and California could target mass tort victims
in even the smallest towns.87
Representing catalogues or inventories of claimants often leads
to conflicts of interest that attorneys may not be able to foresee at
the beginning of litigation, such as differences among bargaining
positions, clients' divergent desires to settle or litigate, or the extent
of latent injuries." These repeat players may adjust their litigation
85. Coffee, supra note 55, at 1358-59. For example, attorney Don Lough
specializes in handling class actions at Ford Motor Co. Greg Bums & Michael J.
Berens, The Class Action Game, Chi. Trib., Mar. 7, 2004, at Al. He stated, "[w]e
tend to see the same lawyers frequently," and "[w]e find ourselves defending the
same cases over and over and over again." Id.
86. See Coffee, supra note 55, at 1358-59.
87. A "Google" search for "law firms specializing in representation of asbestos
victims" revealed a number of firms that advertise nationwide service. Lewis &
Scholnick's website boasts that they "offer nationwide legal representation to
victims of mesothelioma and asbestos-related diseases," and have "handled well
over 1,000 asbestos personal injury and wrongful death cases." It provides
potential clients with a toll-free number. Lewis & Scholnick, Attorneys at Law, at
http://www.lsasbestoslaw.com/lawfirm.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2004). The
search also produced the New York law firm of Belluck & Fox that claims to
provide "individualized legal representation of serious injury cases" and allows
potential clients to fill out a four-lined form so that they can have their personal
injury claim evaluated without missing their state's filing deadline. Belluck & Fox,
at http://www.belluckfox.com/asbestos.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
88. See Erichson, supra note 6, at 569; see generally Samuel Issacharoff, Class
Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 805 (1997). Professor John Coffee
identified four basic structural conflicts that may arise in mass torts:
(1) internal conflicts that exist within the class-typically, because
subcategories of class members are competing over the allocation of the
settlement; (2) external conflicts that arise because class members (or their
attorneys) have some extraneous reason for favoring a settlement that does
not truly benefit the interests of all class members; (3) risk conflicts that
arise because class members or class counsel have very different attitudes
about the level of risk they are willing to bear; and (4) conflicts over
2004]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
tactics according to an expectation that they will meet again, and
settlements may reflect past traditions and the need for future
negotiations rather than the merits of the claims.9° This same
phenomenon of familiarity also occurs in individual tort litigation
where attorneys and insurance companies interact on a similar basis
and may adjust their behavior accordingly. Yet, mass torts amplify
the ramifications and potential for this type of conduct because the
litigation takes place in a common forum before a single judge and
affects numerous cases.
In all types of aggregated actions, lawyers representing similar
claims necessarily prepare the litigation on a group basis with little
personal client involvement.9 A small number of specialized and
well-funded lawyers may dominate the representation of certain
types of mass tort claimants through referrals, 92 reputation,
marketing, 93 and networking, and may litigate those claims before a
limited number of specialized judges.94 For example, in the Dalkon
Shield litigation, six attorneys represented 8,039 claimants (an
average of 1,340 each), and forty-three attorneys represented the
remaining 13,17 4 claimants.95 In the asbestos litigation, only a
relative handful of law firms represent the majority of asbestos
plaintiffs,96 and asbestos defense attorneys organized a single
consortium to negotiate common settlement plans.97
control of the litigation.
John C. Coffee, Jr.,' Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 370, 386 (2000).
89. Cooper, supra note 38, at 1951-52.
90. See id.
91. See Erichson, supra note 6, at 533.
92. When a law firm receives a client through referral, it must pay a forwarding
fee. When clients come directly to the firm, the firm may keep the entire legal fee.
Consequently, the law firm may favor its direct clients so it can keep a larger
portion of the settlement funds. See id. at 572.
93. Linda Mullenix suggests that third-generation mass tort litigation is more
aptly characterized not by the individually-injured plaintiff seeking representation,
but by attorneys conceiving the mass tort then finding clients. Linda S. Mullenix,
Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law Dispute
Resolution Paradigm, 33 Val. U.L. Rev. 413, 432-33 (1999).
94. Cooper, supra note 38, at 1951; Erichson, supra note 6, at 535.
95. Georgene M. Vairo, Reinventing Civil Procedure: Will the New Procedural
Regime Help Resolve Mass Torts?, 59 Brook. L. Rev. 1065, 1075 n.47 (1993).
96. Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal
Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 Brook. L. Rev. 961, 966 (1993).
97. Harry H. Wellington, Asbestos: The Private Management of a Public
Problem, 33 Clev. St. L. Rev. 375, 387-89 (1984). The group was first known as
the Asbestos Claims Facility; however, a smaller group, the Center for Claims
Resolution (CCR) replaced it and represented twenty-one corporations that
manufactured asbestos. Lawrence Fitzpatrick, The Center for Claims Resolution,
53 Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1990, at 13, 17.
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One of the main, but inadvertent, contributors to collusion is the
court.98 Because of the sizable number of the first atypical cases such
as asbestos, Agent Orange, and Dalkon Shield, mass torts pressured
courts to employ streamlined methods of resolution to prevent a
backlog of cases.9 9 At one point, mass tort claims comprised over
twenty-five percent of the entire civil caseload in some courts,10° and
in 1990, asbestos litigation represented seventy-five percent of all
new federal product liability claims. 1 Although the crisis really
arose only in the isolated setting of asbestos, some judges thought
that salvaging the federal docket warranted extreme case
management methods that might normally appear ill-conceived or
short-sighted.' °2
Defendants, plaintiffs, and the judiciary began to consolidate
mass tort cases through various means before a single court. 03
Individual judges exercised control over thousands of factually
similar cases. The most prominent examples include Judge Jack
Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York, who resolved over
240,000 Agent Orange claims;" Virginia's Eastern District judge,
Robert Merhige, who presided over 195,000 Dalkon Shield claims;'0 5
and Judge Charles Wiener of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
who oversaw approximately 106,696 asbestos claims.1°6 Bringing all
factually similar cases before the same judge combined with "repeat
player" attorneys and the need to resolve thousands of claims creates
fertile ground for the possibility of collusion between attorneys in
98. See generally Resnik, supra note 12, at 855(noting that the judge "is not the
disengaged arbiter coming fresh to the question of the quality of the outcome" but
"is often a participant in framing both the conditions under which negotiations have
occurred and sometimes proposing terms for the settlement itself"); Judith Resnik,
Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374, 379 (1982). A number of judges have
taken active roles in producing settlement. See generally Peter A. Schuck, Agent
Orange on Trial: Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts (1987) (describing the active
role that Judge Jack Weinstein took in resolving the Agent Orange litigation);
Sobol, supra note 72 (describing Judge Robert Merhige' s active participation in the
Dalkon Shield litigation).
99. Coffee, supra note 55, at 1359; Cramton, supra note 7, at 815.
100. Deborah R. Hensler et al., Asbestos in the Courts: The Challenge of Mass
Toxic Torts 24-29 (1985).
101. Deborah R. Hensler, Reading the Tort Litigation Tea Leaves: What's
Going on in the Civil Liability System?, 16 Just. Sys. J. 139, 147 (1993).
102. Coffee, supra note 55, at 1364.
103. Part II.C. further develops the methods for consolidation.
104. Schuck, supra note 98, at 205. Judge Weinstein sets forth his views about
the court's role in resolving toxic torts in Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of the Court
in Toxic Tort Litigation, 73 Geo. L.J. 1389 (1985); Weinstein, supra note 40, at
469.
105. Sobol, supra note 72, at 106.
106. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 36, at 8; see also In
re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 416 (J.P.M.L. 1991).
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reaching a settlement. Even though the majority of mass torts do not
threaten to gridlock the judicial system as did the asbestos, Dalkon
Shield, and Agent Orange cases, the visceral reaction caused by these
anomalies continues to influence the handling of all mass torts.
Although these latent injury claims are the most visible, the three
prerequisites for collusion-repeat players, common forum, and the
court's perception that mass torts may cause a caseload
backlog-may arise in any mass tort category.107
In the past, collusion in class settlements appeared in the form of
a "reverse auction," in which defendants, as the auctioneers, found
the lowest plaintiffs' bidder and settled with that particular
attorney.0 8 Increased judicial scrutiny of class action settlements
helps minimize the effect of the reverse auction in class actions.
However, the concept of issue preclusion still affects defendants'
incentives to settle or litigate and the reverse auction continues in
post-aggregation settlements.
Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, aims to avoid relitigating
issues. A new plaintiff who seeks to borrow a past finding of liability
against a particular defendant and apply it to the current action may
assert collateral estoppel offensively against the same defendant. As
the Supreme Court recognized in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,1° 9
"offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when the plaintiff seeks
to foreclose the defendant from litigating an issue the defendant has
previously litigated unsuccessfully in an action with anotherparty."110
Since federal courts permit nonmutual issue preclusion,' a mass
torts defendant who faces a growing number of cases arising out of
similar facts sees the first trial as a must win situation. Otherwise, a
court might allow similar plaintiffs to rely on the liability established
in the first trial to avoid relitigating the same issue. 12 Even if the
defendant loses subsequent trials, courts generally do not allow
plaintiffs to borrow the previous finding of liability where
107. Judges may also pursue settlement because they are disillusioned with trial
and the adversarial system. Resnik, supra note 1, at 939.
108. See Coffee, supra note 55, at 1370.
109. 439 U.S. 322, 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979).
110. Id. at 326 n.4, 99 S. Ct. at 649 n.4.
111. See id. at 330-32, 99 S. Ct. at 651-52. Nonmutual means that a plaintiff
who was not a party to the first action could borrow the finding from the first action
against the defendant and reapply it to that defendant.
112. The Supreme Court, in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, provided trial courts
with the discretion to allow issue preclusion based on analysis of whether the
nonparty could have joined the prior litigation, whether the subsequent litigation
was foreseeable at the time of the first suit so that the defendant could vigorously
defend the action, whether prior judgments against the same defendant are
consistent, and whether the defendant has different procedural opportunities in the
second action. Id. at 322, 99 S. Ct. at 652.
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inconsistent judgments exist.ll3 Once plaintiffs establish a scientific
causal link between, for example, a disease and exposure to a certain
product, then the settlement value of similar claims increases.' 1
4
Due to the high stakes of the first trial for the defendant, the
initial plaintiffs can exert more pressure on the defendant to settle." 5
The Prozac cases against manufacturer Eli Lilly provide an extreme
example of the lengths to which a defendant will go to avoid an
adverse judgment. In a secret quasi-settlement deal, 16 Eli Lilly
113. See id. at 330-32, 99 S. Ct. at 651-52; State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Century Home Components, 550 P.2d 1185, 1191 (Or. 1976); Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 29(4) (1982). Courts have refused to permit the use of
offensive collateral estoppel in a number of mass product defect cases because the
issue factually differed from the issue adjudicated in the first action. Roger H.
Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 779,
813 (1985). To succeed on offensive estoppel in such a case, the plaintiff must
show that the products were similar, as were the defects and the circumstances
surrounding its purchase and use. Id.
114. Coffee, supra note 55, at 1359.
115. One empirical study of four district courts showed that a race to file "might
be inferred from multiple filings of related claims." Thomas E. Willging, Laural
L. Hooper, & Robert J. Niemic, An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address
Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74,97-98 (1996). The study observed,
"the frequency and size of intradistrict consolidations, the frequency and size of
multidistrict litigation consolidations, and the frequency with which we found
related cases represent potential races to the courthouse." Id. at 98.
116. Many times litigants will premise a settlement on the inclusion of a
confidentiality agreement and/or order that prohibits the other side from disclosing
the terms and amounts of the settlement. Courts agree to confidentiality because
it encourages settlements and clears the court's docket. Proponents of
confidentiality favor settlement over trials. Those against confidentiality favor
public access to court records. In response to this debate, some state legislatures
attempted-with little success-to enact rules and statutes that create presumptions
in favor of public access to court records. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 69.081 (2003)
(stating "no court shall enter an order or judgment which has the purpose or effect
of concealing a public hazard or any information concerning a public hazard, nor
shall the court enter an order or judgment which has the purpose or effect of
concealing any information which may be useful to members of the public in
protecting themselves from injury which may result from the public hazard.").
Texas defined "court records" to include unfilled settlement agreements that "have
a probable adverse effect upon the general public health or safety, or the
administration of public office, or the operation of government." Tex. R. Civ. P.
76(a) (governing the sealing of court records). Even with broad statutes such as
these, litigants could privately contract for confidentiality and enforce the
confidentiality clause in a separate suit for breach of contract. These settlements
occur without judicial review or approval for fairness. See Pansy v. Borough of
Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Newman &
Holtzinger, P.C., 992 F.2d 932, 936-37 (9th Cir. 1993). Much of the information
in this footnote comes from Laurie Kratke Dor6, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and
Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 283
(1999), which provides a comprehensive overview of confidentiality in settlement
agreements and sealed records. For more information on confidentiality in
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reportedly paid twenty-eight plaintiffs not to introduce damaging
evidence at trial and not to appeal. 17 The deal resulted in a favorable
verdict for Eli Lilly, 8 positive press coverage, and a discouraging
effect on potential future claimants.'19
The collusive aspect of settlements in the aggregation setting can
arise when a state court class action settlement precludes litigation and
settlement of a federal court class action.1 21 If a state's class action
laws provide for less judicial oversight in the settlement context and
that settlement Rrecludes litigation of the same issues or settlement in
federal court,' then the notion of the reverse auction returns.
Defendants can again search for the lowest bidder. The Panel cannot
aggregate corresponding state court actions, only factually similar
federal court actions.121 If the state court class action settled the
litigation and the class representative in that action released all of the
claims against the defendant, then that release may have a broader
effect than even an adverse judgment in state court that set the bar for
other claims.2 3 The release could bar any federal claims that the party
referred to in state court. After the release, plaintiffs cannot relitigate
the same issues-including the fairness of the settlement-in federal
court.1 24 Federal courts must use state law to determine whether prior
state court litigation precludes federal litigation of an issue and must
settlements, see David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83
Geo. L.J. 2619, 2648-50 (1995).
117. Maureen Castellano, The Secret Deal That Won the Prozac Case, 140 N.J.
L.J. 377 (1995); Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 Mich. L.
Rev. 945, 958 (1998).
118. Potter v. Eli Lilly & Co., 926 S.W.2d 449,451-52 (Ky. 1996).
119. See Erichson, supra note 117, at 958.
120. A defendant cannot certify a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(1)(A) simply because collateral estoppel might bind the defendant on issues
of liability if a plaintiff wins a suit against the defendant. See In re Bendectin Prod.
Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984).
121. See generally Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Understanding State Contribution
Laws and Their Effect on the Settlement of Mass Tort Actions, 73 Tex. L. Rev.
1701, 1704 (1995) (noting the variations among state tort laws).
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
123. For more information on state court releases, see Eggen, supra note 121,
at 1714.
124. See Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1562 (3d Cir.
1994); Nottingham Partners v. Trans-Lux Corp., 925 F.2d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 1991)
("The release contained in the Dana settlement, by its terms, met all the criteria
necessary to engage the gears of the release defense for purposes of this suit: it (1)
applied to appellants, (2) encompassed the claims asserted below, and (3) was
legally enforceable. Since further prosecution of appellants' federal suit is
foreclosed by the release defense ... it would be pointless to discuss at any length
whether their action is also claim-precluded."); Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int'l, Inc.,




give state court determinations full faith and credit.z 5 Thus, plaintiffs
cannot bring issues decided by a state court in federal court. 26 With
judicial oversight in class actions, judges can identify factors
suggesting the reverse auction practice and can take measures to ensure
a just result. In non-class aggregated settlements, judges have no
authority to reject the settlement or inquire into its fairness.
C. The Current Piecemeal Approach to Consolidation
The potential for collusion, gauged in terms of repeat players, a
single forum, and a willing court, varies with the level of aggregation
and type of mass tort. Consolidation within a single district under Rule
42(a) could include repeat players and a single forum, but may not
exert as much pressure on the court as would multidistrict transfer by
the Panel. In short, the higher the number of mass tort claims, the
higher the chances of encountering specialized repeat players and
increasing the pressure on the court. Yet, collusion can occur at any
level of aggregation absent ajudicial duty to inquire into the settlement
terms. Aggregation occurs on various levels within district courts
through civil procedure rules, 127 and across district Courts through the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. 28 Although types of
aggregation differ, courts attempt to centrally manage mass torts
because of the considerable number of potential claimants, 12 complex
subject-matters, costs of litigation,"' delay in the judicial system,
forum-shopping, 133 fraudulent joinder,134 repetitive discovery,135
125. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S. Ct.
892, 896 (1984); Kremer v. Chem. Const. Corp. 456 U.S. 461,480-82, 102 S. Ct.
1883, 1896-98 (1982).
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000).
127. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
129. Working Group on Mass Torts, supra note 35, at 11. The high numbers of
claimants constitute one of the main reasons for implementing a comprehensive
aggregative procedure. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. The transaction costs of litigation may siphon limited funds available
for compensation away from plaintiffs and place the funds in the hands of the
attorneys or in the costs of discovery.
132. Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 1095 (2000); Working Group on Mass
Torts, supra note 35, at 11. Judge Parker observed in the Cimino asbestos litigation
that "[flour hundred and forty-eight members of the [Cimino] class have died
waiting for their cases to be heard." Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp.
649 (E.D. Tex. 1990), affid in part, vacated in part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998).
133. Working Group on Mass Torts, supra note 35, at 11. Forum shopping may
result in a "reverse auction" where a defendant uses competing plaintiff attorneys
to reach the most favorable settlement terms then seeks a court that will approve the
settlement. Id.
134. Id.; James F. Jorden, Selected Issues Concerning Removal and MDL
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coercion to settle despite weak evidence,1 36 difficult choice-of-law
issues, 137 and limited compensation funds. 138 Because tort law
developed from judicial efforts to resolve cases on an individual
basis,' the procedural mechanisms for aggregation reflect the effort
to tailor the process to individuals. Creative judges have stretched
procedural mechanisms such as removal, 4 ° Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 42, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and aggregation
and/or consolidation through the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation 4' in an attempt to manage mass torts. However, this
piecemeal approach lacks the safeguards to prevent settlement
collusion.
1. Federal Jurisdiction
A number of mass tort cases reach federal court through the
removal process. 4 2 Because plaintiffs select the initial forum, they
frequently prefer to file in state court due to a perception of
prejudice against corporate defendants, a relaxed approach to class
certification, and jurors willing to return large monetary verdicts
against the defendant.'43 Although federal judges read removal
statutes narrowly and resolve doubts in favor of not removing a
case,144 a defendant may remove the case or cases to federal court
Considerations in Class Litigation, 635 PLI/Lit 129, 135 (2000). Some plaintiffs
join marginal defendants in an attempt to defeat federal diversity jurisdiction and
keep cases in state rather than federal court.
135. Working Group on Mass Torts, supra note 35, at 11 (1999); Schwarzer et
al., supra note 36, at 1550. On one hand premature consolidation may lead to too
little discovery by precluding innovative individual attempts. On the other hand,
delayed consolidation can result in repetitive discovery and inconsistent pretrial
motions on issues such as admissibility and privilege.
136. Working Group on Mass Torts, supra note 35, at 11. Defendants may feel
coerced into settlement even when weak scientific evidence of causation exists
because of the sheer number of plaintiffs. See infra Part V.C.
137. Working Group on Mass Torts, supra note 35, at 11. For more information
on the choice-of-law in transfer and diversity cases, see Richard L. Marcus,
Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal Judicial System, 93
Yale L.J. 677, 682-86 (1984); Schwarzer et al., supra note 36, at 1544-46.
138. Working Group on Mass Torts, supra note 35, at 11.
139. Dobbs, supra note 132, at 1095.
140. 28 U.S.C. §1446 (2000).
141. Id. § 1407.
142. See id. § 1441.
143. Jorden, supra note 134, at 135.
144. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 107-09, 61 S. Ct. 868,
871-72 (1941); Spectacor Mgmt. Group v. Brown, 131 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 1997);
Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1505 (1 1th Cir. 1996); Bums v. Windsor Ins. Co.,
31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (1 1th Cir. 1994); Tech Hills II Assocs. v. Phoenix Home Life
Mut. Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 963,968 (6th Cir. 1993); Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp.,
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if: (1) the plaintiff could have originally filed the claim case in
federal court as a question under a federal statute, 45 (2) if diversity
exists, 46 or (3) even to join claims validly in federal court.'
Plaintiffs may attempt to overcome removal by including a non-
diverse defendant, waiving claims in excess of $75,000, and
explicitly renouncing all federal claims. 48  Defendants tend to
counter these efforts by alleging fraudulent joinder, aggregating the
damages to calculate the amount in controversy, and realigning the
parties with their real interests in the case. 149
In the past, federal courts used the All Writs Act 5° to remove
state cases to federal court and to enjoin parallel state court
proceedings that hindered the federal judge's ability to finalize a
global settlement in mass tort cases.15' The Second Circuit
employed the All Writs Act to remove additional Agent Orange
litigation to federal court when a group of veterans brought claims
in state court alleging that they did not discover their injuries until
after the federal class action settlement date. 152 Subsequently, the
677 F.2d 571, 576 (7th Cir. 1982).
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (granting district courts original jurisdiction over
disputes arising out of the laws of the United States); Id. § 1441(b) (allowing
removal where original jurisdiction exists).
146. Id. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction); Id. § 1441(c) (removal). District courts
have original jurisdiction where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, and
the controversy arises between citizens of different states, citizens of a state and
citizens or subjects of a foreign state, citizens of different states and in which
citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties, or a foreign state is a
plaintiff and citizens of a state or of different states.
147. Id. § 1441(c). Section 1452, title twenty-eight, governs bankruptcy
removal. Section 1446, title twenty-eight, sets forth the procedure for removing
claims.
148. Jorden, supra note 134, at 140.
149. Id. Judges created the doctrine of fraudulent joinder to prevent plaintiffs
from joining a non-diverse defendant where the plaintiff has no possibility of
proving a cause of action against that defendant. Id. at 141.
150. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000). This Act states:
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may
issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
(b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of
a court which has jurisdiction.
Id.
151. Georgene M. Vairo, An Update on Removal, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 14, 2002, at
B8. A number of courts formerly embraced the All Writs Act to enjoin and remove
parallel state court litigation. See In re VMS Sec. Litig., 103 F.3d 1317, 1323-26
(7th Cir. 1996); Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993).
Others have refrained from using the All Writs Act in this manner. See Henson v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp, 261 F.3d 1065 (1 1th Cir. 2001), affid, 537 U.S. 28, 123 S. Ct.
366 (2002); Hillman v. Webley, 115 F.3d 1461 (10th Cir. 1997).
152. See Agent Orange, 996 F.2d at 1425. The court also relied on the
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Second Circuit dismissed their claims as barred by the previous
settlement and denied a motion to remand the action to state
court."'53 In its denial, the court invoked its "All Writs" authority to
retain jurisdiction over an otherwise non-removable state court
action to "effectuate and prevent the frustration of orders it has
previously issued in its exercise of jurisdiction otherwise
obtained."'54
The Supreme Court, in Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v.
Henson,'55 ended this practice of using the All Writs Act to remove
cases to federal court that did not qualify for original federal
jurisdiction."5 6 Now federal courts may remove state court cases to
prevent frustration of orders only if the federal court would have
had original subject-matter jurisdiction over the case.' 7 The Court
also held that a federal court's retention of jurisdiction over settled
class action suits did not give it the authority to remove parallel
state court actions under its ancillary jurisdiction even when a
previously agreed to settlement provision required the case's
dismissal.'58 If future state court cases frustrate the settlement of
mass torts in federal courts, the federal court must find a means by
which it can assert original jurisdiction before enjoining the state
court action.
multidistrict litigation statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
153. Agent Orange, 996 F.2d at 1439.
154. Id. at 1431 (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co. 434 U.S. 159, 172
(1977). After the Supreme Court issued the Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v.
Henson decision, the Court remanded the Agent Orange litigation for
reconsideration in light of its decision. On remand, Judge Weinstein upheld the
removal and dismissal of the claims. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 304 F.
Supp. 2d 442 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). Rather than finding original jurisdiction through
diversity or federal question, Judge Weinstein determined that original federal
jurisdiction was proper under the federal "officer removal" statute. Id. The officer
removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (2000), requires a defendant to demonstrate
that it is a "person" within the meaning of the statute, that a causal connection exists
between the charged conduct and the asserted official authority, and a colorable
claim to a federal-law defense. Id. at 446. Because the defendants acted under
federal officers within the meaning of the officer removal statute when they
manufactured and delivered the herbicide to the Department of Defense and raised
a government contractor defense, the federal district court claimed jurisdiction. Id.
at 445.
155. 537 U.S. 28, 123 S. Ct. 366 (2002).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 33, 123 S. Ct. at 370.
158. Id. at 34, 123 S. Ct. at 371. The Court reiterated its statement in Peacock
v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 355, 116 S. Ct. 862, 867 (1996), that a "court must have
jurisdiction over a case or controversy before it may assert jurisdiction over
ancillary claims." Henson, 537 U.S. at 34, 123 S. Ct. at 371. Consequently,
ancillary jurisdiction could not provide the original jurisdiction that the parties
needed to qualify for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Id.
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Once a federal court retains proper jurisdiction over one case
that relates factually to a larger mass tort action, the court can exert
supplemental jurisdiction over the related claims so long as they
form part of the same case or controversy under Article I.
1 59
Supplemental jurisdiction permits federal diversity jurisdiction if
one plaintiff meets the $75,000 minimum. 16' After a single plaintiff
meets the minimum amount in controversy requirement, putative
class members may "piggyback" on that claim even through their
individual claims do not meet the minimum requirement.
16
2. Aggregation
Once federal courts have jurisdiction over one mass tort case,
aggregation of factually similar cases can occur through three means.
First, the litigants, usually the plaintiffs, can move to certify a class
action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.162 Second, if
actions are pending in multiple federal courts, the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation can, on its own motion or a motion by a party,
consolidate and transfer cases "involving one or more common
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000).
160. Id. § 1332.
161. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599,
607 (7th Cir. 1997); In re Abbott Labs, 51 F.3d 524, 527-29 (5th Cir. 1995).
Section 1367 overruled Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 292, 294, 94 S. Ct.
505, 507, 508 (1973), to the extent that all class members need not satisfy the
minimum jurisdictional amount. Stromberg Metal Works v. Mress Mech., Inc, 77
F.3d 928,930 (7th Cir. 1996);Abbott, 51 F.3d at 529; see also 1 J. Moore, Moore's
Federal Practice [ 0.97[5] (Supp.) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 expressly
overrules Zahn). But see Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co, 166 F.3d 214
(3d Cir. 1999); Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631 (10th Cir. 1998); Crosby
v. Am. Online, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 257, 263 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Bernard v. Gerber
Food Prods. Co., 938 F. Supp. 218, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Waters v. Grosfeld, 904
F. Supp. 616, 620 (E.D. Mich. 1995); In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 866 F. Supp.
406, 413 (D. Minn. 1994). For more information on the effect of supplemental
jurisdiction, see Mark C. Cawley, Note, The Right Result for the Wrong Reasons:
Permitting Aggregation of Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 in Multi-Plaintiff
Diversity Litigation, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1045 (1998); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,
Debate over § 1367: Defining the Power to Define Federal Judicial Power, 41
Emory L.J. 13 (1992); Jonathan R. Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts
to Certify Questions of State Law, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1672 (2003); James E.
Pfander, The Simmering Debate Over Supplemental Jurisdiction, 2002 U. I11. L.
Rev. 1209 (2002); Joan Steinman, Supplemental Jurisdiction in § 1441 Removed
Cases: An Unsurveyed Frontier of Congress' Handiwork, 35 Ariz. L. Rev. 305
(1993). Section 1367(d) does not, however, toll the limitations period for state law
claims that plaintiffs asserted against non-consenting state defendants that a court
dismisses on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn.,
534 U.S. 533, 546, 122 S. Ct. 999, 1007 (2002).
162. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
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questions of fact" to a single district court for pretrial purposes.163
Third, if multiple, but related, actions are pending in a single federal
district, then that court may use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a)
to consolidate, for pretrial and trial, actions "involving a common
question of law or fact" to avoid "unnecessary costs or delay. ' 164
Each method of aggregation contains unique prerequisites. A
district court may consolidate actions under Rule 42(a) if they
163. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000).
164. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
165. Methods of Consolidation and Their Requirements:
Who May What May be
Type Consolidate When Duration Consolidated
Fed. R. District When an Pretrial or Cases pending in
Civ. P. Court action trial the same district




28 Judicial When civil Pretrial Cases pending in
U.S.C. § Panel on actions any federal court








Fed. R. Litigant When Post- Cases pending in
Civ. P. questions of certificati any court, state
23(b)(3) law or fact on or federal, and
common to pretrial, potential
the class trial, and claimants so
predominate settlement long as notice
over any provisions are
questions satisfied and the
affecting only claimant does
individual not "opt-out" of












involve "a common question of law or fact."'" Similarly, the Panel
may consolidate pending actions if they concern "one or more
common questions of fact. ' 161 Yet, for the parties to consolidate
mass torts under the class action mechanism of Rule 23(b)(3), the
common questions of law or fact must predominate over questions
affecting only individual class members and the class action
procedure must provide the superior mechanism for resolution.
61
Despite the variance in consolidation requirements, aggregating mass
torts generally produces the same principal effect: settlement. 69
Although aggregation frequently produces the uniform effect of
settlement and, consequently, the consistent danger .of collusion,
federal judges can supervise and validate only settlements with
certified classes. 7 ° Data indicates that most mass tort claimants do
not allege class status.' 7' Overall, torts account for less than one-fifth
of class action activity in the United States.' 72 Only about forty-one
percent of multidistrict litigation motions involving product liability
mass torts alleged class status.'73 One study, which traced forty-three
mass product defect and mass accident cases brought before the Panel
in the 1990s found that litigants collectively settled sixty percent of
166. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
167. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000).
168. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's
note. Like the vast majority of the law, determining the superior consolidation
method for mass torts depends largely upon subjective opinion. Because the
consolidation mechanisms convey various concerns, the policies underlying the
class action mechanism shed light on when it becomes the superior method for
resolution of certain types of mass torts. As Parts IV and V further discuss,
Congress and the courts may derogate in practice from effectuating these policy
concerns in settlements. Rule 23 mirrors the overall tort goals of fairness and
efficiency. The 2003 revisions to Rule 23(e) implicitly recognize that impending
certification most often results in settlement and attempts to balance the resulting
impulse toward expediency and efficiency with a countervailing requirement of
fairness. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), (f).
169. See Cramton, supra note 7, at 819; See McNeil & Fanscal, supra note 19,
at 489.
170. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), (g)(2)(a).
171. Hensler, supra note 1, at 900. "Since the panel's inception, about thirty-
five percent of all the motions decided included cases with class status claims; in
mass product defect cases, the fraction with class claims was somewhat higher, at
forty-one percent." Id.
172. Id. at 893.
173. Id. at 900. Only about thirty-five percent of all the motions brought before
the Panel alleged class status. Id. Despite a hesitancy, that stems perhaps from the
1966 advisory committee warning that the class action mechanism may not
appropriately resolve mass accidents, the class action mechanism may provide a
good fit for addressing the needs of non-latent personal injury type of dispersed
mass torts. See Davis, supra note 32, at 163. Product liability actions can include




those cases.174 Yet, only about half of those settlements occurred
within the protections of the class action framework.'75 Mass torts,
particularly dispersed mass torts with latent effects like asbestos, may
not qualify for class treatment since common issues may not
predominate 7 6 or certification may not provide the superior 177 means
for resolution.
For mass torts that do fit within the class action framework, the
2003 amendment to Rule 23(e) and (g) ensures greater judicial
scrutiny of settlements. 17' By encouraging the court to designate
interim counsel during the pre-certification period to protect the
interests of the putative class, the new Rule 23 advisory committee's
note explicitly recognized that "[s]ettlement may be discussed before
certification," and that "an attorney who negotiates a pre-certification
settlement must seek a settlement that is fair, reasonable, and
adequate for the class."'179 Revised Rule 23 allocated additional
power to the judiciary to oversee the conduct of the class action
174. See Hensler, supra note 1.
175. Id.
176. To determine whether common questions of law or fact predominate over
individual issues, the Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) recommends that the
court:
" determine whether the alleged injuries arose from a single incident and
therefore might be more likely to have common issues predominate than
in a dispersed mass tort;
" focus "on the legal or factual questions that qualify each class member's
case as a genuine controversy";
" look for variations in individual factual issues that may arise out of
different levels and timing of exposure, different types of injuries and
levels of damages, and different issues of causation; and
" consider whether "[dlifferences in state law . . . compound [any]
disparities."
Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth), supra note 36, § 22.921, at 452 (internal
citations omitted).
177. To evaluate whether the class action mechanism provides the superior
means, as compared to other available methods, for the fair and efficient resolution
of the actions, the Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) recommends that the
judge consider:
" whether the proposed settlement is manageable;
" whether, given the individual stakes for members of the proposed class,
potential class members have an interest in "individuaily controlling the
prosecution . . . of separate actions," recognizing that, as the amount of
damages at stake increases, a class member's interest in individual control
typically increases; and
" whether other settlements have been presented to other courts, and if so,
the status of those actions and whether any determinations in other courts
might preclude certification of the class proposed.
Id. § 22.921, at 452-53 (internal citations omitted).
178. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), (g).
179. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g) advisory committee's note.
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settlement and contemplated the now commonplace practice of filing
a proposed class action simultaneously with motions to certify the
class for settlement purposes only. 8 ° However, the revisions also
clarified and seemingly limited the court's authority to scrutinize
settlements that it does not actually certify. The Manual for Complex
Litigation (Third) advised that "[a]pproval is required of the
settlement of any action brought as a class action, regardless of
whether the settlement occurs prior to certification, and even if the
only claims being settled are those of the individual plaintiffs;"'
8
'1
however, the new advisory committee's note indicated that Rule
23(e) only requires scrutiny of certified class settlements.18 2
Presumably, the amended rule still permits courts to approve non-
certified settlements at its discretion.
Litigants may agree on settlement terms at various times during
the course of the class action such as after certification, after pretrial
discovery and pretrial motions, but before the certification hearing,
or after parties move to certify the class for settlement at the same
time as they move to approve the specified settlement terms. 83 The
court must make two determinations when reviewing any proposed
settlement in the class action context. First, it must decide whether
the proposed settlement class meets the certification criteria in Rule
23(a) (numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation)" s as well as one of the three subdivisions under
180. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) advisory committee's note ("Notice of a settlement
binding on the class is required either when the settlement follows class
certification or when the decisions on certification and settlement proceed
simultaneously.").
181. Manual for Complex Litigation (Third) § 30.41, at 237 (1995).
182. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) advisory committee's note.
183. Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth), supra note 36, § 22.9021, at 450.
184. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) specifies four requirements for every
class action:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are common questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
The 1966 revision of this rule adopted a pragmatic approach to class treatment
and listed four functional reasons for the class action: (1) preventing serious
litigation-related unfairness for both defendants and class members, (2) ensuring
remedial efficacy, (3) promoting law enforcement, and (4) facilitating litigation
efficiency. Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the
Substantive Merits, 51 Duke L. J. 1251, 1259-60 (2002). Adequacy of class
representation has also developed into a heavily litigated area. The analysis to
determine whether class representation is adequate asks first "whether any
substantial conflicts of interest exist between the representatives and the class," and
second "whether the representatives will adequately prosecute the action." In re
2004]
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23(b).' Second, according to Rule 23(e), the court must conduct a
hearing to verify the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the
settlement terms.'86 The first criterion of meeting the requirements
of Rule 23(a) and (b) becomes particularly important in "certify-to-
settle" cases, where a party simultaneously files a motion for
certification and a motion for settlement approval. 8 7 In this situation,
the court may not have sufficient information to make the required
findings under Rule 23(e).188
Because of the court's duty under Rule 23(e) to protect absent
class members, the parties cannot settle a class action without judicial
Healthsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.R.D. 447,460-61 (N.D. Ala. 2003). To defeat
a party's claim to class certification, the conflict must be "fundamental" and
targeted at the specific issues in controversy. 7A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1768, at 326-27 (2d ed. 1986). When
certain class claims are harmed by the same conduct that benefits others, a
fundamental conflict exists. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 350 F.3d
1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2003).
185. See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,620,117 S. Ct. 2231,
2248 (1997). Plaintiffs may opt to use Rule 23(b)(1) where a multitude of individual
plaintiffs might create inconsistent standards or impair the interests of nonparties. A
court may certify a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) if "the party opposing the class
has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class," which would
make injunctive or declaratory relief applicable to the entire class. Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(2). Plaintiffs should not employ this type of action if they seek monetary
damages since the drafters envisioned this section as a suitable means for adjudicating
civil rights, consumer rights, and patent rights. Rule 23(b)(3) applies when questions
of law or fact common to the entire class predominate over questions affecting
individual class members and the class action is the superior method for adjudication.
Mass torts litigants typically attempt to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3).
To determine the superiority of a class action under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must
make specific findings to determine:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against
members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; [and] (D) the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The courts have not clarified the amount of proof needed to
satisfy the certification requirements; however, courts should at least require a
preponderance of the evidence. L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Comment, Between "Merit
Inquiry" and "Rigorous Analysis:" Using Daubert to Navigate the Gray Areas of
Federal Class Action Certification, 31 Fla. St. Univ. L. Rev. 1041.
186. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(c).
187. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620, 117 S. Ct. at 2248.
188. The Supreme Court, in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, id., and in Ortiz
v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831-32, 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2307-08 (1999),
highlighted the need for the judge to determine the adequacy of the representation.
Consequently, the judge should examine the motives and interests of the various
groups, including future claimants, and decide whether counsel has any conflicting
interests.
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consent. 189 To counterbalance the impulse toward efficiency by all
of the key players (plaintiff, defendant, and judge), Rule 23(e)
imposes the countervailing requirement that the court conduct an
inquiry into the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the
proposed settlement.' 90 Where parties seek simultaneous certification
and settlement approval, courts "must be even more scrupulous than
usual" and apply heightened scrutiny when examining the proposed
settlement's fairness.' Consequently, the class certification process
provides more security for mass tort claimants who may have little
motive or ability to monitor their attorneys during settlement because
of their nominal attorney-client relationship and /or because they have
experiences only the initial symptoms of injury.
This relative security of aggregation through the class certification
framework disappears when the court refuses to certify the class and
either a court consolidates cases through Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 42(a) or the Panel transfers cases for "coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings."' 92 Rule 42 promotes the goal of
efficiency by allowing a court to consolidate actions within its district
(including different divisions) when the actions involve common
questions of law or fact and consolidation "may tend to avoid
unnecessary cost or delay."'193 To consolidate under Rule 42, the
actions need not contain identical issues since the court may choose to
consolidate only the common questions then allow the actions to
proceed individually on distinct issues. 94 Some courts have used Rule
42(a) to require plaintiffs to file one unified complaint to promote a
simplified management system, streamline judicial management, and
reduce the proliferation of papers typically filed in consolidated
189. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(3)(1)(A).
190. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 805 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Rule 23(e) imposes on the trial judge the duty of
protecting absentees, which is executed by the court's assuring the settlement
represents adequate compensation for the release of the class claims.").
191. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620, 119 S. Ct. at 2248; see also Gen. Motors Corp.
Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank, 55 F.3d at 805.
192. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000). The parties could still move for class status after
consolidation by the Panel.
193. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). The court may, under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(b), transfer
cases, motions, or hearings pending in the same district to a single division. Part
V.B. more thoroughly discusses the criteria for evaluating the fairness of
settlements. For more information on the history of Rule 42(a) and how it worked
in conjunction with section 1407 and 1404 before the Supreme Court's Lexecon
decision, see Gregory R. Harris, Note, Consolidation and Transfer in the Federal
Courts: 28 U.S.C. Section 1407 Viewed in Light of Rule 42(a) and 28 U.S.C.
Section 1404(a), 22 Hastings L.J. 1289 (1971).
194. See Masterson v. Atherton, 223 F. Supp. 407,408-10 (D. Conn.) (granting
request for consolidation of wrongful death and personal injury actions arising from
the same event), affid, 328 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1963).
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cases.' 95 To decide whether to exert their discretionary powers of
consolidation, courts typically engage in a balancing test that weighs
the time and effort saved for the parties, witnesses, and the court
against any inconvenience, delay, or additional ex ense that litigants
would incur by having to attend the same trial.' 9 - Judges generally
decline to consolidate cases when it would confuse the jury or
prejudice one or more of the parties. 97
Judge Carl B. Rubin used Rule 42 to consolidate more than five
hundred cases for trial in the Bendectin litigation (a morning sickness
drug that allegedly caused birth defects)." After discovery, the court
consolidated the cases for trial on all common issues of liability.199
If the plaintiffs established liability, then the court would remand the
cases to the transferor district for damages. 200 However, the court
eventually decided to trifurcate the trial and submit only the question
of causation to the jury.2°' Should the plaintiffs prove causation, then
the jury could hear the issue of liability. After a jury was assembled,
some of the parties requested that the court certify a mandatory class
for settlement purposes only under Rule 23(b)(1), the limited fund
provision.2 °2 With a settlement offer on the table, the court recessed
195. Murphy, supra note 32, at 597-98 ("One of the important factors for any
transferee judge, and one of the primary reasons multidistrict cases are consolidated
for pretrial purposes, is to promote efficient use of judicial and other resources..
• The unified complaint guarantees a simplified management system and avoids the
problems of selecting one lead case to be representative of all cases filed."); see
also Katz v. Realty Equities Corp., 521 F.2d 1354, 1358-62 (2d Cir. 1975); In re
Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 161, 176-78 (C.D. Ca.
1976).
196. 7C Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 2283 (1972); see also Arnold v. E. Airlines, Inc., 681 F.2d 186, 193 (4th Cir.
1982) (holding that the court must balance competing interests before
consolidating); Stein, Hall & Co. v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 264 F. Supp.
499, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (providing the basic tests for balancing factors to
determine whether to consolidate).
197. See, e.g., Dupont v. S. Pac. Co., 366 F.2d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 1996)
(requiring the district court to ensure that rights of the parties are not prejudiced by
consolidation); Bradley v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 88 F.R.D. 307,(E.D. Wis. 1980)
(stating that where the prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value, courts
should not consolidate).
198. In re "Bendectin" Prod. Liab. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 239 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
199. In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 295 (6th Cir. 1988). The court also
appointed a Lead Counsel Committee and selected only some of the plaintiffs
attorneys. Id. at 297.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 296.
202. A limited fund is a fund "from which the plaintiffs could be compensated
for their claims and therefore adjudications by earlier plaintiffs could 'as a practical
matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members [of the class] not parties
to the adjudications."' In re Bendectin Prod. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 305 (6th
Cir. 1984). A number of courts endorsed the limited fund theory under Rule
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the trial and certified the class for settlement purposes only.203 The
Sixth Circuit reversed the certification decision because the district
court did not conduct a fact-finding inquiry into whether a limited
fund would subvert some of the plaintiffs' rights. 2' After the Sixth
Circuit decertified the class, the district court rescheduled the trial in
the same trifurcated manner. The jury held that the plaintiffs did not
establish causation.0 5 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit approved the
consolidated trial and noted, "to have broadened the issues beyond
that of causation would have occasioned a real risk of over-
encumbering the jurors and impairing their ability to reach a
knowledgeable and intelligent verdict based upon the evidence...
"206 A number of the cases proceeded individually in state and
federal courts. Although one firm represented most of the plaintiffs,
they lost the majority of the cases because they still put forth only
weak scientific evidence of causation. 0 7
Litigants and courts may use Rule 42(a) in conjunction with title
28, section 1404(a) or section 1406 to transfer cases to other federal
districts.0 8 Under these statutes, a court in which an original action
was filed may transfer cases to another district for trial if the
transferee forum satisfies the personal jurisdiction and venue
requirements.2° Once the original courts transfer multiple cases to
23(b)(1)(B). See In re N. Dist. of CA, Dalkon Shield IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 1982); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D.
718, 725 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
203. Bendectin, 749 F.2d at 302.
204. Id. at 306. In its order, the Sixth Circuit observed:
Although we shall issue the writ [vacating the certification order], we
realize that the district judge has been faced with some very difficult
problems in this case, and we certainly do not fault him for attempting to
use this unique and innovative certification method. On pure policy
grounds, the district judge's decision may be commendable, and several
commentators have argued that Rule 23 should be used in this manner.
Id. at 307; see also Note, Class Certification of Mass Accident Cases Under Rule
23(b)(1), 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1143 (1983).
205. Bendectin, 857 F.2d at 296.
206. Id. at 326.
207. See Paul D. Rheingold, Mass Tort Litigation § 5:15 (2003).
208. See generally Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation § 5.32, at
86-88 (1969). For a historic overview of the interaction, see Harris, supra note
193, at 1301; Martin I. Kaminsky, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation:
Emerging Problems and Current Trends of Decision, 23 Syracuse L. Rev. 817, 819
(1972). For information on the legislative history of section 1404(a), see Marcus,
supra note 137, at 710.
209. See, e.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Turtur, 743 F. Supp. 260, 263
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Cote v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981, 984 (7th Cir. 1986); Shutte v.
Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 24 (3d Cir. 1970); Dubin v. United States, 380
F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1967). Even if plaintiffs consent to the change of forum, a court
cannot transfer the proceedings if the transferee court does not have personal
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a single district, the parties may request consolidation pursuant to
Rule 42(a).
More commonly, however, the Panel orders the aggregation
and/or consolidation of pending cases in multiple district courts under
title 28, section 1407.21p Although section 1407 gives the transferee
court jurisdiction for pretrial purposes only, as a practical matter, the
transferee court does not have to remand the overwhelming majority
of cases since most terminate after consolidation.1 Statistics show
that after the Panel aggregates cases for pretrial purposes, parties
settle seventy-four percent of them, and litigate only twenty-six
percent.1 2
III. HISTORICAL PURPOSE AND FUNCTION OF THE JUDICIAL PANEL
ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
Although aggregation through multidistrict litigation (MDL) now
provides the predominant method for coordinating complex litigation
in general, and mass torts in particular, the Panel did not utilize
section 1407's full potential until the 1990s. This section traces the
development of the Panel and explains the purposes, functions, and
goals intended by both the judiciary and Congress." 3 It also begins
to map the lower courts' budding need for increased efficiency in
response to mass tort litigation.
A. Initial Policy Concerns
Conceptually, the Panel developed from the creation of a
Coordinating Committee by the Judicial Conference of the United
jurisdiction over the plaintiff. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 80 S. Ct. 1084
(1960).
210. Rheingold, supra note 24, at 398.
211. See Hensler, supra note 1; see also Howard, supra note 1, at 480 (noting that
the Panel remanded only 2,600 out of 16,700 total actions brought before in the
1980s); Resnik, supra note 1, at 928. In 1997, Judge Weigel observed that the
remand rate to transferor courts was only five percent. Weigel, supra note 1, at 583.
212. Hensler, supra note 1.
213. For an in-depth analysis of the Panel's history and the history of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407, see Comment, The Judicial Panel and the Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation,
87 Harv. L. Rev. 1001 (1973) [hereinafter Comment, Conduct of Multidistrict
Litigation]; Comment, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation: Embryonic
Guidelines for the Consolidation of Pretrial Proceedings, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 786,
787-92 (1969) [hereinafter Comment, Embryonic Guidelines]; Harris, supra note 193,
at 1307; Kaminsky, supra note 208, at 818; John T. McDermott, The Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation, 57 F.R.D. 215 (1973); Blake M. Rhodes, Comment, The
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 711, 713 (1991); Mike
Roberts, Multidistrict Litigation and the Judicial Panel, Transfer and Tag-Along
Orders Prior to a Determination of Remand: Procedural and Substantive Problem
or Effective Judicial Public Policy?, 23 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 841, 844 (1993).
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States.214 At the Conference's request, Chief Justice Earl Warren
instituted the Committee in 1962 to streamline the judicial response
to an avalanche of electrical equipment antitrust cases and to dispel
fears that duplication of pretrial efforts would create lengthy
discovery delays.2 5  The Judicial Conference and Chief Justice
Warren asked the committee to efficiently and economically resolve
the nearly 2,000 separate antitrust actions filed against the electrical
equipment manufacturers in thirty-six different courts. 216  In
response, the Committee scheduled a unified national discovery and
transferred the consolidated cases for trial.217  The Committee
reduced the 2,000 cases to nine trials, only five of which continued
until judgment.1 8
As evidenced by his later remark to the American Law Institute
in 1967, "[o]ur alarm was understandably great and makes equally
understandable the measure of my satisfaction in being able to report
that every single one of those cases has been terminated, 2 19
Chief Justice Warren was primarily concerned with expeditious
resolution. Despite the speed of resolution, the Coordinating
Committee process, which often required thirty or more judges to
convene in one location, did not fulfill the corresponding need for
efficiency.22 ° Consequently, when the Committee drew on its
experience to draft, for the Judicial Conference, the statute that
created the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, it endeavored
to improve the efficiency of pretrial proceedings.22' Yet, at that
time, the Committee concluded that the existing mechanisms of
transfer under title 28, section 1404(a) and consolidation pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) sufficiently addressed the
214. The Coordinating Committee included Alfred P. Murrah, Chairman, then
Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit; Sylvester J. Ryan, then Chief Judge of the
Southern District of New York; Thomas J. Clary, then Chief Judge of the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania; Roszel C. Thomsen, then Chief Judge of the District of
Maryland; Joe E. Estes, then Chief Judge of the Northern District of Texas; Judge
William B. Bums of the Central District of California; Chief Judge William H.
Becker of the Western District of Missouri; Judge George H. Boldt of the Western
District of Washington; and Judge Edwin A. Robson of the Northern District of
Illinois. McDermott, supra note 213, at 215.
215. See H.R. Rep. No. 1130, at 3 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1899;
see also Rhodes, supra note 213, at 713. The electrical equipment cases consisted
of over 1,900 related, private antitrust actions against the electrical equipment
manufacturers.
216. McDermott, supra note 213, at 215.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 215-16.
219. Chief Justice Earl Warren, Address to the American Law Institute (May 16,
1967).




problems of multiple trials after the completion of pretrial
proceedings.222
In the House Report on the bill, which became title 28, section
1407,223 the Judiciary Committee explained that the policy behind the
statute served dual functions:
The objective of the legislation is to provide centralized
management under court supervision of pretrial proceedings of
multidistrict litigation to assure the "just and efficient conduct"
of such actions. The committee believes that the possibility for
conflict and duplication in discovery and other pretrial
procedures in related cases can be avoided or minimized by
such centralized management.224
Section 1407 implicitly assumes, by coordinating pretrial discovery,
that transfer will avoid delay, repetition, and duplication and will
instead resolve related claims efficiently and economically. 2 Congress
concluded that the statute would promote both justice and efficiency
though streamlined, less repetitive discovery.22' Although the House
Report and the text of the statute itself purport to "promote the just and
efficient conduct" of the action,227 the primary motive prompting the
passage of section 1407-the need to prevent an overburdened federal
docket-indicates that the actual scale tips toward efficiency rather than
justice. This same desire for efficiency and prompt resolution makes
settlement a welcome alternative to multiple adjudications of difficult
choice-of-law issues and complex scientific evidentiary issues that often
arise in mass torts.228
222. McDermott, supra note 213, at 216.
223. The text of the multidistrict litigation statute reads in part:
(a) When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are
pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district
for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be
made by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation authorized by this
section upon its determination that transfers for such proceedings will be for
the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and
efficient conduct of such actions. Each action so transferred shall be
remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial
proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have
been previously terminated: Provided, however, That the panel may
separate any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim and
remand any of such claims before the remainder of the action is remanded.
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000); see also Comment, Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation,
supra note 213, at 1011.
224. H.R. Rep. No. 1130, at 2-3 (1968); see also S. Rep. No. 454 (1968).
225. McDermott, supra note 213, at 217.
226. See, e.g., In re Multidistrict Civil Antitrust Actions Involving the Distrib.
of Scotch Whiskey, 299 F. Supp. 543 (J.P.M.L. 1969).
227. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000).




Ideally, Panel members should counterbalance the impulse
toward expediency. The Chief Justice of the United States designates
seven circuit and district court judges as Panel members. 22' The
Panel does not act simply as a judicial steering committee that
reroutes claims to certain districts. Instead, the judges exercise
considerable discretion over whether to aggregate and/or consolidate
a group of cases proposed for multidistrict litigation and may
transfer cases on their own initiative or by request of one of the
parties. 3° Unlike district courts that consolidate cases under Rule
42,231 the Panel is not limited by venue requirements since the
transfer applies only to pretrial proceedings.232 The two criteria for
deciding to transfer cases are whether the transfer "will be for the
convenience of the parties and witnesses and will promote the just
and efficient conduct of such actions. 233
As interpreted by the Panel in light of Congress's intent, a
transfer order should eliminate duplicative discovery, prevent
conflicting rulings, minimize litigation costs, and reduce time and
effort of the claimants, attorneys, witnesses, and courts.23 ' The
legislative history of section 1407 imparts additional advice for
when the Panel should order transfer and states:
If only one question of fact is common to two or three cases
pending in different districts there probably will be no order
see Chamblee, supra note 185.
229. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (2000) ("The judicial panel on multidistrict litigation
shall consist of seven circuit and district judges designated from time to time by the
Chief Justice of the United States, no two of whom shall be from the same
circuit."). The original panel members included: Judge Alfred P. Murrah, then
Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit; Judge John Minor Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit;
Judge Edward Weinfeld of the Southern District of New York; Chief Judge Edwin
Robson of the Northern District of Illinois; Chief Judge William H. Becker of the
Western District of Missouri; Chief Judge Joseph S. Lord III of the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania; and Judge Stanley A. Weigel of the Northern District of
California. McDermott, supra note 213, at 217.
230. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c)(i), (ii) (2000). The Panel typically only initiates
transfer proceedings for "tag-along" cases. The Panel may also order consolidation
and transfer based on the request of a person who is not even a party to the
litigation. See, e.g., In re Equity Funding Corp. Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 1379,
1390 n.4 (J.P.M.L. 1974). For more information on the criteria for consolidating
cases, see Comment, Embryonic Guidelines, supra note 213, at 793-96.
231. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
232. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000); see also Earle F. Kyle, IV, The Mechanics of
Motion Practice Before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 175 F.R.D.
589, 592 (1998). The Panel may transfer parens patriae antitrust actions brought
by states under 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) for both pretrial and trial proceedings.
233. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000).
234. See In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484 (J.P.M.L. 1968).
2004]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
for transfer, since it is doubtful the transfer would enhance
the convenience of the parties and witnesses or promote
judicial efficiency. It is possible, however, that a few
exceptional cases may share unusually complex questions of
fact, or that many complex cases may share a few questions
of fact. In either of these instances substantial benefit may
accrue to courts and litigants through consolidated or
coordinated pretrial proceedings. 35
Because the history and text of section 1407 supply little in the way
of specific guidance, Congress endowed the Panel with great
discretion over consolidation and transfer as well as selection of the
transferee court.23 6 The test for transfer involves a three-part analysis
that requires the Panel to consider the existence of common questions
of fact, the convenience for the parties and witnesses, and the justice
and efficiency of the proceedings.237 In selecting the transferee court,
the Panel often considers which court has the majority of factually
similar pending cases,"' where discovery has occurred or will
occur, where related cases progressed the furthest and quickest,
which court would provide the highest cost savings at the least
inconvenience,' where common factual occurrences took place, and
which judges have the experience and skill to handle complex
cases. 1 1 The courts of appeal may review the Panel's refusal to
235. S. Rep. No. 454, at4-5 (1968); see also In re IBM, 302 F. Supp. 796, 799
(J.P.M.L. 1969).
236. See Plumbing Fixture, 298 F. Supp. at 488 (noting that the Panel should use
its discretion). The transferee court must consent to the transfer of such actions to
the court. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (2000). The Panel is limited only by the
requirement that the transfer serve "the convenience of the parties and witnesses"
and promote "the just and efficient conduct" of litigation. Id. § 1407(a). Although
litigants debate the most appropriate forum, the Panel generally transfers the claims
to the forum where the majority of those cases are pending, to a district where
similar cases progress more rapidly, or to a district with a strong nexus with the
litigation (either because the occurrence of events took place in that district or
because the corporation's headquarters and records are in that district). See In re
Master Key Antitrust Litig., 320 F. Supp. 1404 (J.P.M.L. 1971); In re Mid-Air
Collision Near Fairland, Ind. Litig., 309 F. Supp. 621 (J.P.M.L. 1970); In re Mid-
Air Collision Near Hendersonville, N.C., 297 F. Supp. 1039 (J.P.M.L. 1969); In re
Admission Tickets Antitrust Litig., 302 F. Supp. 1339 (J.P.M.L. 1969).
237. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000).
238. See Comment, Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 213, at 1025
("[D]espite the weight of many typical choice-of-forum factors which favored the
Eastern District of New York, the majority chose the Southern District of Florida
because all of the issues and most of the parties would be subject to a decision on
the merits there." (internal citations omitted)); Kaminsky, supra note 208, at 825.
239. See Kaminsky, supra note 208, at 826.
240. See id. at 827.
241. Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth), supra note 36, § 20.132, at 221.
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transfer only by extraordinary writ, which further enhances the
Panel's discretion.242
Because the Panel retains a considerable amount of freedom in
deciding whether to coordinate cases to promote "just and efficient
conduct of multidistrict actions," 243 section 1407 also allocates
authority to the Panel to ensure fairness in its decision to aggregate.
Yet, the Panel interpreted its role in light of congressional intent to
promote just and efficient conduct by "eliminat[ing] the potential for
conflicting contemporaneous rulings by coordinate district and
appellate courts"244 and by centralizing "to avoid duplication of
discovery, prevent inconsistent or repetitive pretrial rulings (such as
those regarding class certification), and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel and the judiciary.""24 Given this interpretation
of its goals, the Panel promotes fairness for both plaintiffs and
defendants only by preventing inconsistent pretrial rulings and
avoiding duplicative discovery. The Panel seemingly ignores the
promotion of "justice" as a separate requirement and presumes that
justice is best served by streamlining discovery and increasing cost
savings. For the most part, efficiency seems to serve as a proxy for
both justice and fairness.
This approach fails to recognize that the practical consequence
of transfer translates into a non-opt out class action for pretrial
purposes and produces settlement as would class certification. Yet,
The Panel may choose to transfer only certain claims, which is called a "partial"
transfer. In this sense, the Panel may transfer an entire action but may
simultaneously remand claims inappropriate for transfer to the transferor (the
original court in which the action was filed) court such claims as it deems
inappropriate for transfer. These claims may include cross-claims, counterclaims,
or third party claims. Id. at § 20.13 1, at 220.
242. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e) (2000). This section states:
No proceedings for review of any order of the panel may be permitted
except by extraordinary writ pursuant to the provisions of title 28, section
1651, United States Code. Petitions for extraordinary writ to review an
order of the panel to set a transfer hearing and other orders of the panel
issued prior to the order either directing or denying transfer shall be filed
only in the court of appeals having jurisdiction over the district in which
a hearing is to be or has been held. Petitions for an extraordinary writ to
review an order to transfer or orders subsequent to transfer shall be filed
only in the court of appeals having jurisdiction over the transferee district.
There shall be no appeal or review of an order of the panel denying a
motion to transfer for consolidated or coordinated proceedings.
Id.; see also Suggested Proceduresfor Multidistrict Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 589,594
(1977).
243. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
244. In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 491-92 (J.P.M.L. 1968).
245. In re Ford Motor Co. Crown Victoria Police Interceptor Prod. Liab. Litig.,




neither the Panel nor the transferee courts have the authority to
ensure fair and adequate settlement outcomes, as would a court in a
real class action. Without this oversight and assurance, the
defendants could settle the plaintiffs' attorney's inventory of cases
with nominal compensation to each claimant but with what would
amount to a large contingency fee for the attorney.2 46 Plaintiffs'
counsel could also blackmail a defendant into settling cases with
weak evidence of causation just by bringing a large number of
claims against it.247 Consequently, efficiency through procedural
devices, without the balance of fairness, does not necessarily
correlate into just outcomes.248
Although the text and legislative history of section 1407 indicate
congressional concern for both justice and efficiency, these same
documents also suggest that neither Congress nor the Coordinating
Committee anticipated that aggregation would generate one of the
preconditions for collusion in settlements, a single forum. During the
passage of section 1407 in 1968, none of the preconditions for
collusion-repeat players, single pretrial forums, or a greater
willingness by the court to clear its docket through
settlement-existed to the extent that they do today. 249 Although
only five of nine trials in the electrical equipment cases went to
judgment,250 nothing in the electrical equipment case context warned
the Committee of the state of things to come. Consequently, even
though section 1407 aims to effectuate the goal of "just conduct,"
nothing in the statute permits the Panel to ensure fairness,
reasonableness, or adequacy in settlements or to endow the
transferee court with the authority to oversee settlements. If
settlement after transfer could occur only with consent of the Panel
or the transferee courts, then section 1407 would appropriately
balance the value of efficiency with the counterweight of fairness.
246. For a severe critique of plaintiffs counsel advancing their own interests
over those of their clients, see Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps:
Georgene v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1045 (1995). For more
balanced critiques, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial
Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 877 (1987); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class
and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey &
Jeoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative
Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1 (1991).
247. See infra Part V.C.
248. See George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort
Class Actions, 26 J. Legal Stud. 521, 559-69 (1997) (explaining the failings of the
procedural approach to mass torts).
249. See generally Coffee, supra note 55, at 1364-67.
250. McDermott, supra note 213, at 215.
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However, in line with Congressional intent, which largely
emphasized expediency, the Panel has continually placed paramount
importance on efficiency. 251 As Judge Weigel observed in one of his
concurrences, "coordinating and consolidation may impair, not
further, convenience, justice and efficiency . . . neither the
convenience of witnesses and parties nor the just and efficient
conduct of actions are served, ipso facto, by transfer just because
there are common questions of fact in the civil actions involved. ' 25 2
To further the goal of expediency, the Panel used to encourage the
transferee courts to transfer cases to themselves for trial under title
28, section 1404 rather than remanding the cases back to their
original district courts as contemplated by title 28, section 1407.
C. Lexecon Limits
Despite the Panel's broad range of authority to transfer actions
for pretrial purposes, the transferee judge cannot "self-transfer" the
cases to that particular court for trial. Before the Supreme Court's
251. See Richard A. Chesley & Kathleen Woods Kolodgy, Note, Mass Exposure
Torts: An Efficient Solution to a Complex Problem, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 467, 520
(1985).
252. In re "East of the Rockies" Concrete Pipe Antitrust Cases, 302 F. Supp.
244, 254 (J.P.M.L. 1969) (Weigel, J., concurring). Judge Weigel set forth a number
of questions that the Panel should consider before ordering transfer:
How many common questions of fact are there? What is their nature?
How many cases are presently and prospectively involved? What is the
geographical location of the districts in which the cases pend? If it is
anticipated that further cases will be filed, in what districts? Who are the
principal witnesses in the cases and where do they reside? What
detriment, financial or otherwise, will be imposed upon any of the parties
by ordering transfer? Will transfer result in substantial saving of
duplicative work? Will transfer usefully avoid conflicting rulings in the
pretrial proceedings of the cases involved? Can many of the
disadvantages of transfer be worked out by cooperation among counsel
without transfer? Are pretrial proceedings already far along in any one or
more of the cases? Will transfer hasten or delay progress in the cases?
What is the availability of a judge or judges in the proposed transferee
court or courts? Will the advantages of transfer overcome the normal
desirability of having the same judge who conducts the trial also conduct
pretrial proceedings? Will transfer impede or promote the prospect of
settlements? Will transfer serve any ulterior motive of any party or
parties, such as forum shopping? If class actions are involved, will
transfer make for complexity or for simplification? Will transfer unjustly
delay or deny any party's right to provisional remedies such as injunctive
relief? What is the status and possible effect of any appeals pending in
any of the cases? Will transfer operate to eliminate or avoid an




decision in Lexecon v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach,253
transferee judges typically followed the Panel's procedural rule
14(b) and transferred the cases to their own court for trial pursuant
to title 28, sections 1404 or 1406.254 In Lexecon, the Court held that
a transferee court conducting pretrial proceedings pursuant to
section 1407 had no authority to invoke section 1404(a) to assign the
cases to itself for trial purposes.2 5 5 Self-transfer violated section
1407's requirement that the Panel remand consolidated cases to their
original transferor districts "at or before the conclusion of such
pretrial proceedings. 2 56
The legislative history of section 1407 indicates that both
Congress and the Coordinating Committee agreed that "trial in the
originating district is generally preferable from the standpoint of the
parties and witnesses, 257 so they designed the statute to "maximize
the litigant's traditional privileges of selecting where, when and how
to enforce his substantive rights or assert his defenses while
minimizing possible undue complexity from multi-party jury
trials." '258 Congress recognized that adjudicating all cases in one
massive trial could subvert the rights of the parties and may not
serve the ends of fairness, so it chose to limit consolidation to
pretrial proceedings. Although the legislative history of section
1407 emphasized the rights of plaintiffs as individuals, the Supreme
253. 523 U.S. 26, 118 S. Ct. 956 (1998).
254. See Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 208, § 5.3,
at 89 ("Section 1404(a) and Section 1407 are not mutually exclusive remedies but
are cumulative, and may both be employed in respect to a given case."); Comment,
Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 213, at 1018, 1031; John F. Nangle,
From the Horse's Mouth: The Workings of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, 66 Def. Couns. J. 341, 344 (1999); Suggested Procedures for
Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 242, at 600. The Panel's Rule 14(b) provided
that "[e]ach transferred action that has not been terminated in the transferee district
court shall be remanded by the Panel to the transferor district for trial, unless
ordered transferred by the transferee judge to the transferee or other district under
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406." Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 32-33, 118 S. Ct.
at 960-61.
255. Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 28, 118 S. Ct. at 959. In its holding, the Supreme
Court invalidated Rule 14(b), which the Panel created pursuant to its rule-making
authority as prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f). Id. The Court noted that "out of the
39,228 cases transferred under § 1407 and terminated as of September 30, 1995,
279 of the 3,787 ultimately requiring trial were retained by the courts to which the
Panel had transferred them." Id. at 33, 118 S. Ct. at 961.
256. Id. at 28, 118 S. Ct. at 959 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000)); see also
Carter G. Phillips et al., Rescuing Multidistrict Litigation from the Altar of
Expediency, 1997 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 821, 825 (1997).
257. S. Rep. No. 90-454, at 5 (1967).
258. Report of the Coordinating Committee on Multiple Litigation
Recommending New Section 1407, Title 28 (Mar. 2, 1965), reprinted in In re
Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 499 (J.P.M.L. 1968).
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Court's Lexecon decision made no mention of this policy concern
and instead strictly interpreted the plain text of section 1407.259
In deciding Lexecon squarely on section 1407's language, the
Court limited the question, noting, "[t]he relevant question for our
purposes is whether a transferee court, and not a transferor court, may
grant such a [change of venue for trial] motion.""26 Because the
Court resolved the case on such narrow grounds, it seems that
nothing in the decision would prevent the transferor court from
making an end run around section 1407 and the Lexecon holding by
directly sending the cases to the designated transferee court for trial
pursuant to section 1404(a).261 Section 1404(a) contains no specific
language requiring the court to transfer the actions only upon a
party's motion.262 Consequently, federal courts can transfer cases
under section 1404(a) without the parties' motion, stipulation, or
consent.263 As long as the court provides an opportunity for the
parties to address the issues relating to transfer, the court may
exercise its own authority to transfer the cases without unfairness to
the parties.26 Section 1404(a) does, however, limit the transfer to
another district where the cases might have been brought,265 whereas
259. Although the Supreme Court made no mention of harm to individual cases
and to the rights of the plaintiffs, Judge Kozinski's dissent in the Ninth Circuit's
review of Lexecon attacked the circuit's majority opinion and the federal judiciary
for allowing § 1404(a), a statute designed to protect a plaintiff's choice of forum,
to effect self-transfers. In re Am. Cont'l Corp./Lincoln Say. & Loan Sec. Litig.,
102 F.3d 1524, 1546-48 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
260. Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 39, 118 S. Ct. at 964; see also Trangsrud, supra note
113, at 804-09.
261. See generally Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation, supra note
208, § 5.4, at 89 ("[Clonsideration should be given to transfer, under § 1404(a), of
all cases to a single transferee district; or to initiation by the court or by the parties
of a proceeding before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation for a transfer
for pretrial purposes only under § 1407, Title 28, U.S.C. Thereafter the trial
procedures set forth in Section 5.1 of the Manual should be employed.").
262. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000); Robinson v. Town of Madison, 752 F.
Supp. 842, 846 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
263. In re Scott, 709 F. 2d 717, 721 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Lead Indus., Inc. v.
OSHA, 610 F.2d 70, 79 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979); Library Publ'ns, Inc. v. Heartland
Samplers, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 701, 705 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Sjostrom & Sons, Inc.
v. Wilson Tile & Terazzo, Inc., 1992 WL 280432, at *7 (N.D. I11. 1992); Nat'l
Acceptance Co. of Am. v. Wechsler, 489 F. Supp. 642, 649 n.9 (N.D. Ill. 1980);
Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milling Mach., 254 F. Supp. 130, 134 (N.D.
I11. 1966).
264. Robinson, 752 F. Supp. at 846; Clopay Corp. v. Newell Cos., 527 F. Supp.
733, 738 (D. Del. 1981).
265. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000). By restricting transfer to a district where the
cases might have been brought, section 1404(a) invokes the general venue
requirements of section 1391. Section 1391 states that civil actions founded upon
diversity jurisdiction may be brought only in:
(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside
1992004]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the Panel may transfer the actions to any district for pretrial purposes
under section 1407.266
Once the cases changed venues under section 1404(a), the
transferee court could then consolidate the cases under Rule
42(a). 267 To transfer under section 1407 or to consolidate under
Rule 42(a), the court need only find common questions of fact.268
In Lexecon, the problem was that the transferee court retained
jurisdiction over cases the Panel transferred to it according to its
section 1407 authority. The Panel might avoid this problem by
designating a district court that meets the venue requirements of
section 1391 as the trial court to which other districts could transfer
their cases. Either method of aggregation, section 1404(a) or 1407,
supplies the prerequisites for collusion by bringing similar
specialized mass tort cases before a single court and thereby
increasing the likelihood of repeat players and a judge who feels
pressured to resolve the mounting cases on his or her docket.
Although the Panel has not attempted to conduct an end run
around the Lexecon decision by appointing a district court and
strongly suggesting that transferor courts transfer factually similar
cases to that district, the Panel has urged legislative change. It
proposed that Congress amend section 1407 to reinstate the practice
of allowing the transferee court to transfer cases to itself for trial.269
Allowing the transferee court to retain jurisdiction for trial permits
the judge to strong arm or at least emphatically encourage
defendants to settle. 27 °  The proposal itself acknowledges,
"historical data indicate that the overwhelming majority of cases
consolidated and transferred by the Judicial Panel to transferee
judges settle or are adjudicated on pretrial motion. ' '271 The proposal
in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part
of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial
district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the
time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action
may otherwise be brought.
Id. § 1391(a). The same requirements apply to actions brought as federal questions
with the exception that the actions may be brought in "a judicial district in which
any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may be
otherwise brought." Id. § 1391(b).
266. See Id. § 1407.
267. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
268. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000); Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
269. See Nangle, supra note 254, at 346.
270. Settling cases may be a valid goal if the Panel uses its discretion in
consolidating them and if the settlements are fair. See infra Parts V.C., IV.B., &
IV.C.
271. Nangle, supra note 254, at 346.
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also admits that the Lexecon change might have diminished the trial
court's power to coerce settlements, stating, "the transferee judge's
ability to facilitate a global settlement of the consolidated cases is
probably somewhat greater if he or she is empowered to try the
consolidated cases if it becomes necessary. ' 2 The proposal
indicated that "[tihe empirical significance of this observation is
hard to measure, but the principle that a judge has greater power to
facilitate settlement if, later on, he or she might also serve as the
trial judge, seems right. 2 73 The Chairman of the Panel, Judge John
F. Nangle, concluded that the proposal was "sound and will
promote efficient and fair adjudication. 274 Yet, this proposition
assumes that the Panel made its initial decision to transfer the cases
only after a thorough inquiry into whether the transfer promoted





275. A number of critics have argued that the Panel is too quick to find common
facts. See Comment, Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 213, at 1026;
Chesley & Kolodgy, supra note 251, at 519; Benjamin W. Larson, Comment,
Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach: Respecting the Plaintiffs
Choice of Forum, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1337, 1344 (1999).
Number and Percentage of Mass Tort Motions Made to the Panel and Number of
Motions Granted
Case 1968-69 1970s 1980s 1990s Final Totals
Type
M G M G M G M G M G
Air 6 5 56 50 52 42 36 42 146 127
Crash (83%) (89%) (81%) (81%) (87%)
Acci- 1 1 12 7 30 15 5 15 48 26
dent (100%) (58%) (50%) (50%) (54%)
Pro- 0 0 16 9 20 7 54 7 90 55
ducts (0%) (56%) (35%) (35%) (61%)
M=motions; G=granted
Data come from Hensler, supra note 1, at 898. This chart demonstrates that the
Panel has granted the majority of transfer requests. In an earlier article, Hensler
observed that the Panel granted almost three-quarters of the mass tort motions for
transfer. Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of




IV. CONGRESSIONAL PRAGMATISM: EFFICIENCY AS A PROXY FOR
FAIRNESS?
A. Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2004
The Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act of 2004, now pending
in the House of Representatives, provides the Panel's requested Lexecon
"fix. 276 This Act is one of several bills that Congress has attempted to
pass since the 1998 Lexecon decision.277 The House Report quoted
Panel Chairman John F. Nagle stating that transfer back to original
transferor courts was "cumbersome, repetitive, costly, potentially
inconsistent, time consuming, inefficient, and a wasteful utilization of
judicial and litigant resources. 278 The bill proposes to amend part of
title 28, section 1407(a) to read: "Each action so transferred shall be
remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial
proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall
have been previously terminated or ordered transferred to the transferee
or other district under subsection (i)." 279 It then adds a new subsection
at the end of title 28, section 1407(a) that explicitly entitles the Panel to
transfer cases for trial purposes. 280 This subsection also permits the
276. H.R. 1768, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. Rep. No. 108-416, at 4 (2004).
Congress has already overruled Lexecon to a limited extent with its passage of the
Multidistrict, Multiparty Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 2002, 28 U.S.C. § 1369.
The Act grants federal courts original jurisdiction over "any civil action involving
minimal diversity between adverse parties that arises from a single accident, where
at least 75 natural persons have died in the accident at a discrete location." 28
U.S.C. § 1369 (2000). This Act addresses only mass accidents, and does not apply
to other types of mass torts such as personal injury mass torts, economic loss mass
torts, or property damage mass torts. For more information on this Act, see supra
Part II.A. 1.
277. Multidistrict Litigation: House Subcommittee Approves Legislation
Streamlining Multidistrict Panel Procedures, 72 U.S.L.W. 2056 (2003).
Congress considered a provision to overturn the result in Lexecon. Section
310 of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1999, 106 H.R. 1752,
would have amended s 1407 by allowing that: "Any action transferred
under this section by the panel may be transferred by the transferee judge
for trial purposes to the transferee or other district in the interest ofjustice
and for the convenience of the parties and witnesses."
Vairo, supra note 51, at B7. Congress also included a Lexecon "fix" in the
MMTJA; however, that portion of the bill did not pass. The MMTJA provided a
more controversial fix than simply allowing the transferee court to retain
jurisdiction for trial purposes because it expanded federal jurisdiction at the expense
of state courts.
278. H.R. Rep. No. 108-416, at 4 (2004).
279. Id. at 2.
280. Id. This new subsection reads:
(i)(1) Subject to paragraph (2) and except as provided in subsection (j)
[exempting antitrust actions brought by the United States], any action
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Panel to remand the cases to another district entirely so long as it serves
"the interest of justice" and "the convenience of the parties and
witnesses. ' 2
81
As noted by the sponsor of the bill, House Chairman James F.
Sensenbrenner, Jr., "[w]hile the bill allows a transferee court to retain
a case for trial on liability issues and, when appropriate, on punitive
damages, it creates a presumption.., that the trial of compensatory
damages will be transferred [back to the transferor court]." 2
Consequently, the Chairman felt that this presumption "ensure[d] that
plaintiffs will not be unduly burdened in the pursuit of their claims.'"283
It is true that many plaintiffs would not feel the effects of a Lexecon
"fix" since transferee courts dispose of almost seventy-five percent of
all multidistrict litigation cases before trial through settlement.28 The
House passed the bill unanimously on March 24, 2004;285 however, the
Senate must approve the bill before it becomes law.
B. Class Action Fairness Acts: An Altered Role for the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
In his recommendation that the House pass the Multidistrict
Litigation Restoration Act of 2004, Chairman Sensenbrenner contrasted
the Act's "narrow breadth" with what he viewed as the "broader and.
more troubling legislation to expand Federal court jurisdiction such
as the alleged class-action reform. The controversial Class Action
Fairness Acts may soon amplify the need for judicial efficiency and
economy by placing an additional burden on the already overtaxed
transferred under this section by the panel may be transferred for trial
purposes, by the judge or judges of the transferee district to whom the
action was assigned, to the transferee or other district in the interest of
justice and for the convenience of the parties and witnesses.
(2) Any action transferred for trial purposes under paragraph (1) shall be
remanded by the panel for the determination of compensatory damages to
the district court from which it was transferred, unless the court to which
the action has been transferred for trial purposes also finds for the
convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, that
the action should be retained for the determination of compensatory
damages.
Id. This practice of self-transfer has been criticized on a number of grounds. See
Comment, Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 213, at 1036-40.
281. H.R. Rep. No. 108-416, at 2 (2004).
282. Id. at 19.
283. Id.
284. See Hensler, supra note 1; see also Comment, Conduct of Multidistrict
Litigation, supra note 213, at 1029 ("Many multidistrict cases have been terminated
by settlement in section 1407 transferee courts.").
285. House Approves Bill to Streamline Federal Multidistrict Panel Procedures,
72 U.S.L.W. 2572 (2004). The Senate did not produce a companion bill. Id.
286. H.R. Rep. No. 108416, at 19 (2004).
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federal judiciary.2 87 Although federal judges stringently oppose the
concept of the acts since the federal courts already lack sufficient
operational resources,2 8 Congress continues to introduce various forms
of the bill each year.2 89 Each version of the act differs, but the core
provision in each implements a concept of "minimal diversity.",290
1. Effects on Federal Jurisdiction
Minimal diversity expands federal court jurisdiction over large
interstate class actions by requiring that only one plaintiff and one
defendant reside in different states. In the most recent version of the
act, if minimal diversity exists and the aggregate amount in controversy
exceeds $5,000,000, any defendant or any plaintiff may remove the
action from state to federal courts without the consent of all the
defendants or all the plaintiffs.292 The district court may, however, "in
the interests of justice and looking at the totality of the circumstances,
decline to exercise jurisdiction" if more than one-third but less than
two-thirds of the proposed class plaintiffs and the "primary defendants
are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed.', 293 Yet,
before refusing jurisdiction, the court must consider a laundry list of
factors including whether the claims "involve matters of national or
interstate interest," "will be governed by laws of the State in which the
action was originally filed or by the laws of the other states," "[have]
been plead in a manner that seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction," "[were]
brought in a forum with a distinct nexus with the class members, the
alleged harm, or the defendants," contain a number of proposed
plaintiffs from one state, and whether plaintiffs, during the three-year
period prior to the filing of that class action, filed one or more other
class actions asserting similar claims.294
287. For information on past bills, see John Conyers, Class Action "Fairness"-
A Bad Deal for States and Consumers, 40 Harv. J. on Legis. 493 (2003); Glenn A.
Danas, The Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of1999: Another Congressional
Attempt to Federalize State Law, 49 Emory L.J. 1305 (2000).
288. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 1115 Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 60 (2003) (statement of Sen. John
Conyers).
289. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, S. 274, 108th Cong. (2003);
Class Action Fairness Act of 2002, H.R. 2341, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002); Class
Action Fairness Act of 2001, S. 1712, 107th Cong. (2001); Class Action Fairness
Act of 2000, S. 353, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. (2000); Interstate Class Action
Jurisdiction Act of 1999, H.R. 1875, 106th Cong. (1999).
290. See S. 274, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003).
291. See id.





2. Effects on the Multidistrict Litigation Panel
The Senate's most recent bill, the Class Action Fairness Act of
2004,295 aims to ameliorate certain types of settlements and purports to
limit the authority of the Panel by restricting its ability to transfer
actions removed pursuant to the act. Although the revised Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 provides protection against unfair
settlements, this class action bill prohibits federal courts from
approving (1) a proposed "coupon" settlement (giving coupons to
plaintiffs typically redeemable for the defendant's products) absent a
finding that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate; 296 (2) a
proposed settlement that results in a net monetary loss for class
members unless the loss is substantially outweighed by other
nonmonetary benefits;297 and (3) a proposed settlement that provides
those geographically closer to the court with more money or
benefits. 298 The proposed bill also specifically limits the authority of
the Panel by including a provision that states, "Any action(s) removed
to Federal court pursuant to this subsection shall not thereafter be
transferred to any other court pursuant to section 1407, or the rules
promulgated thereunder, unless a majority of the plaintiffs in the action
request transfer pursuant to section 1407.' 299 Yet, the next portion of
the bill undercuts this limitation by applying the restriction only to
cases that contain no federal class action allegations.
The bill defines "class action" to mean:
any civil action filed in a district court of the United States
under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or any
295. S. 2062, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (2004). The Senate may vote on the most
recent version of the Class Action Fairness Act before the end of this year's session.
Ralph Lindeman, Class Action Bill: Class Action Lawyers Doubt Provisions in
Legislation Aimed at Curbing Abuses, 5 Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) 265
(2004).
296. Class Action Fairness Act of 2004, S. 2062, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (2004);
see also Martha Neil, Texas Clips Coupons: If Class Action Plaintiffs Are Paid in
Coupons, Their Lawyers Will Be, Too, Says New Law, A.B.A. J. E-Report, July 3,
2003. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) now prohibits the court from approving
a settlement that is not fair, reasonable, and adequate regardless of whether the
settlement includes coupons. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
297. Class Action Fairness Act of 2004, S. 2062, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (2004).
298. Id. Congress makes no mention of how a court might possibly conduct an
inquiry into the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of a settlement and find that
a settlement allocating additional funds to those closer in geographical proximity
to the court could be deemed "fair."
299. Id.
300. Id. This section states, "(ii) This subparagraph will not apply-(I) to cases
certified pursuant to rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; or (II) if
plaintiffs propose that the action proceed as a class action pursuant to rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id.
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civil action that is removed to a district court of the United
States that was originally filed under a State statute or rule
of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by
1 or more representatives as a class action.3°'
Regardless of whether the defendant removed the class action to
federal court, because plaintiffs probably brought the suit as a class
action of some type they may seek to certify it under Rule 23. A
number of states have rules of civil procedure governing class
actions that resemble Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.302 Others
have more relaxed rules.30 3 If the parties certified a class action in
a state with relaxed class action rules, it may not be a viable federal
class action. Although the bill may prevent the Panel from
consolidating these types of actions under some circumstances, it
does not prevent parties from requesting a change of venue under
title 28, section 1404(a) then consolidation pursuant Rule 42(a).
C. The Potential Interaction Between the Acts and Possible
Effects
Realistically, the Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act and
the Class Action Fairness Act could interact as follows: The
plaintiffs would file an action in state court under a state class
action statute. The defendants may then decide to remove the
action to federal court, a jurisdiction that many defendants view as
301. Id.
302. See, e.g., Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901 (McKinney 2004)
(resembling Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)). The prerequisites in Florida's
rule resemble Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). Florida's rule states:
Before any claim or defense may be maintained on behalf of a class by one
party or more suing or being sued as the representative of all the members
of a class, the court shall first conclude that (1) the members of the class are
so numerous that separate joinder of each member is impracticable, (2) the
claim or defense of the representative party raises questions of law or fact
common to the questions of law or fact raised by the claim or defense of
each member of the class, (3) the claim or defense of the representative party
is typical of the claim or defense of each member of the class, and (4) the
representative party can fairly and adequately protect and represent the
interests of each member of the class.
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a).
303. See, e.g., 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-802 (2004) (permitting certification
where "(1) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) There are questions of fact or law common to the class, which common
questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, (3)
The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class,




less plaintiff friendly, based on a number of positive and negative
factors. Federal court may provide an attractive option for
defendants if Rule 23 provides more stringent certification
requirements than does its state class action counterpart and if no
other factually similar claims are pending against it in other federal
courts. If plaintiffs in other districts filed factually similar claims
that alleged class status under Rule 23, then the Panel could transfer
all cases to a single district in which case the actions probably
would settle. Because Rule 23(e) requires court approval of any
certified class settlement, the federal court could require the
defendant to pay more than if the defendant settled the actions
under a state class action statute that did not provide for judicial
supervision. From the plaintiffs' perspective, removal to federal
court may dampen the hopes for a large state court jury verdict and
require travel to an inconvenient forum, yet could increase the
chance of settlement and ensure that the settlement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate. If settlement did not occur, the plaintiffs
may then face the possibility of litigating the action in the transferee
forum.
In any case, a litigant could aggregate factually similar claims
to promote settlement. Removing claims to federal court frequently
provides a single forum, increases the probability of encountering
repeat players, and amplifies the need for the court to approve a
settlement to dispense with the extra burden of state-based class
action claims. Consequently, the Class Action Fairness Act
supplies all of the preconditions for collusion in settlements.
Although the revised Rule 23 provides protections for federal class
actions, if the plaintiffs do not meet the prerequisites for
certification under Rule 23 and the defendants achieve joinder
through section 1404(a) and Rule 42, then judges do not have the
authority to scrutinize settlements. °5 By potentially passing both
the Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act, which strengthens the
power of the transferee court to induce settlements and thereby
promote efficiency, and the Class Action Fairness Act, which
increases the potential for aggregation and intensifies the pressure
on the federal courts to lighten their overburdened dockets,
Congress may enhance the potential for collusion in settlements.
304. See supra Part II.B. (describing the prerequisites for collusion). The
preconditions for collusion are repeat players, a single forum, and a willing judge.
Collusion in settlements need not necessarily have a willing judge since judges have
little authority to prevent settlement collusion outside of class actions and
bankruptcy.
305. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; Fed. R. Civ. P. 42.
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V. REJECTING CONGRESSIONAL PRAGMATISM FOR MASS TORTS:
THE COURT'S SETTLEMENT CONCERNS
Although Congress's proposals prioritize efficiency while
increasing the burden on the federal courts, the Supreme Court's
decisions evaluating the by-product of quick class action settlements
prize justice and fairness over efficiency. °6 In Amchem Products, Inc.
v. Windsor"°' and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,308 the Court conditioned
approval of settlement-only class certifications upon satisfaction of Rule
23 criteria and disapproved a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) mandatory "limited
fund" settlement of asbestos injuries.309 Even though these decisions
occurred in the class action and asbestos context,31 ° they recognized the
potential for collusion in settlements and provided a framework for
considering fundamental characteristics of fair settlements.
A. The Supreme Court's Concern about Fairness
1. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor: Rule 23(b)(3) & Future
Claimants
Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor presented the Court with an
opportunity to end a number of the asbestos claims that continue to
inundate the federal court system.3 ' The global settlement was a
306. The lower courts and Congress took a proceduralist view of mass torts.
This view "is concerned with the generic effect of a particular procedure on the
fairness and efficiency of the judicial system, not with its effect on the underlying
substantive rule in issue." Davis, supra note 32, at 157.
307. 521 U.S. 591, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
308. 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
309. Before these two decisions, a 1996 study of class actions in four district
courts found that the courts certified fifty-nine (thirty-nine percent of all class
certifications) cases for settlement purposes only. Willging et al., supra note 115, at
112. In twenty-eight of those cases, attorneys filed a proposed settlement with the
court before, or simultaneously with, the first motion to certify. Id. The courts
approved twenty-four of the twenty-eight (eighty-six percent) without any changes.
Id. at 113. These findings may indicate that the Supreme Court, in Amchem and Ortiz,
intended to send a message to all district courts that they needed to further inquire into
the fairness of these suspicious settlements.
310. By any measure, the asbestos claims represent a mass tort anomaly. The
asbestos litigation has more claims by far than any other mass tort and, as a latent
injury mass tort, it presents a number of difficulties with timing. Even the Supreme
Court urged Congress to adopt a legislative approach to asbestos claims instead of
judicial resolution. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 591, 117 S. Ct. at 2234. For in depth
information on the asbestos cases, see Griffin B. Bell, Asbestos Litigation and
Judicial Leadership: The Courts' Duty to Help Solve the Asbestos Crisis (2002);
Carroll et al., supra note 66; Hensler et al., supra note 100; Thomas E. Willging,
Trends in Asbestos Litigation (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1987); Thomas E. Willging, Asbestos
Case Management: Pretrial and Trial Procedures (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1985).
311. 521 U.S. at 591, 117 S. Ct. at 2234.
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paradigm of efficiency. 1 2 Asbestos cases have plagued the courts
since the 1970s when the flood of lawsuits began and plaintiffs first
requested that the Multidistrict Litigation Panel consolidate the
cases.3 13 When the number of claimants multiplied to 26,639 in
1991,314 the Panel consolidated and transferred the cases to Judge
Weiner in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.315 Once aggregated,
the plaintiff and defense attorneys formed steering committees and
started settlement negotiations.31 6 After the plaintiffs' attorneys agreed
to bind both inventory and potential plaintiffs, the plaintiffs and
defendants filed their joint motion for conditional class certification
and proposed settlement agreement on January 15, 1993.37 Approving
the proposed settlement would help rid the federal courts of the largest
mass tort action ever filed. Yet, the settlement lacked the requisite and
fundamental aspects of fairness and adequacy.
The core of the Court's Amchem decision held that a class action
attorney could adequately represent only a class with sufficient
cohesion.31 8 The Court affirmed the Third Circuit's disapproval of a
comprehensive class settlement, with fragmented classes, that
purported to settle both present and future claims even though future
claimants had no attorney-client relationship with the lawyers.31 9
Litigants simultaneously filed a class action complaint, answer,
proposed settlement, and a joint motion for class certification pursuant
to Rule 23(b)(3). 32" The Rule 23(b)(3) "opt-out" Amchem settlement
312. See id. at 600, 117 S. Ct. at 2238 (noting that "the Defendants' Steering
Committee made an offer designed to settle all pending and future asbestos cases").
313. In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 417 (J.P.M.L.
1991); see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 598, 117 S. Ct. at 2237-38 ("'[This] is a tale of
danger known in the 1930s, exposure inflicted upon millions of Americans in the
1940s and 1950s, injuries that began to take their toll in the 1960s, and a flood of
lawsuits beginning in the 1970s .... The most objectionable aspects of asbestos
litigation can be briefly summarized: dockets in both federal and state courts continue
to grow; long delays are routine; trials are too long; the same issues are litigated over
and over; transaction costs exceed the victims' recovery by nearly two to one;
exhaustion of assets threatens and distorts the process; and future claimants may lose
altogether."' (quoting Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on
Asbestos Litigation 2-3 (Mar. 1991)).
314. Asbestos, 771 F. Supp. at 416.
315. Id. at 424; see alsoAmchem, 521 U.S. at 599, 117 S. Ct. at 2238.
316. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 599-600, 117 S. Ct. at 2238 ("Ronald L. Motley and
Gene Locks-later appointed, along with Motley's law partner Joseph F. Rice, to
represent the plaintiff class in this action-cochaired the Plaintiffs' Steering
Committee. Counsel for the Center for Claims Resolution (CCR), the consortium
of 20 former asbestos manufacturers now before us as petitioners, participated in
the Defendants' Steering Committee.").
317. Id. at 601-02, 117 S. Ct. at 2239.
318. Id. at 623, 117 S. Ct. at 2249; see also Coffee, supra note 88, at 374.
319. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 611, 117 S. Ct. at 2243.
320. Id. at 591, 117 S. Ct. at 2234.
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enjoined class members from separately pursuing asbestos-related
personal iniury suits in any court, bound absent and unknown future
claimants,321  did not sufficiently represent divergent intra-class
interests, provided inadequate funding, and included an allocation
system that limited compensation and liability.322
The Supreme Court observed that since the 1966 revisions of
Rule 23, "class-action practice has become ever more
'adventuresome' as a means of coping with claims too numerous to
secure their 'just, speedy, and inexpensive determination' one by
one," and that this proliferation of class actions "reflects concerns
about the efficient use of court resources and the conservation of
funds to compensate claimants who do not line up early in a litigation
queue. 323 Although the Court ultimately approved this expanded use
of the class action for settlement purposes only, the settlement class
could not skirt all the requirements of Rule 23. The Court recognized
that "a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would
present intractable management problems" when litigants filed a
settlement-only class certification request.324 Commonly known as
"manageability," this factor in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions often
prevents lower courts from certifying nationwide classes that would
require them to apply numerous state laws to different claims. 5
Doing so would defeat the superiority of the class action mechanism
for resolving disputes.326
After Amchem, trial courts need not evaluate the manageability
factor in evaluating settlement classes because manageability relates
only to trial issues.327 Yet, district courts cannot ignore all the
321. The Court pointed out that "counsel for masses of inventory plaintiffs
endeavored to represent the interests of the anticipated future claimants, although
those lawyers then had no attorney-client relationship with such claimants." Id. at
601, 117 S. Ct. at 2239.
322. See id. at 591, 627, 117 S. Ct. at 2234, 2251; see also Coffee, supra note
88, at 393.
323. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617-18, 117 S. Ct. at 2247. At its inception,
commentators considered the class action mechanism "the most adventuresome"
innovation. Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev.
497,497 (1969) (including a discussion by the Reporter of the Rules amendments
regarding the Rule 23(b)(3) class).
324. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620, 117 S. Ct. at 2248; see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3)(D) (factoring in "the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.").
325. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002).
326. See, e.g., id. (decertifying a class action because the court would have to
apply the laws of all fifty states, thereby making the class unmanageable).
327. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620, 117 S. Ct. at 2248 ("Confronted with a request
for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the
case, if tried, would present intractable management problems, for the proposal is
that there be no trial." (internal citation omitted)).
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prerequisites of class certification contained in Rule 23.328 These
specifications were "designed to protect absentees by blocking
unwarranted or overbroad class definitions" and consequently
"demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement
context., 329 The settlement context does not afford the court the
opportunity to adjust the class, as would a trial where the court could
observe the proceedings unfold. 3 0  If the district court only
conducted a fairness inquiry under Rule 23(e) this would deprive
class counsel of one of its main bargaining tools-the threat of
litigation-and would require the court to rule on a settlement
without the information uncovered by adversarial investigation.33
The settlement class in Amchem was "sprawling" and it contained
claimants that differed in terms of exposure and injury. Yet, the
settlement did not separate claims into subclasses where
representatives of that class could ensure that the settlement served
the interests of the subgroup. 3 2 Instead, the named parties, who
suffered from diverse medical injuries, purported to represent one
giant class.333 Because the proposed settlement did not meet the
prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and (b) and the global settlement provided
no structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for
diversely affected individuals, the Court did not approve the
settlement.334
The Court's Amchem decision best serves as a warning that courts
may certify settlement class actions, but should proceed with
caution.335 In studying a set of cases for the Federal Judicial Center,
328. Id. The court indicated, "if a fairness inquiry under Rule 23(e) controlled
certification, eclipsing Rule 23(a) and (b), and permitting class designation despite
the impossibility of litigation, both class counsel and court would be disarmed." Id.
at 621, 117 S. Ct. at 2248.
329. Id. at 620, 117 S. Ct. at 2248.
330. Id., 117 S. Ct. at 2248.
331. Id. at 621, 117 S. Ct. at 2249.
332. Id. at 624, 627, 117 S. Ct. at 250-51.
333. Id. at 626, 117 S. Ct. at 2251.
334. Id. at 627, 117 S. Ct. at 2251. For more information on the Amchem
settlement, see Sofia Adrogue, Mass Tort Class Actions in the New Millennium, 17
Rev. Litig. 427, 435-40 (1998); Mark C. Weber, A Consent-Based Approach to
Class Action Settlement: Improving Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 59 Ohio
St. L.J. 1155, 1169 (1998).
335. See Stephen A. Saltzburg (moderator), The Future of Class Actions in Mass
Tort Cases: A Roundtable Discussion, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 1657, 1662 (1998). For
more information on the impact of the Supreme Court's Amchem decision on class
action settlements, see Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney
Reports on the Impact of Amchem and Ortiz on Choice of a Federal or State Forum
in Class Action Litigation: A Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules




Professor Jay Tidmarsh gleaned the following three basic
propositions from the Court's decision: (1) "class actions can
sometimes be used to resolve mass tort controversies, 336 (2) "a
settlement class action ... [in the mass tort context] must meet
most but not all of the requirements of litigation class actions...
but a court may take the settlement into account in determining
whether a class action is a superior way to adjudicate the
controversy,, 337 and (3) the Amchem settlement failed because it did
not satisfy the adequacy of representation requirement of Rule
23(a)(1) or the predominance requirement in Rule 23(b)(3). 338
2. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.: Rule 23(b)(1) & Insurance
Funding
Two years after the Amchem decision, the same settling parties
attempted to evade the decision by avoiding any set allocation
amounts and resolving each claim through a post-approval
arbitration procedure.339 Yet, the Supreme Court disapproved this
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) mandatory (no provision allowing claimants to
"opt-out" of the settlement) "limited fund" settlement of asbestos
personal injury claims in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.340 Despite the
two-year decision gap, attorneys negotiated the Amchem and Ortiz
settlements almost alongside one another.341 After Amchem, the
Supreme Court remanded Ortiz to the Fifth Circuit for further
consideration in light of that holding, but the Fifth Circuit affirmed
its prior decision to uphold the Ortiz settlement because it was a
limited fund settlement, under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), rather than a
23(b)(3) settlement.342 In fact, the two settlements shared a number
of features: many of the same attorneys negotiated both settlements,
both included side deals for plaintiffs with individual
representation, both attempted to settle potential future asbestos
Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Class Action Update 2002: Mass Tort Trends, Choice of Law
Rule 23(f Appeals, and ProposedAmendments to Rule 23, SH009 ALI-ABA 1189,
1199-1211 (2002); Memorandum from the Federal Judicial Center Project Team to
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Sept. 9, 2002) (providing empirical data
on the effects of Amchem/Ortiz on the filing of federal class actions), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsfllookup/AmChem.pdf/$file/AmChem.pdf.
336. Jay Tidmarsh, Mass Tort Settlement Class Actions: Five Case Studies 25
(Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1998).
337. Id. at 26-27.
338. Id. at 27-29.
339. Coffee, supra note 88, at 393.
340. 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
341. Cabraser, supra note 335, at 1195.
342. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 830, 119 S. Ct. at 2307.
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claims with unknown plaintiffs, and both settlements contained
questionable fund allocation.343
The Ortiz limited fund presented the Court with an unusual
situation in which the proceeds of a settlement between Fibreboard
and its insurance company supplied the money for the limited fund
settlement that would compensate the asbestos claimants.
Although the fund provided some $1.525 billion, Fibreboard
contributed only $500,000. 34 5 The Court focused on the lack of an
evidentiary foundation for both the district and appellate courts'
determination of the limited fund based on Fibreboard's assets and
expressed dissatisfaction with the inquiry into whether the fund was
fair and reasonable. 346 The Court noted that settlement-only class
actions required "heighten[ed] attention" at the certification stage
"because certification of a mandatory settlement class, however
provisional technically, effectively concludes the proceeding save for
the final fairness hearing. '347 A fairness hearing "is no substitute for
rigorous adherence to those provisions of the Rule 'designed to
protect absentees.' ' 348 In effect, the limited settlement fund in Oritz
mirrored a bankruptcy result, but circumvented the fairness
protections afforded by bankruptcy.349
Had the Amchem and Ortiz settlements been less sprawling, dealt
with a more isolated incident, and included only one defendant, as in
the orthopedic bone screw litigation, the Supreme Court might have
upheld the settlement. In approving a limited fund settlement under
Rule 23(b)(1)(B), Judge Bechtle distinguished Amchem by noting
that the orthopedic bone screw litigation was "defined and
congruous," so it did not present the widespread intra-class conflicts
inherent in the asbestos settlement.35 Unlike the latent injury
asbestos settlement, no future claimants existed in the bone screw
343. Cabraser, supra note 335, at 1196.
344. Id.
345. Id. For more information on the details of the settlement fund, see George
M. Cohen, The "Fair" Is the Enemy of the Good: Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corporation
and Class Action Settlements, 8 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 23, 27-36 (2000); David
Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort
Cases, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 831, 858 (2002).
346. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 853, 854, 119 S. Ct. at 2318. The court observed that
"[flair treatment ... was characteristically assured by straightforward pro rata
distribution of the limited fund." Id. at 855, 119 S. Ct. at 2319.
347. Id. at 849, 119 S. Ct. at 2316.
348. Id., 119 S. Ct. at2316.
349. The bankruptcy protections are described in detail in Part V.B. Bankruptcy
gives the court an active role in protecting tort claimants and defendants and
handles the pooling function much better than does the class action. Coffee, supra
note 55, at 1383; see also infra Part V.B.




litigation.35 All claimants who had surgery knew soon after the
surgery whether they had a claim against Acromed.352 Acromed
Corporation was the only defendant." The settlement treated all
claims equally and employed a post-approval claims administration
process that evaluated claimants on an equal and independent
basis.354
Yet, the Supreme Court, in Amchem and Ortiz, faced a seemingly
infinite number of future claims and a diversely injured group of
present claimants so it stressed the need to ensure that absent class
members, who might also be affected differently, must receive fair
and equal treatment.3 55 In order to protect these absentees, the Court
required strict compliance with Rule 23 to monitor (1) whether a fair
basis existed for binding the claimants and (2) whether the attorneys
adequately represented those absentees without conflicts of interest
within the class.35 6 However, by raising the bar to class certification,
the Court may have decreased fairness in aggregated settlements by
forcing some types of mass torts further outside the protections of the
class action. 357p
A recent study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, the
Judicial Conference's research agency, found that neither Amchem
nor Ortiz significantly impacted whether attorneys filed their cases
in federal or state court.35' However, it did find that federal judges
were more than twice as likely as state court judges to deny class
certification motions.359 Forty-three percent of the surveyed attorneys
thought that the Amchem and Ortiz decisions made it harder to certify
351. See id. at 173.
352. Id.
353. See id. at 158.
354. See id.
355. S. Elizabeth Gibson, Case Studies of Mass Tort Limited Fund Class Action
Settlements & Bankruptcy Reorganizations 18 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 2000).
356. Id. at 18. A 1996 study of class actions found that arguments addressing
actual or potential conflicts of interest between class members and the class
representative occurred with some frequency. Willging et al., supra note 115, at
124.
357. See John D. Aldock & Richard M. Wyner, The Use of Settlement Class
Actions to Resolve Mass Tort Claims after Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 33
Tort & Ins. L.J. 905, 909-10 (1998); Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Life AfternAmchem: The
Class Struggle Continues, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 373, 386-94 (1998); John C.
Coffee, Jr., After the High Court Decision in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,
Can a Class Ever Be Certified Only for the Purpose of Settlement?, Nat'l L.J., July
21, 1997, at B4; Conference Report: High Court's Amchem Ruling Raises Issues
on Scope of Class Settlements, Panelists Say, 66 U.S.L.W. 2122 (1997); Howard
M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 Geo. L.J. 1983,
1996 (1999) ('To whatever extent Amchem may make certain class actions more
difficult in federal court, some parties will take their class actions to state court.");
Resnik, supra note 12, at 842-43.
358. Willging & Wheatman, supra note 335, at 4.
359. Id. at 35.
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and settle class actions.36 After these decisions, courts generally use
settlement class actions on "a highly selective case-by-case basis. 361
If the settlement does not meet the requirements for class
certification, then the claimants receive no procedural protections of
fairness, reasonableness, or adequacy absent judicial supervision
through a bankruptcy proceeding.
B. The Bankruptcy Alternative
Because courts are less willing to certify mass tort class action
settlements, a number of defendants turned to the only other
alternative that facilitates a binding global resolution of pending and
potential claims: bankruptcy. 362 Bankruptcy's advantages include
nationwide jurisdiction, the ability to construct a fair and equitable
settlement,3" and the absolute priority rule that prevents the debtor's
shareholders from participating in the company's reorganization until
all creditors are paid.3' Despite the relative advantage of satisfying
tort claimants' claims ahead of shareholders, the bankruptcy process
also includes a rule that restricts judges from confirming a Chapter 1 1
plan over the objection of a single claimant who would receive more
in Chapter 7 liquidation than in Chapter 11 reorganization.365 The
Bankruptcy Code compels judges to conduct a confirmation hearing
and to make a determination of whether the proposed plan satisfies
thirteen statutory requirements including feasibility.366 The court may
confirm the plan even if a class of interests votes it down so long as the
court finds that the plan satisfies all thirteen factors, does not unfairly
discriminate, and is fair and equitable.367
360. Id. at 6.
361. Thomas E. Willging, Mass Torts Problems & Proposals: A Report to the
Mass Torts Working Group (Appendix C) 37 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1999).
362. See generally Coffee, supra note 55, at 1386-87.
363. Despite the benefits, the drafters of the bankruptcy code did not have mass
torts in mind when creating it, and it, like other procedural mechanisms, strains to
respond to mass torts.
364. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2000); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford,
Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large,
Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 125, 181 (1990).
365. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7). This rule is commonly known as the best
interests of the creditor principle. For a discussion of this rule and the policy
behind it, see Elizabeth Warren, Business Bankruptcy 139-40 (1993).
366. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1128(a), 1129; see also Warren, supra note 365, at 30.
The plan must satisfy all thirteen requirements. For more information on
bankruptcy rules and related reforms, see Elizabeth C. Wiggins et al., Survey on the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1996), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/banksur.pdf/$File/banksur.pdf.
367. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1)-(2); see also Warren, supra note 365, at
134-36. The term of art for this decision is "cram down." See Jeffrey Davis,
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A recent study comparing the use of the limited fund class action
settlements (before the 2003 revisions to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure) with bankruptcy reorganization concluded that
bankruptcy provided the superior method for resolving mass torts in
terms of fairness and effective judicial review. 368  This section
highlights the principles of fairness and justice inherent in the
bankruptcy process that promote the view that bankruptcy provides a
superior method for resolving mass torts. By examining the Dalkon
Shield litigation, this section lays a foundation for incorporating these
key fairness principles into the larger scheme of post-aggregation
settlements.
Although the court can achieve and approve a limited fund class
action settlement with more speed and efficiency and less cost than
a mass tort bankruptcy reorganization, bankruptcy protects tort
claimants by permitting them to vote against the plan and by
appointing a future claims representative to act on behalf of future
interests.3 9  Aggregation promotes settlement, but decreases
individual autonomy. One of the principal determinations that must
be made to evaluate the fairness of any process that purports to
resolve claims en masse is whether the method-be it bankruptcy,
class action, or other types of aggregation-provides individual
claimants with a meaningful voice in the decision to accept the
settlement.37 ° Providing claimants with a meaningful voice differs
dramatically from a meaningful choice."' Whenever individuals
must choose between accepting the terms of a collectively negotiated
settlement and funding individual litigation against large corporate
defendants, most rational claimants will opt for the settlement.372
Cramming Down Future Claims in Bankruptcy: Fairness, Bankruptcy Policy, Due
Process, and the Lessons of the Piper Reorganization, 70 Am. Bankr. L.J. 329
(1996).
368. Gibson, supra note 355, at 5.
369. Id. at 5-6.
370. See Cramton, supra note 7, at 822 ("Collective action may also deprive
individuals of meaningful control over their own legal claims, pushing them
involuntarily into compensation grids and administrative claims-handling processes
to whose ministrations they have not consented.").
371. The Model Rule of Professional Responsibility that applies to aggregated
settlements states, "[a] lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not
participate in making an aggregate settlement of or against the clients ... unless
each client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client." Model R. of
Prof 1 Conduct 1.8(g). The Rule also requires the lawyer to disclose "the existence
and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person
in the settlement." Id. Even clients informed of conflicts will most often choose
to remain with their attorney when the choice is between waiving a conflict and
finding a new attorney.
372. After studying the filings in four district courts, Thomas Willging, Laural
Hooper, and Robert Niemic concluded that, based on levels of recovery, most class
members would not pursue separate individual actions should the class certification
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Rule 23(c) and (g) preserves some of the security inherent in
individual attorney-client relationships through its notice provisions
and selection of class counsel.373 Outside the class action, however,
giving claimants a meaningful voice includes not only notifying them
about upcoming court proceedings, but also supplying them with
sufficient financial and other data to make informed judgments
regarding the adequacy of the proposed settlement, allowing them an
opportunity to voice their concerns with or opposition to the proposed
settlement, and ensuring that the resolution process allocates
sufficient weight to their concerns.374
Scholars and commentators highlight the Dalkon Shield
Claimants Trust as a paradigm of fairness and efficiency because it
gave individuals a meaningful voice. 375 The Dalkon Shield litigation
began when A.H. Robins Company, Inc. marketed an intrauterine
birth control device known as the Dalkon Shield.376 It caused
numerous health problems including pelvic inflammatory disease and
septic abortions. By 1975, A.H. Robins faced 286 complaints against
it and, due to its aggressive marketing campaign, anticipated many
more.3 77 In 1975, the Panel consolidated the cases and transferred
them to the District of Kansas where Judge Frank Theis presided over
pretrial discovery for four years. 378 After four years, the Panel began
remanding the cases to the transferor courts.
Judge Spencer Williams, of the Northern District of California,
conditionally certified a nationwide class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) on
the issue of damages, and a Rule 23(b)(3) statewide class on liability
and compensatory damages.379 All parties, aside from one plaintiff,
opposed the certification. 380  The Ninth Circuit reversed both
fail. Willging et al., supra note 115, at 84.
373. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c), (g).
374. Gibson, supra note 355, at 14.
375. See, e.g., Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, and the
Rhetoric of Mass Tort Claims Resolution, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 79, 123 (1997). The
Johns-Manville litigation also provides a prominent, but less successful, example
of a mass torts bankruptcy case. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). The Manville Trust was inadequately funded and could
never fully compensate the victims. Frank J. Macchiarola, The Manville Personal
Injury Settlement Trust: Lessons for the Future, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 583, 583
(1996). When instituted, the Trust was a relatively new creation. Id. Because the
trust did not operate in a single jurisdiction, different judges and juries awarded
varying recovery amounts to claimants that made it impossible to compensate each
victim equally. Id. at 583-86.
376. Gibson, supra note 355, at 187.
377. Id. at 187-88.
378. In re N. Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847,
849 (9th Cir. 1982).
379. Id.
380. Id. at 849; Gibson, supra note 355, at 188.
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certifications.38" ' The record did not support a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class
since the district court had not conducted a fact-finding inquiry into
the extent of A.H. Robins assets in relation to its tort liability and the
Rule 23(b)(3) class could not stand because it satisfied neither the
typicality nor the superiority requirement.382 The Ninth Circuit also
observed, in its evaluation of the superiority requirement, that
efficiency qualified as a factor supporting class certification, as did
litigation costs. 383 Yet, the court was not concerned about fairness.
Instead, the Ninth Circuit noted that the few issues that might be tried
on a class basis weighed against the ones that needed individual
attention.3 4  Consequently, class certification saved little actual
time.385 This forced A.H. Robins to begin settling nearly eight cases
a day, but it still faced approximately 6,000 unresolved claims.386 By
1985, the company and its insurer had paid $530 million to resolve
9,500 cases and faced serious financial difficulties.387 Eventually, the
company filed for Chapter 11 reorganization.388
The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust formed an integral part of the
Chapter 11 reorganization of A.H. Robins and resolved thousands of
claims. 389 A number of characteristics contributed to the success of
the Trust and its acclaim as a fair process. In forming the Trust, the
court included an estimation of necessary funding, a database of
potential future claimants, 390 a reorganization plan, disclosure of the
381. Dalkon Shield, 693 F.2d at 857.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 856. Judge Spencer Williams, who certified the class, wrote an
insightful critique to the Ninth Circuit' s reversal. See Honorable Spencer Williams,
Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323, 332 (1983). The
Ninth Circuit essentially accused Judge Williams of over managing the litigation.
Dalkon Shield, 693 F.2d 847. Ironically, judicial management was precisely what
was needed as judged by the later bankruptcy action. Ackles v. A.H. Robins Co.,
59 B.R. 99 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986), affd sub nom. Beard v. A.H. Robins Co., 828
F.2d 1029 (4 " Cir. 1987).
384. Dalkon Shield, 693 F.2d at 856.
385. Id.
386. Gibson, supra note 355, at 189.
387. Id.; Sobol, supra note 72, at 47, 349 n.84.
388. Gibson, supra note 355, at 189; Sobol, supra note 72, at 47, 349 n.84.
389. Vairo, supra note 375, at 123. For more on the factual and procedural
history of the Dalkon Shield litigation, see Sobol, supra note 72; Kenneth R.
Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 53 Law & Contemp. Probs. 79
(1990); Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost (or
Found)?, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 617 (1992); Vairo, supra note 375, at 123.
390. In 1997, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission proposed the
following statutory definition of "mass future claim:"
[a] claim arising out of a right to payment or equitable relief that gives rise
to a right to payment that has or has not accrued under nonbankruptcy law
that is created by one or more acts or omissions of the debtor if: (1) the
act(s) or omission(s) occurred before or at the time of the order for relief;
(2) the act(s) or omission(s) may be sufficient to establish liability when
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reorganization plan to each tort claimant, arms length negotiation,
active judicial supervision, a cap on attorneys fees, a court-appointed
examiner, and a court-appointed database expert.
To adequately estimate the number of claimants, A.H. Robins
conducted an extensive notification campaign and, with court-
approval, set a date after which it would not consider new claims.39'
The campaign produced an estimated number of 195,000 valid
claims. 39 The court then appointed Professor Francis McGovern to
compile a database of the claimants that included information about
the seriousness of their claims based on a questionnaire asking about
the gravity of injury and evidence of causation.3 93 After receiving
evidence about the seriousness of claims, the court conducted an
estimation hearing on the valuation of the claims and Judge Merhi e,
the primary bankruptcy judge, announced a value of $2.475 billion.
injuries are ultimately manifested; (3) at the time of the petition, the debtor
has been subject to numerous demands for payment for injuries or
damages arising from such acts or omissions and is likely to e subject to
substantial future demands for payment on similar grounds; (4) the holders
of such rights to payments are known or, if unknown, can be identified or
described with reasonable certainty; and (5) the amount of such liability
is reasonably capable of estimation.
National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Final Report: Bankruptcy: The Next
Twenty Years (Oct. 20, 1997); see also Kathryn R. Heidt, Future Claims in
Bankruptcy: The NBC Amendments Do Not Go Far Enough, 69 Am. Bankr. L.J.
515 (1995). Attorneys Ralph Mabey and Peter Zisser advocate the extensive use of
bankruptcy to deal with future claims. See Ralph R. Mabey & Peter A. Zisser,
Improving Treatment of Future Claims: The Unfinished Business Left by the
Manville Amendments, 69 Am. Bankr. L.J. 487 (1995). They define a future claim
as "'a claim against a debtor for an injury or disease that has not yet become
manifest at the time the debtor has filed for bankruptcy, but is based upon the
occurrence, prior to the bankruptcy, of one or more material events, acts, or failures
to act."' Id. at 477-78 (quoting Ralph R. Mabey & Jamie Andra Gavrin,
Constitutional Limitations on the Discharge of Future Claims in Bankruptcy, 44
S.C. L. Rev. 745, 749-50 (1993)).
391. Gibson, supra note 355, at 193. The campaign spent $4.5 million to air
announcements on network and cable television, publish 233 newspaper ads,
publish press releases in foreign newspapers, and notify public health officials and
American embassies. Id.
392. Id. at 194.
393. Id. at 195. Compiling the database cost $5 million and took fourteen
months. Id.
394. Id. at 196. Judge Merhige failed to provide an explanation for the final
estimation. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit could not review the district court's
method for validity. Id. at 216. The Bankruptcy Code provides the authority to
estimate the size and number of all present and future claims. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)
(2000). This section provides, "[t]here shall be estimated for purposes of allowance
under this section-(1) any contingent or unliquidated claim, the fixing or liquidation
of which, as the case may be, would unduly delay the administration of the case;
or (2) any right to payment arising from a right to an equitable remedy for breach
of performance." Id. Parties may also request a jury trial to determine the actual
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With a firm cap on tort liability, A.H. Robins accepted a merger offer
by American Home Products that included a claims resolution facility
and additional funding.39 5 The additional funding served as both a
floor and a cap on the new company's obligations to the tort
claimants.396
A.H. Robins sent the reorganization plan and all disclosure
materials to each tort claimant in a 261-page statement.397 The
plaintiffs' counsel overwhelmingly disfavored the ?Ian, yet ninety-
four percent of the voting tort claimants voted for it. 98 Almost three
years after A.H. Robins filed for bankruptcy, the district court
approved the reorganization plan.399
The Claims Resolution Facility administered payments to Dalkon
Shield victims through three options. Claimants could select Option
1, which paid $725 to all claimants and required them only to file a
amount of a claim for distribution purposes, 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (2000), and courts
have used this process to estimate potential personal injury liability in mass torts.
See A.H. Robins v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1012-13 (4th Cir. 1986).
Richard Sobol, an attorney who wrote a book exclusively devoted to the Dalkon
Shield litigation, criticized the implementation of the methodology for the
evaluation process. He noted:
A serious shortcoming with the methodology concerned the identification
of the claims in the sample to which historic value would be accorded.
Ideally, in statistical sampling the pertinent information is determined
concerning the sample and the assumption is made that the same factual
pattern will be replicated in the universe. If 25 percent of the homes in a
statistically valid sample are tuned to the "Cosby Show," it is assumed that
25 percent of all the homes in the universe from which the sample was
drawn are tuned to the "Cosby Show." The comparable methodology for
estimating the value of the universe of the Dalkon Shield claims would be
actually to liquidate the claims in a sample, using the procedures that
would be used to liquidate claims under the plan of reorganization, and to
project the liquidated value of the sample to the universe.
Sobol, supra note 72, at 181.
395. Gibson, supra note 355, at 196.
396. See Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694,697
(4th Cir. 1989); Gibson, supra note 355, at 196. The reorganization plan did not
include a limit on attorneys fees, but did allow loss of consortium claims by family
members. Gibson, supra note 355, at 197.
397. Gibson, supra note 355, at 196. The statement included a "thorough
summary of the complex plan in terms that almost anyone could understand."
Menard-Sanford, 880 F.2d at 696; see also In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742,
748-49 (E.D. Va. 1988). However, the disclosure statement did not estimate how
much each claimant might recover. Menard-Sanford, 880 F.2d at 696; Sobol, supra
note 72, at 230. Yet, the Fourth Circuit held that "any specific estimates may well
have been more confusing than helpful and certainly would be more calculated to
mislead." Menard-Sanford, 880 F.2d at 697.
398. Gibson, supra note 355, at 198.
399. This confirmation released all liability against the Robins family and its
corporate officials in return for $10 million. Id.
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single form,' Option 2, which required claimants to present medical
proof and allowed them to recover between $850 and $5,500,41 or
Option 3, which allowed claimants with serious and provable Dalkon
Shield injuries to engage in settlement talks with the Trust and if the
individuals declined the offer they could go to binding arbitration or
trial.4°2 The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust distributed full payments
to the claimants nine years ahead of schedule.4 °3
Both the court-appointed examiner, former bankruptcy judge
Ralph Mabey, and Judge Merhige, who presided over the A.H.
Robins bankruptcy case, played an integral role in overseeing the
negotiations, settlement, and fund disbursement. By taking an active
role in judicial management, Judge Merhige prevented collusion from
occurring between the plaintiffs and defendants, defendants and their
insurers (Aetna Casualty Co.), and defendants and their takeover
company (American Home Products). After the administrators of the
Trust realized that the Trust actually had extra funds, Judge Merhige
placed a ten percent cap on attorneys' fees for the additional amounts
that the Trust distributed to all claimants who did not initially select
Option 1." He reasoned that because the attorneys did not exert any
additional efforts, they should not receive extra fees.40 5 On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit upheld the cap, calling it a "wonderful example[]
of chutzpah."4°6 Although critics have condemned some aspects of
judicial treatment,40 7 overall, close judicial supervision at each step
of the process resulted in fair administration of hundreds of
thousands of claims.
C. Is Settlement an Appropriate Measure of Success?
Courts and commentators alike place a high value on settlement
because it prevents drawn out litigation and presumably allows
defendants to remain solvent.4 8 Courts conduct aggregated litigation
400. Approximately 132,000 claimants selected this option. Id. at 199.
401. Approximately 18,000 claimants selected this option, which the plan
designed for claimants with serious alternative causation problems. Id. at 200.
402. Approximately 49,000 claimants selected this option and most of them
agreed to take the initial settlement offer. Id. at 200.
403. Id. at 199.
404. Bergstrom v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 86
F.3d 364, 370 (4th Cir. 1996).
405. Id.
406. Id. at 377.
407. Gibson, supra note 355, at 215 (noting the criticism of Judge Merhige's
refusing to allow a relatively inexperienced attorney whom he had appointed to
represent future claimants hire outside counsel).
408. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 616 F.2d 305,312 (7th Cir. 1980)
("It is axiomatic that the federal courts look with great favor upon the voluntary
resolution of litigation through settlement."); Adams v. Robertson, 676 So. 2d 1265,
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with a presumption against trial and a penchant toward efficiency."
Chief Justice Warren praised the Coordinating Committee for the few
number of electrical equipment cases that actually went to trial.410
The Panel wants to legislatively overrule the Lexecon decision for
fear that it could hinder the trial court's ability to promote
settlements.4 1 Even the Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth)
speaks of facilitating mass tort settlements.4 2 Yet, is settlement that
comes at the price of blackmail a legitimate goal?
In individual litigation, settlement indicates that the parties
resolved their differences without the need for or costs of litigation.
In the mass tort setting, however, when a large number of potential
claimants emerge and settlement of some sort becomes inevitable, the
tort system has created an absolute liability for defendants. The clear
assumption is that when plaintiffs emerge in droves alleging similar
injuries from the same product, the defendant must be liable. The
defendant faces a "catch-twenty-two": either quietly compensate
aggregated weak claims through settlement or pay perhaps even more
in attorneys' fees, damaging press, and future claims. More and more
frequently, absolute liability does not happen after class certification
hearings filled with scientific experts and causation evidence, but
after multidistrict aggregation that coerces defendants into quick
settlements in hopes of avoiding the negative publicity and additional
lawsuits.413
The pressure to settle and the corresponding financial burdens
stem not only from the need to sidestep negative publicity, but also
from a fear that "[olne jury, consisting of six persons ... will hold
1275 (Ala. 1995) (observing that the "judicial policy favoring settlement is
particularly important in the context of class actions"); Cooper, supra note 38, at
1979 ("Settlement seems to hold out the best promise for resolving large numbers
of mass tort claims at one time, on consistent terms that achieve some measure of
similar treatment for similar injuries and with substantial savings in litigation
costs."); Cramton, supra note 7, at 819 (noting that "[t]he transferee judge often
takes an active role in encouraging or pressing settlement); Resnik, supra note 12,
at 840 (noting that "the judicial policy favoring settlements is said to have special
force in the class action context); Schwarzer et al., supra note 36, at 1560-61.
409. See Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1331 (5th Cir. 1977) ("Particularly
in class action suits, there is an overriding public interest in favor of settlement);
Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1976) ("It hardly
seems necessary to point out that there is an overriding public interest in settling
and quieting litigation."); Gaddis v. Campbell, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1313 (M.D.
Ala. 2004) ("Judicial policy favors voluntary settlement of cases."); Resnik, supra
note 98, at 395 (observing that judges manage litigation as a quest toward
efficiency); Resnik, supra note 12, at 840.
410. Rhodes, supra note 213, at 714.
411. See supra Part III.C.
412. Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth), supra note 36, § 22.91, at 447.
413. See McNeil & Fanscal, supra note 19, at 489. For more information on the
use of experts in class certification hearings, see Chamblee, supra note 185.
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the fate of an industry in the palm of its hand., 414 In the past, the
rhetoric of "blackmail" centered on class certification. Once
certified, plaintiffs tend to have an inequitable bargaining advantage
over defendants that pressures defendants to settle.4 ,5 Judge Posner,
in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,4 6 and Judge Easterbrook, in both
West v. Prudential Securities, Inc.41 7 and In re Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc.,418 commented disapprovingly on how the class action device has
turned into a medium for blackmail.419 Judge Posner demonstrated
alarm over the weak proof of the plaintiffs' claims in the HIV
hemophiliac litigation as compared to the tremendous litigation and
liability risks for the defendant. 420 A transferee judge attempted to
manage the litigation by certifying the class and setting a limited
class-wide issue for trial.421 The plaintiffs proposed a novel theory
of tort liability: even though the outbreak of H1V occurred before
anyone had heard of HIV, because Hepatitis B existed, the defendants
failed to use due care with respect to that virus.422 That due care, so
the theory went, would have prevented transmission of the
HIV/AIDS virus.423 The defendants prevailed in the first twelve of
414. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995).
415. Davis, supra note 32, at 218; Priest, supra note 248, at 521 ("THE single
most salient feature of the modem mass tort class action is the extraordinary power
that derives from certification of a class alone. This power stems from the prospect
that the tort claims of a large-numbered class might reach a jury that might render
a large aggregate judgment."); Georgene Vairo, Judicial v. Congressional
Federalism: The Implications of the New Federalism Decisions on Mass Tort Cases
and Other Complex Litigation, 33 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1559, 1588 (2000); see also
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, J.,
dissenting) ("The appropriate action for this Court is to affirm the district court and
put an end to this Frankenstein monster posing as a class action."), rev'd, 417 U.S.
156, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974); Henry J. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View
120 (1973). But see Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining
Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92 Harv. L. Rev. 664,
679-82 (1978-79); Charles Silver, "We're Scared to Death:" Class Certification
and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1357 (2003).
A 1996 study compared the outcomes of certified classes with the outcomes of
non-certified cases to determine whether certifying a class coerces settlement.
Willging et al., supra note 115, at 143. The study found that, across four district
courts, certified class actions were two to five more times likely to settle that cases
containing class allegations that were not certified. Id.
416. 51 F.3d at 1294.
417. 282 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2002).
418. 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002).
419. But see In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 159
(2d Cir. 2001) (certifying a class despite its potential coercive effect).
420. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d at 1299.
421. James M. Wood, The Judicial Coordination ofDrug and Device Litigation:
A Review and Critique, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 325, 351 (1999).




thirteen cases that went to trial.424 Even if the defendants lost, they
probably faced no more than $125 million in liability.425 Yet, with
class certification, their liability could exceed $25 billion and cause
bankruptcy.426 Judge Posner concluded that the plan to certify this
class under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) "so far exceed[ed] the permissible
bounds of discretion in the management of federal litigation as to
compel [the Seventh Circuit] to intervene and order
decertification. '4 7
Judge Easterbrook voiced a similar concern that settlements
"reflect [a] high risk of catastrophic loss" and force "defendants to
pay substantial sums even when the plaintiffs have weak
positions. 428 Consequently, "[t]he effect of a class certification in
inducing settlement to curtail the risk of large awards provide[d] a
powerful reason to take an interlocutory appeal. 429  Judge
Easterbrook reiterated his position in In re Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc. by remarking that the consequence of aggregating millions of
claims "makes the case so unwieldy, and the stakes so large, that
settlement becomes almost inevitable-and at a price that reflects the
risk of a catastrophic judgment as much as, if not more than, the
actual merit of the claims. 430
The coercion aspects of aggregation also appeared in the breast
implant litigation.4' The Panel consolidated the breast implant
litigation in 1992 before Judge Sam Pointer, Jr. of the Northern
District of Alabama.432 At the end of 1993, Dow Coming Corp.,
along with two other defendants, negotiated a settlement for nearly
$4 billion. However, few verdicts existed upon which to base the
settlement value and plaintiffs put forth weak scientific evidence of
causation.433 Judge Pointer spread the fairness. hearing on the
424. Vairo, supra note 415, at 1589.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d at 1297.
428. West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing
Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 497 (1991); Reinier Kraakman, Hyun Park &
Steven Shavell, When are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 Geo. L.
Rev. 1733 (1994); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without
Foundation?, 7 J.L. Econ & Org. 55 (1991)).
429. Id.
430. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc, 288 F.3d 1012, 1016 (7th Cir. 2002).
431. The Bendectin litigation serves as a counterexample to the breast implant
litigation. After the Sixth Circuit decertified the class, most of the individual
litigation failed due to problems with scientific causation. See supra notes 198-207
and accompanying text.
432. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Liab. Litig., 783 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L.
1992); Tidmarsh, supra note 336, at 75.
433. Tidmarsh, supra note 336, at 76; see McNeil & Fanscal, supra note 19, at
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settlement out over three days, but no medical or legal experts
testified.434 After revising the settlement several times, Dow Coming
eventually filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization. This
prompted a characterization of plaintiffs as greedy and
unmeritorious.4
Although the danger of blackmail exists with respect to class
certification, the 2003 amendments to Rule 23 lessen this danger.
Rule 23(e) requires that the court conduct a hearing prior to
approving a settlement to inquire into the merits of the claims and to
determine the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the
settlement.436 Rule 23(f) permits defendants or plaintiffs to appeal
the trial court's decision to certify the class even for settlement
purposes only.437 The real danger inherent in the coercive aspect of
settlements arises when parties negotiate settlements after
multidistrict aggregation without the protection of appealing
certification decisions. Absent a facially invalid agreement, the court
typically enters consent judgments as presented by the parties.438
Judges have neither the obligation nor the authority to scrutinize the
fairness or adequacy of settlements after aggregation and/or
consolidation.439
To a great extent, whether post-aggregation settlement serves as
an appropriate measure of success depends on the goal. If the goal
is compensating tort victims," then the judicial system seems willing
to regard considerations of fault, responsibility, and deterrence as
peripheral so long as the settlement provides adequate compen-
496.
434. Gibson, supra note 355, at 106; Tidmarsh, supra note 336, at 77.
435. See generally In re Dow Coming Corp., 187 B.R. 919 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1995); Marcia Angell, Science on Trial: The Clash of Medical Evidence and the
Law in the Breast Implant Case (1996); Davis, supra note 32, at 187; Hensler,
supra note 274, at 180 ("Many ordinary Americans seem to think that class actions
are a new-fangled litigation device invented by greedy plaintiff attorneys.").
436. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
437. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
438. The court does, however, have a duty to ensure that the settlement is not
illegal or against public policy. See United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d
1358, 1362 (5th Cir. 1980); Harris v. Graddick, 615 F. Supp. 239, 241-42 (M.D.
Ala. 1985); Resnik, supra note 12, at 854.
439. Id.; Judith Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 43, 85-92(1987).
440. See Dobbs, supra note 132, at 12; Priest, supra note 248, at 544 ("The
value of efficiency in societal interactions and the value of achieving perfect justice
are equally offended if the damages award or settlement amount to any single
plaintiff is excessively high or low."); David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions:
What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don't, 37 Harv. J. on Legis. 393, 410, 419
(2000); William W. Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order Out
of Chaos, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 837, 837 (1995).
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sation.44 If tort law aims to deter undesirable behavior," 2 then the
absolute liability of defendants through coerced settlements does not
achieve deterrence. Despite one commentator's assertion that
"[o]ptimal deterrence is achieved by threatening the defendant with
the aggregate, average loss (pecuniary and nonpecuniary) attributable
to its tortuous conduct, "" 3 when the judicial system effectively holds
defendants absolutely liable by forcing them to settle-regardless of
fault or negligence-then defendants have little incentive to take
excessive precautionary measures.'" If the emphasis is on efficiently
pushing mass tort cases through the judicial system, thereby reducing
repetitive trials and disposing of cases, then settlement symbolizes a
paradigm of success." Similarly, if the goal is to achieve closure for
mass tort defendants, then a global settlement and bar on future
claims also denotes success." 6
Yet, settlement as a measure of success, without judicial
oversight and scrutiny, breaks down if the goal is fairness. When
the tort system aims to provide individuals with meaningful control
over their own legal claims without requiring them to choose
between minimal compensation and costly litigation, then settlement
does not accurately measure success."4  Nor does settlement
measure the success of fairness when defendants feel pressure from
all sides, including the judiciary, to compensate weak claims." 8
Critics of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation claim that the
441. See Cramton, supra note 7, at 821.
442. See Dobbs, supra note 132, at 12; Rosenberg, supra note 440, at 417-19
(observing that "the systemic bias favoring the defendant subverts the goal of fully
internalizing the costs of tortuous harm to prevent it from occurring in the first
place").
443. David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims
in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 210, 239 (1996). Rosenberg also
argues that plaintiffs "are never made better off by being vested with a property
right... to an inefficient day in court, to personal control over their claims, and to
other anticollectivist procedures." Id. at 257.
444. See generally Cooper, supra note 38, at 1950 ("Defendants frequently
complain that there is no chance of winning on the merits-even a defendant
willing to risk the full damages liability that would follow a fair adjudication of
liability will settle for fear that the sheer mass of self-identified victims will
overwhelm reason and force a finding of liability.").
445. See generally Willging, supra note 361, at 15.; Priest, supra note 248, at
541 ("Efficiency is surely the most carefully elaborated objective of tort law ....
it provides that a defendant be held liable in tort only in context where the harm to
the plaintiff could have been prevented by a cost-effective investment of the
defendant.")
446. See generally Priest, supra note 248, at 543-44 ("[Ilmplicit in both the
efficiency and equity approaches to tort law, there is a benefit in achieving finality
in litigation and proceeding with more normal life.").
447. See generally Willging, supra note 361, at 17.
448. See id. at 10.
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Panel finds the existence of common factual questions and orders
aggregation of mass torts too quickly, before evaluating whether the
aggregation promotes justice."4 If true, this-when combined with
evidence that most aggregated claims settle-may indicate that early
aggregation compels defendants to settle claims that they might
otherwise successfully litigate.
The debate surrounding the conflicting aims of the tort system
for individual litigation-compensating injured persons and
deterring future undesirable behavior-has existed since its
inception.45° The rise of mass torts in the asbestos cases further
complicated the goals of the tort system by creating a judicial need,
or at least a perceived need, for efficiency. The lower courts,
Congress, and eventually the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation responded to the asbestos crisis by streamlining the
process and experimenting with innovative class action techniques
that ultimately did not survive the Supreme Court's reactionary
emphasis on fairness. 45' The pressure to settle in the context of
aggregation most often comes at the price of fairness when
conducted outside the class action mechanism. Yet, the judicial
system need not pursue one goal at the expense of the others when
Congress can endow judges with the authority to supervise
settlement of aggregated mass torts and to tailor their approval of
settlements to the individual aspects of that particular litigation.
VI. A CONSERVATIVE PROPOSAL TO ADDRESS A MOUNTING
PROBLEM
A. Prior Recommendations Tailored to Diverse Goals
Both academics and judges have created numerous proposals to
reform the way the justice system manages mass torts. Past proposals
aim to reform the class action system without regard to aggregated
claims that do not qualify for class action status. The 2003 revisions
to Rule 23 mooted a substantial number of these proposals.
Additional plans addressed aspects of litigation, such as trial45 2 or
449. See, e.g., In re Willingham Pat. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 1019, 1021 (J.P.M.L.
1971) (Weigel, J., dissenting); (suggesting that the common facts were inadequate
to justify a transfer in light of the burden on the parties, witnesses, and counsel);
Stanley J. Levy, Complex Multidistrict Litigation and the Federal Courts, 40
Fordham L. Rev. 41, 48 (1971); Roberts, supra note 213, at 847; see also supra
notes 251, 276.
450. See Dobbs, supra note 132, at 13.
451. The Supreme Court expressed its views on fairness in its Amchem and Ortiz
opinions. See supra Part V.A.
452. Based on Judge Robert Parker's use of statistical sampling in the Cimino
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alternative dispute resolution,453 which occur only after settlement
talks fail. Many of these proposals endeavored to further streamline
the efficiency of the tort system without properly balancing fairness
concerns 454
Proposals for efficiency are often comprehensive and seem to fail
because they aspire to change too much at once and focus primarily
on litigation with over 1,000 claims. Comprehensive proposals
include those authored by Professor Edward Cooper, the American
Law Institute, and the American Bar Association Commission on
Mass Torts. These schemes react to mass tort anomalies such as
asbestos, Agent Orange, and Dalkon Shield,455 but intrude too
extensively on state sovereignty to provide a reasonable solution to
"everyday" mass torts that have far less than 1,000 claims and may
lack the latent injury aspect of these anomalies.4 56  In addition,
asbestos litigation, 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986), Professors Michael Saks and Peter
Blanck proposed that courts use statistical sampling in mature mass torts by using
various trials to determine a range of damages. See Michael J. Saks & Peter D.
Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits ofAggregation and Sampling
in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 Stan L. Rev. 815 (1992). For other proposals based
on statistics, see Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective
Responsibility: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 Va. L. Rev. 845 (1987);
Kenneth S. Abraham & Glen 0. Robinson, Aggregative Valuation of Mass Tort
Claims, 53 L. & Contemp. Probs. 137 (1990); Kenneth A. Bordens & Irwin A.
Horowitz, The Limits of Sampling and Consolidation in Mass Tort Trials: Justice
Improved or Justice Altered?, 22 Law & Psychol. Rev. 43 (1998); Howard Ross
Cabot & Alan A. Matheson Jr., The Use of Statistics to Wrest Control Over the
Trial of Mass Damage Claims, 7 Inside Litig., Mar. 1993, at 16; Martin H. Redish,
Procedural Due Process andAggregation Devices in Mass Tort Litigation, 63 Def.
Couns. J. 18 (1996); Glen 0. Robinson & Kenneth H. Abraham, Collective Justice
in Tort Law, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1481 (1992); Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass
Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. 11. L. Rev. 69 (1989). For a critical look at the use
of statistics, see McNeil & Fanscal, supra note 19, at 507.
453. Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) may also include judicial settlement
efforts. See Judith Resnik, Procedural Innovations, Sloshing over: A Comment on
Deborah Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative
Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1627,
1627-29 (1995). For ADR proposals for mass tort cases, see Deborah R. Hensler,
A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half Empty: The Use ofAlternative Dispute Resolution
in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1587 (1995); McNeil &
Fanscal, supra note 19, at 490; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlement
of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1159 (1995);
Tom R. Tyler, A Psychological Perspective on the Settlement of Mass Tort Claims,
53 Law & Contemp. Probs. 199 (1990). Some of these proposals aim to fairly
distribute settlement proceeds, but they do not adequately address the problem of
initial fairness in the settlement itself.
454. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 453 (recommending the use of fast-track
ADR procedures);
455. See ABA Report, supra note 34, at le (1989) (Paul Rheingold's dissent and
proposal).
456. See generally supra Part II.A (describing the various types of mass torts). A
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Congress may feel more comfortable taking smaller steps toward
change rather than implementing sweeping legislation. When the
judicial system proposes too much at once, the changes rarely make
it past Congress."'
If Congress enacted an all-encompassing system designed to
accommodate colossal mass tort litigation, which comprises only
about fifteen percent of total mass tort litigations subject to
multidistricting,458 it may encourage large-scale meritless lawsuits.
Francis McGovern likened an extensive mass tort system to a
"highway" 459 or "Field of Dreams., 46' The "highway" aphorism
translates into a sensible anecdote: don't build the highway
prematurely because it will promote a proliferation of frivolous mass
tort claims.4 61 This recommendation suggests that a feasible solution
should take into account the changing numbers and types of mass
torts.
462
number of proposals focus on the state-federal relationship in mass torts. Their
guidance is certainly needed; however, this Article focuses primarily on multidistrict
litigation by the Panel, which currently can aggregate only federal cases. One state
court judge has proposed a revision of the multidistrict litigation statute. See Sandra
Mazer Moss, Response to Judicial Federalism: A Proposal to Amend the Multidistrict
Litigation Statute from a State Judge's Perspective, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1573 (1995). A
federal judge has also commented on revising the multidistrict litigation statute to
permit state-federal coordination. See Schwarzer et al., supra note 36, at 1529. Judge
Schwarzer's proposal allows limited removal of related state court cases where
minimal diversity exists, allows the state court to retain jurisdiction to litigate the
merits of the decisions, makes the litigation binding in all subsequent proceedings, and
requires federal courts remand the cases to state court when the case is ready for trial
or summary judgment. Id. at 1533. For innovations on voluntary state-federal
coordination, see James G. Apple et al., Manual for Cooperation Between State and
Federal Courts (1997); Schwarzer et al., supra note 47, at 1700-07 (containing cases
about voluntarily coordinated state-federal cases). For a discussion on the advantages
of state-federal judicial cooperation as well as the disadvantages, see Francis E.
McGovern, Rethinking Cooperation Among Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 44 UCLA
L. Rev. 1851 (1997); Mark C. Weber, Complex Litigation and the State Courts:
Constitutional and Practical Advantages of the State Forum Over the Federal Forum
in Mass Tort Cases, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 215 (1994).
457. For example, a number of product liability reforms have failed. See, e.g.,
S. 640, 102 Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (attempting to set national standards for product
liability suits); S. 100, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (failing to pass after the Senate
Commerce Committee failed to pass a vote to send the bill to the Senate floor); S.
44, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (failing after the Senate took no further action on
the bill after the Commerce Committee approved it). Congressional attempts to
legislate a comprehensive tobacco settlement also failed. See The Universal
Tobacco Settlement Act, S. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 1530, 105th Cong.
(1997).
458. See infra note 482 and accompanying pie chart.
459. McGovern, supra note 67, at 1840.
460. Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 Va. L.
Rev. 1721, 1750 (2002).
461. See McGovern, supra note 67, at 1840-45.
462. See id.
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Professor Cooper proposed a comprehensive approach derived
from Rule 23. This approach intended to change the current
jurisdictional framework by: (1) empowering one court with
nationwide jurisdiction to control all litigation events, (2) providing
statutory definitions of mass tort elements and administrative
processes for compensation, (3) expanding personal jurisdiction to
provide for a single court with nationwide personal jurisdiction, (4)
joining all potentially liable defendants, (5) establishing a means to
determine a single source of applicable law as selected by a mass
torts panel of judges, (6) selecting counsel without controlling who
the adversaries might be, (7) conveying notice "as good as can be
managed" to identifiable claimants or appointing representatives for
those without notice, (8) incorporating a cushion of time for claims
to mature and to receive information from evolving scientific studies,
and (9) tackling aggregate settlement issues such as disparate group
representation, claimant participation, impartial judicial review, and
information for objectors.463 The recent Class Action Fairness Act
comes close to Cooper's proposal to establish nationwide jurisdiction
by implementing minimal diversity and removal to federal court.4"
By aggregating both federal and state claims in one court,4 65 this
proposal substantially raises the stakes of the litigation and the
corresponding emphasis on settlement. Without providing a safety
net to ensure the fairness of aggregated settlements, this proposal
prioritizes efficiency without a counterweight to balance fairness
concerns.
The American Law Institute (AL) Complex Litigation Project
provided an extensive proposal that concentrated on consolidation,
choice-of-law, and transfer of multiforum, multiparty cases among
state and federal systems.466 The AL project would create a statutory
Complex Litigation Panel to replace the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation and would set standards for the panel to apply
when deciding whether to consolidate cases within the federal
463. Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of Class Actions, 40 Ariz. L. Rev.
923,946-51 (1998); see also Cooper, supra note 38, at 1943; Edward H. Cooper,
Federal Class Action Reform in the United States: Past and Future and Where
Next?, 69 Def. Couns. J. 432 (2002).
464. See supra Part IV.B.
465. Professor Cooper observes, in a later article, "effective aggregation presents
severe challenges to received notions of federalism." Cooper, supra note 38, at
1952.
466. See Schwarzer et al., supra note 36, at 1542. For a critique of the ALl
project, see Richard A. Epstein, The Consolidation of Complex Litigation: A
Critical Evaluation of the ALI Proposal, 10 J.L. & Com. 1 (1990); Linda S.
Mullenix, Unfinished Symphony: The Complex Litigation Project Rests, 54 La. L.
Rev. 977 (1994); Louise Weinberg, Mass Torts at the Neutral Forum: A Critical
Analysis of the ALI's Proposed Choice Rule, 56 Alb. L. Rev. 807 (1993).
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system.467 To order transfer and consolidation the panel must find
that the order would "promote the just, efficient, and fair conduct"
based on whether it would reduce costs, duplicative litigation, the
likelihood of inconsistent adjudications, and burdens on the
judiciary.468 The panel would also take into account factors such as
the number of parties, the geographic dispersion of the cases, and the
stages of litigation.469
To organize the litigation, the proposal granted the transferee
court broad discretionary power in identifying common issues for
similar treatment, certifying classes for either the entire litigation or
certain issues, preparing a preliminary plan for the conduct of
litigation, severing issues for trial or remand, and transferring
damages for a consolidated trial.47° Parties could petition the
Complex Litigation Panel for review of the transferee court's
decisions.47 ' The court of appeals of the circuit containing the
transferee court would also have the authority to grant an
interlocutory order to review liability decisions.472 Like Professor
Cooper's approach, the ALI project contemplated nationwide
jurisdiction to the fullest extent possible by the Constitution.471 This
would authorize the panel to transfer and consolidate actions in a
state court and to remove actions from state court that "arise from the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences
as an action pending in the federal court, and share a common
question of fact with that action. 474 It would also require potential
litigants to join pending proceedings or face possible issue preclusion
from relitigating the issues decided in the consolidated
proceedings. 75 Even without considering the federalism problems
with nationwide jurisdiction and the emphasis on efficiency,476 the
467. American Law Institute, supra note 62, at 78.
468. Id. at 36-38.
469. Id.; Mullenix, supra note 466, at 986 (observing that the ALI project fails
to explain how this new panel would interact with Rule 23 and whether the panel
would trump the class certification rules).
470. American Law Institute, supra note 62, at 103-07.
471. Id. at 129-30.
472. Id.
473. Id. at 147; Mullenix, supra note 466, at 981.
474. American Law Institute, supra note 62, at 220-21.
475. Resnik, supra note 1, at 932.
476. See id. ("The difference between the ALI 1990s proposal and the 1966
class action proposal is that what the ALl terms efficiency appears paramount in its
conception, whereas for at least some of the kinds of class actions created by the
1966 amendments to Rule 23, enabling access was the prime concern."). The
proposal "adopt[s] an intermediate approach under which federal courts would have
jurisdiction over certain categories of tort cases but would apply state substantive
law." Schwarzer et al., supra note 36, at 1540. Federal courts could exert
jurisdiction over actions transactionally related to cases in federal court. Id. For
more information on the division between state and federal courts and the general
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proposal falls short in terms of settlement concerns. Although the
transferee court has broad discretionary power to organize the
litigation, the ALI project did not consider the need for judicial
oversight of settlements.
The American Bar Association Commission (ABA) on Mass Torts
also proposed a comprehensive plan to reform judicial handling of
mass torts. As noted in Part ll.A, the ABA limited its definition of
"mass tort litigation" to a set of "at least 100 civil tort actions arising
from a single accident or use of or exposure to the same product or
substance, each of which involves a claim in excess of $50,000 for
wrongful death, personal injury or physical damage to or destruction
of tangible property.",47  The ABA proposal called for a federal
judicial panel that would identify torts meeting this definition and
consolidate some or all of those actions "before a federal court
empowered to resolve all issues including liability and damages. ' '478
By incorporating choice-of-law and punitive damages standards, the
ABA hoped to include sufficient federal law to support federal
jurisdiction while avoiding the question of federal substantive law. 479
Like Professor Cooper's and the ALI project's proposals, the ABA
proposal incorporated nationwide jurisdiction,8 but offered no
assurance that the impending pressure to settle would result in fair
settlements.
Relatively few multidistrict litigations have over one hundred
claims, let alone over one thousand claims.481 Consequently, a viable
proposal must incorporate enough flexibility to fluctuate between
variable numbers and types of claims.482 To a certain extent, the
notion of federalism, see American Law Institute, Study of the Division of
Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts (1968); James G. Apple, Manual for
Cooperation Between State and Federal Courts (1997); Federalism and the Judicial
Mind: Essays on American Constitutional Law and Politics (Harry N. Scheiber, ed.,
1992); Federalism: The Shifting Balance (Janice C. Griffith, ed., 1989);
Perspectives on Federalism: Papers from the First Berkeley Seminar on Federalism
(Harry N. Scheiber, ed., 1987).
477. ABA Report, supra note 34, at 26.
478. Id.
479. Schwarzer et al., supra note 36, at 1540.
480. ABA Report, supra note 34, at 40.
481. See infra notes 482-483 and accompanying pie chart.
482. Distribution of Types of Multidistrict Mass Torts: Product Defect and
Catastrophic Event Motions, 1990-1999.
Case Type
(Product Defect Percent of Number Percent
Allegation) Number Total Granted Granted
Catastrophic Event 5 9 4 80
Personal Injury 28 52 21 75
Property Damage 5 9 4 80
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proposed remedy must begin by defining the type of mass tort it
targets. If mass torts are only those litigations that. reach epic
proportions of over 1,000 claims, then the solution should address only
those torts. Mass torts of over 1,000 claims comprise only fifteen
percent of current mass tort litigations subject to the multidistrict
litigation statute.4 3 Litigation with a hundred or more cflimants makes
up only thirty-six percent.4' Forty-nine percent of current mass tort
Financial Injury 16 30 14 88
TOTAL 54 100 43 80
Hensler, supra note 1, at 902.
483. The Multidistrict Litigation Panel had 45,010 actions either pending as of
September 30, 2003, or closed since October 1, 2002. Of all those actions only the





Name Type Circuit Transferred Court Total
1. Rezulin Product Second 996 13 1,009
Liability
2. Asbestos Product Third 99,268 7,428 106,696
Liability
3. Orthopedic Product Third 2,808 273 3,081
Bone Liability
Screw
4. Diet Drugs Product Third 3,658 105 3,763
Liability
5. Baycol Product Eighth 4,519 1,576 6,095
Liability










Data source: Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 36, at 1-28.
When evaluated as individual pieces of litigation, seven litigations, then
litigation with over 1,000 claims makes up only fifteen percent of all current mass
tort multidistrict litigation.
484. Yet, the Panel also transferred the following mass torts of 100 or more total
cases for multidistrict treatment. See chart in Appendix A.
When evaluated as individual pieces of litigation, seventeen litigations, then
litigation with over 100 claims makes up only thirty-six percent of all current mass
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litigation includes less than 100 claims.485
Less than 100 Claims
49% Over 1,000 Claims
15%
4 Over 1,000 Claims: 15%
Over 100 Claims Li Less than 100 Claims: 49%
36% Over 100 Claims: 36%
Figure: Mass Tort Multidistrict Litigation Pending as of
September 30, 2003, or Closed Since October 1, 2002
In this Article's definition of mass torts, which declines to place an
arbitrary limit on the threshold number of claims needed to qualify and
focuses instead on the operational issue of whether a particular group
486
of claims needs special judicial management, the types and number
of claimants within "mass torts" subject to multidistrict litigation vary
dramatically.487 Consequently, it makes sense to provide a flexible
solution that judges with the most mass tort experience-the Panel and
the transferee judges-can implement and adapt as needed.488
B. Conferring Judicial Authority to Authorize Post-Consolidation,
Pre-Certification Settlements
By overemphasizing efficiency and expediency in resolving mass
torts, Congress and the lower courts impaired the balance between
tort multidistrict litigation.
485. The Panel transferred mass torts of less than 100 total cases for multidistrict
treatment. See chart in Appendix B.
When evaluated as individual pieces of litigation, twenty-three litigations, then
litigation with less than 100 claims makes up forty-nine percent of all mass tort
multidistrict litigation.
486. Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth), supra note 36, § 22.1, at 343. The
Panel selected these claims for special judicial management. Consequently, these
claims meet the operational definition of requiring special treatment.
487. See Resnik, supra note 12, at 861 ("All of us who think about class actions
or other forms of aggregation must confront that aggregates range in size, in kinds
and values of claims, in dimensions of legal and factual complexity not easily
mapped in the current iterations; and moreover the variations are always and
unendingly changing.").
488. See generally Davis, supra note 32, at 161 ("[T]he context of the particular
type of mass tort litigation involved must be given central focus to determine
whether the class action can be usefully employed-useful to effectuate the goals of
both the judicial system and the organic tort laws which that system exists to
enforce.").
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the dual goals of efficiency and fairness.489 Because the system has
survived the mass tort phenomenon for decades now, confronting
mass torts no longer dictates that the system focus solely on the goal
of efficiency at the expense of fairness. This impulse toward
expediency has caused access to justice to vary among different
aggregative techniques. Collective settlements that do not qualify as
class actions or result in bankruptcy often lack both the security
inherent in the adversarial process and the judicial oversight intrinsic
in class actions and bankruptcy. Thus, to preserve a uniform balance
between the tort system's goals of efficiency and fairness, the process
of adjudicating mass torts should require judicial approval of all post-
aggregation settlements.490
To best ensure judicial regulation and approval of post-
aggregation settlements, Congress should amend subsection (a) of
title 28, section 1407 to permit the Panel to require transferee courts
to approve settlements that occur after aggregation by the Panel as
the Panel sees fit. As revised, title 28, section 1407(a) should read as
follows: 4
91
When civil actions involving one or more common
questions of fact are pending in different districts, such
actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be
made by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation
authorized by this section upon its determination that the
transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of
the parties and witness and will promote the just, efficient,
and fair conduct of such actions. To make this determination,
the panel shall consider such factors as whether the transfer
would reduce costs, duplicative litigation, inconsistent
adjudications, and burdens on the judiciary. The panel also
shall consider the number of parties, the geographic
dispersion of the cases, and the stages of litigation.
To further promote justice and fairness after transfer by
the panel, the panel may on its own motion or a motion from
any party, require parties to receive approval from the
489. See generally id. at 159; Resnik, supra note 98 (characterizing managerial
judging as a quest for efficiency that dates as far back as the 1900s); Trangsrud,
supra note 113, at 831-33 ("Mass tort cases thus confront courts with a procedural
conundrum: how to preserve fairness while promoting efficiency.").
490. See Resnik, supra note 12, at 858.
491. Congress need not include the language in subsection (a) if it determines
that a new section is more appropriate. Congress presumably has power under the
Commerce Clause to legislate mass torts. See George T. Conway III, Note, The
Consolidation of Multistate Litigation in State Courts, 96 Yale L.J. 1099, 1116
(1987); Epstein, supra note 466, at 43; Schwarzer et al., supra note 36, at 1540.
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transferee court before collectively4 92 settling cases pending
before the transferee court. Should the panel enter such a
motion, the transferee court may approve the settlement only
after a hearing and on finding that the settlement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate.
Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel
at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the
district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been
previously terminated: Provided, however, That the panel
may separate any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-
party claim and remand any of such claims before the
remainder of the action is remanded.4 93
The requirements for ordering transfer should mirror those proposed
by the ALl project to ensure that the transfer does not unduly
prejudice one or more of the parties. To order transfer and
consolidation the panel must find that the order would promote just,
efficient, and fair conduct based on factors of whether it would
reduce costs, duplicative litigation, inconsistent adjudications, and
burdens on the judiciary.494 The panel should also consider the
number of parties, the geographic dispersion of the cases, and the
stages of litigation.495 These specific findings should ensure that
defendants do not face undue pressure to settle early in the litigation
when they might prefer to go to trial. Of course, the Panel may find
particular factors irrelevant in certain cases and can always weigh
some considerations more heavily than others so long as the result
advances the just, efficient, and fair conduct of the litigation.
Amending section 1407(a) would help prevent collusion in mass
tort settlements occurring outside the class action and bankruptcy
context by endowing the transferee court with the authority to
approve settlements. 96 Rule 23 and the Manual for Complex
Litigation (Fourth) encourage active judicial management in class
actions; 497 however, this active management should extend to
492. The Panel may determine the number of settlements that qualifies for a
collective settlement, or may authorize the transferee court to make this
determination once it determines the total number of cases.
493. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000). The underlined text denotes proposed
additions to the current version of 28 U.S.C. § 1407. If Congress were to pass the
"Lexecon fix," then this final paragraph should reflect the decision to allow the
transferee court to retain jurisdiction for trial purposes. See supra Part IV.A.
494. See American Law Institute, supra note 62, at 36-38.
495. See id.
496. Although the proposal specifically contemplates mass tort settlements,
there is no reason that the Panel could not authorize the transferee court to approve
settlements in other types of multidistrict litigation should it find that the
authorization would further the dual purposes of fairness and efficiency.
497. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) advisory committee's note; Manual for Complex
Litigation (Fourth), supra note 36, § 22.91, at 446.
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settlements in the non-class aggregated context as well. Judicial
supervision helps protect absent or disinterested litigants (due
perhaps to being only in the early stages of a latent illness), as well
as defendants faced with bandwagon claims containing little
scientific evidence of causation.
Because plaintiff and defense attorneys may enter the courthouse
with aligned interests and file joint motions for approval of the
proposed settlement, the judge may receive little crucial information
through the adversarial process. In mass tort cases requiring
scientific evidence of causation, or where an expert might impart
information withheld by the attorneys, the transferee court should
consider appointing an expert to aid it in determining whether the
settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.49 The court may also
use its inherent judicial authority to appoint a technical advisor to
assist in understanding complex technical information.499 Judges
employed experts to aid them in both the breast implant litigation 500
498. Federal Rule of Evidence 706 permits the court to appoint its own expert
witnesses. Fed. R. Evid. 706; see generally Erichson, supra note 356, at 1986-95.
The court may also appoint a guardian ad litem. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527
U.S. 815, 827, 854, 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2305, 2318-19 (1999) (permitting the district
court to appoint a law professor as a guardian ad litem and citing the guardian's
report on a factual matter); Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 70 F.R.D. 533, 535-36
(S.D. Fla. 1976) (using the court's authority under Rule 23(d)(5) to appoint a
guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the class in responding to the
plaintiffs' attorneys' requests for fees). The court may also appoint a special master
to assist it. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 257-58
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (noting that the parties "filed a joint motion for appointment of a
special master to assist the Court during the discovery process, and to review
sensitive and confidential information relevant to these proceedings"), vacated on
other grounds, 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'd sub nom Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997); see generally Thomas E. Willging
et. al., Special Masters' Incidence and Activity: Report to the Judicial Conference's
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and Its Subcommittee on Special Masters
(2000).
499. See Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 158 (1st Cir. 1988); see also In
re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312, 40 S. Ct. 543, 547 (1920) ("Courts have (at least in
the absence of legislation to the contrary) inherent power to provide themselves
with appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties."); see
generally Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation:
Defining a Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43
Emory L.J. 995 (1994); Erichson, supra note 356, at 1986.
500. In the consolidated multidistrict litigation, Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr.
appointed a national panel of neutral experts to provide him with evidence on
scientific questions regarding evidentiary reliability on causation evidence linking
diseases to silicon gel breast implants. See In re Silicon Gel Breast Implants Prod.
Liab. Litig., MDL No. 926, OrderNo. 31E (N.D. Ala., Oct. 31, 1996), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS/orders.htm; Erichson, supra note 356, at
1989-91. Judge Robert E. Jones appointed four technical advisors to advise him
on similar issues in breast implant litigation. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996). Some critics claim that Judge Jones did not rely
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and the asbestos litigation .501 Additionally, the court may require
counsel to provide further information needed to thoroughly assess
the proposed settlement such as the likelihood of success at trial,
likelihood of class certification, defendant's financial resources,
value of the claims, attorneys' fees, litigation costs, and the status of
any parallel or overlapping actions. °2 By allocating authority to the
transferee court to approve settlements, the court retains the
necessary flexibility to approach variable types of mass torts. It
ensures that judges with the most experience in handling both
complex cases in general and that set of aggregated cases in
particular can tailor settlement approval to the circumstances of the
litigation. Congress may more willingly consider a simple proposal
that enhances fairness for all parties than it would of sweeping
reforms. °3
In the meantime, however, all federal courts faced with mass tort
claims that include class certification allegations should liberally
construe Rule 23 and use their authority to oversee the conduct of
collective settlements.5" Rule 23(e)(1)(A) states that "[tihe court
must approve any settlement.., of the claims, issues, or defenses of
a certified class."5 °5 Although the 2003 revisions speak directly only
to certified settlements, the rule does not eliminate the court's ability
to require approval of non-certified settlements that contain
enough on his experts. See Joseph Sanders & D.H. Kaye, Expert Advice on
Silicone Implants: Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 37 Jurimetrics J. 113, 120-23
(1997).
501. Judge Jack Weinstein appointed a panel of experts in the asbestos litigation
to help him estimate future claims in the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust.
See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 151 F.R.D. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); see
also Erichson, supra note 356, at 1991; Weinstein, supra note 40, at 469. Similarly,
Judge Carl Rubin used a standing panel of experts to review asbestos cases and
determine whether the individual had an asbestos related disease. See Carl B.
Rubin & Laura Ringenbach, The Use of Court Experts in Asbestos Litigation, 137
F.R.D. 35 (1991).
502. See Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth), supra note 36, § 21.631, at
320; see also In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148
F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998); Schwarzer, supra note 440, at 843-44.
503. The Class Action Fairness Acts provide an example of sweeping reforms.
Certain members of Congress have unsuccessfully introduced new versions of the
act for at least the past five years. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, S.
274, 108th Cong. (2003); Class Action Fairness Act of 2002, H.R. 2341, 107th
Cong. (2002); Class Action Fairness Act of 2001, S. 1712, 107th Cong. (2001);
Class Action Fairness Act of 2000, S. 353, 106' Cong. (2000); Interstate Class
Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999, H.R. 1875, 106" Cong. (1999).
504. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; see generally Williams, supra note 383, at 325 ("[It is
my suggestion that, for a small, but inevitable number of cases involving hundreds
or thousands of persons injured in similar ways by a single nationally marketed
product, or in some types of mass catastrophe, the class action device holds the
most promise as an effective tool to accommodate competing interests.").
505. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
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allegations of class status. The 2003 advisory committee's note
observed that the change from "a class action" to "a certified class"
resolved ambiguous language that some courts "read to require court
approval of settlements with putative class representatives that
resolved only individual claims." 5°6 The note continues, "[t]he new
rule requires approval only if the claims, issues, or defenses of a
certified class are resolved by a settlement, voluntary dismissal, or
compromise. '"507 Although the court's duty to inquire into the terms
of the settlement extends only to certified classes, the language
indicates that courts may still approve aggregated settlements with
class action allegations. A liberal reading of Rule 23(e) best serves
the purposes of Rule 23, "to assure the fair conduct of [class]
actions,"'08 and aligns Rule 23 with the purposes of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action,"5" and the goals of the tort system.
As previously mentioned, the tort system aims to compensate injured
persons and deter future wrongdoing.51° Conservatively reading Rule
23(e) to permit judges to ensure fairness only in certified class
settlements subI)ects a greater number of settlements to the possibility
of collusion.5" It may also encourage defendants (at least those
defendants who do not need a global settlement) to quickly settle
claims with minimal funds before the putative class falls under the
judge's watchful eye. Consequently, to prevent collusion and bolster
fairness in settlements, judges should scrutinize all collective
settlements with class allegations under Rule 23(e).
Requiring judicial supervision of aggregated or pre-certified class
settlements may result in making private settlements public. Critics
might argue that this could have a chilling effect on settlements by
bringing marginal claimants out of the woodwork to file suit for a
slice of the settlement. This is unlikely for three reasons. First, most
mass tort plaintiffs attorneys engage in extensive advertising for
clients as soon as they find even a marginally viable claim. Second,
making settlements public may allow defendants to resolve more
claims at once. Third, defendants face strong incentives to settle
aggregated claims and those economic incentives likely outweigh any
countervailing reservations about public records. Making settlements
more accessible to the public adds the additional benefit of public
accessibility, which may further prevent settlement collusion.
506. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A) advisory committee's note (emphasis added).
507. Id. (emphasis added).
508. Id. (describing the purposes behind the 1966 amendments).
509. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
510. See Dobbs, supra note 132, at 13.
511. See generally Resnik, supra note 12, at 860 ("[Jludges should scrutinize all
proposed settlements of aggregates, be they in classes long, recently, or
concurrently certified, or in consolidated or MDL proceedings.").
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C. Applying Characteristics of Legitimate Class Action
Settlements to Aggregated Settlements
Besides a greater potential for collusion outside the class action,
the main difference between class action settlements and settlement
after aggregation is that a class action may bind all
claimants---current and future. Otherwise, aggregated settlements
primarily resemble a class action settlement.5' Consequently, many
characteristics of a legitimate class action settlement easily translate
into characteristics of a legitimate post-aggregation settlement.
Class action settlements, particularly global settlements that bind
future claimants, cause particular concern because of both their
binding nature and the potential for conflicts of interest between class
counsel and class members.513 Plaintiffs typically have one chance
to "opt-out" of the class in which case they would have to pursue the
claim on their own. The logistics of the class action make this
unlikely. At their core, class actions serve three vital purposes: (1)
preserving judicial resources and increasing judicial economy; 514 (2)
protecting the rights of potential claimants who would not pursue
individual claims due to expense, reticence, or ignorance; 515 and (3)
guarding against the possibility of inconsistent results. 516 Similarly,
mass tort class actions and aggregated mass torts provide an
opportunity for people with small claims to assert their rights,517
allow claimants to pool their resources to conduct scientific research
for evidence of causation, and supply the means to face corporate
defendants on even ground. By opting-out of the class or the
512. See Erichson, supra note 6, at 529.
513. Numerous courts have found conflicts of interest between class counsel and
class members. See Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 785 (7th Cir.
2004); Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279-83 (7th Cir. 2002);
In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768,
801-05 (3d Cir. 1995); Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 524
(1st Cir. 1991); Coffee, supra note 88, at 385-93. Consequently, judges have a
duty to carefully scrutinize the terms of a proposed settlement to ensure that class
counsel behave as "honest fiduciaries for the class as a whole." Mirfasihi, 356 F.3d
at 785; see also Uhl v. Thoroughbred Tech. & Telecomm., Inc., 309 F.3d 978, 985
(7th Cir. 2002); Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2002);
In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir. 2001); Grant v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 823 F.2d 20, 23 (2d Cir. 1987).
514. Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 349, 103 S. Ct.
2392, 2395 (1983); Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553, 94 S. Ct.
756, 766 (1974).
515. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 813, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 2975
(1985); Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1091 (3d Cir.1976);
Brown v. Cameron-Brown Co., 92 F.R.D. 32, 49-50 (E.D. Va. 1981); Shields v.
First Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 56 F.R.D. 442, 445 (D. Ariz. 1972).
516. First Fed. of Mich. v. Barrow, 878 F.2d 912, 919 (6th Cir. 1989).




aggregated settlement, the plaintiff loses much of the protection
afforded by group status and must choose between the certainty of
receiving some sort of compensation through settlement and the
uncertainties of litigation.
Like class certification, aggregation of mass torts results in
settlement and may serve as a precursor to class status. Although
post-aggregation settlements do not officially bind non-parties in the
way that class certification does, the settlement may set a standard
bar to which the court may defer in determining future compensation.
As in class actions, highly specialized plaintiff and defense firms
handle the majority of similar types of mass tort litigation, which
supplies one of the precursors for collusion. Centralization of similar
claims creates at least a class action environment in which core
groups of attorneys manage litigation on behalf of hundreds of
clients.5 I8 In multidistrict litigation, the plaintiffs' steering committee
generally conducts pretrial litigation and may negotiate settlement
terms."' Claimants in aggregated actions have similar disincentives
and inabilities to monitor their attorneys as they do in class actions.
For example, in latent injury mass tort cases, those claimants with
only the early symptoms of illness may have less incentive to monitor
their attorneys or fight for a larger portion of the settlement. 52 1
Claimants also experience an attenuated lawyer-client relationship.52'
Due to the similarities between class action settlements and
settlements after non-class aggregation, the multidistricing process
should also permit judicial approval of settlements. This would
ensure that similarly situated individuals receive equal fairness
protections regardless of how the courts aggregated the litigation.522
518. See supra Part II.B.
519. Erichson, supra note 6, at 541.
520. For example, some asbestos plaintiffs are symptomatic whereas others are
exposure-only plaintiffs. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,610,
117 S. Ct. 2231, 2243 (1997).
521. Depending on whether one views the class action as a principal/agent
relationship or as an entity, the attorney may have a greater duty to his or her clients
in an aggregated non-class action. Though attenuated, in an aggregated action
without class status, the attorney retains a semblance of the individual attorney-
client relationship. Some academics have argued that an attorney representing a
class action may regard it as an entity, much like a corporation or business
organization. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 88, at 379; Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23:
Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 13, 26-32 (1996) (noting
the positive effects of regarding class members as an entity); David L. Shapiro,
Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 913, 917-18
(1998) (contending that "the class as entity should prevail over more individually
oriented notions of aggregate litigation."). The obvious impact of this distinction
is that the attorney can ignore preferences of particular class members as he or she
might ignore the leanings of individual shareholders in a corporation. Coffee, supra
note 88, at 379.
522. See Coffee, supra note 88, at 372 ("Across all class action contexts, the
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Non-class aggregated mass tort settlements should include a fair
determination of both liability and damages, a reasonable assurance
that claimants entitled to compensation are not excluded through
unscrupulous means such as stringent restrictions on who may collect
the compensation, a minimum adverse impact on business and
economy so long as the goal of deterring future offensive conduct is
achieved, and a minimum expenditure of transaction costs by way of
the parties and the judiciary.523 In the class action context, judges
recognize the variations between claimant groups, particularly in
personal injury dispersed mass torts, and can ensure that the
settlement adequately meets claimants' evolving needs. Class action
jurisprudence has developed a number of fair techniques to address
the varying degrees of injury between plaintiffs.524 Although a post-
aggregation settlement cannot bind future claimants in the same way
that a class action might, these settlements could prevent present
parties without severe injuries from relitigating after ascertaining the521
extent of their injuries. Consequently, if the court could approve
settlements for aggregated personal injury dispersed mass torts, it
might endorse a settlement that incorporated a "back-end" opt-out of
the settlement, a threshold limit on opt-outs, and/or the use of
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or claims facilities to
administer and process claims that meet agreed upon definitions and
criteria.526 In aggregated settlements, the client retains the right to
decide whether to accept or reject the settlement offer, so block
settlements should resemble opt-out settlement class actions.527
The "back-end" opt out of a settlement would permit claimants
in the early stages of latent injuries to request exclusion from the
settlement until they could ascertain the full extent of their injuries.528
This would prevent an "all or nothing" situation in which an offer to
settle might force a claimant with initial symptoms or injuries to
accept less compensation."' If the parties presented the court with
scientific information on the cycle of the expected symptoms from
the disease or exposure, then the court could determine whether the
same principal/agent problems recur and need to be addressed in a consistent
fashion."); Resnik, supra note 12, at 858.
523. See Schwarzer, supra note 440, at 837.
524. See, e.g., Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth), supra note 36, § 22.921.
525. See supra Part H.B. (describing preclusion). The concept of res judicata
would prevent the same parties from relitigating their claims.
526. See Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth), supra note 36, § 22.922, at
453-54; Cooper, supra note 38, at 1991.
527. See Cooper, supra note 38, at 1991; Erichson, supra note 6, at 570.
528. See Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth), supra note 36, § 22.922, at
453.
529. See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1203, 2000 WL
1222042, at *20-*21, *26, *39 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (providing a description of back-




"back-end" opt-out provision supplied an adequate amount of time
for a plaintiff to opt-out of an inadequate settlement.
A limit on the number of opt-outs secures protection for the
defendants. Defendants may legitimately condition settlement terms
on a threshold number of opt-outs, so that if the number or
percentage exceeded that limit, the defendant could renegotiate the
settlement terms.530 Often termed a "blow-out" clause,531 defendants
may choose to include this type of protection in settlements with a
high number of cases that could lead to individual litigation.532
Using alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (ADR), such as
arbitration, mediation, or a claims facility bolsters fairness for both
the defendant and the plaintiff after plaintiffs establish liability and
general causation.533 When aggregation of immature mass torts
forces a premature comprehensive settlement, alternative dispute
resolution may incorporate the necessary flexibility to use more
comprehensive case-management techniques as the mass tort
matures.53 These processes can individually assess injury and could
allocate resources on the basis of the proscribed settlement terms
once the plaintiff establishes injury and causation. They also
humanize the process of mass torts by permitting claimants to tell
their story and know that someone associated with the legal system
will hear it.535
ADR could include test-case trials to establish a range of values
for resolving similar claims. The settlement could create and define
the requisite criteria for compensation and could form institutions to
administer and monitor claims, as Judge Merhige required in
establishing the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust.5 36 Settlement terms
530. See Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth), supra note 36, § 22.922, at
454.
531. See id.
532. In the class-action context, the eent of a "blow-out" may prompt the need
to provide class members with additional notice. See In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 926, Order No. 27 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 22, 1995),
available at http://www.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ORDERS/orders.htm.
533. See generally In re Diet Drugs, 2000 WL 1222042, at *23-*24, *63;
Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth), supra note 36, § 22.922, at 454; McNeil
& Fanscal, supra note 19, at 506.
534. See McGovern, supra note 67, at 1841-45 (discussing the stages of a tort
maturation process); see generally Coffee, supra note 55, at 1439; Jack B.
Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice Through ADR, II
Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 241, 288 (1996).
535. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking the Mass out of Mass Torts: Reflections
of a Dalkon Shield Arbitrator on alternative Dispute Resolution, Judging,
neutrality, Gender, and Process, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 513,523 (1998). Judge Jack
Weinstein also recognized the cathartic value of permitting individuals to tell their
story. Jack B. Weinstein, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation 9-11 (1995).
536. See Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth), supra note 36, § 22.922, at
454; see supra Part V.B. (describing the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust); see also
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may also include an administrative appeals process, an auditing
mechanism, or both to ensure that plaintiffs and defendants alike
remained satisfied with the system's outcomes.537
Critics of ADR' s use to resolve "residual disputes" that remain at
the end of an aggregated settlement wonder whether ADR satisfies
claimants' expectations for procedural justice.5 38 Although ADR
provides, to some extent, individualized assessments of harm, the real
aspect of procedural justice should enter the equation on the front
end, when the court evaluates the fairness of the proposed aggregated
settlement. Attempts at procedural justice as received in the
individual context necessarily fall short in collective representation
precisely because of collective representation.539 Yet, the benefits of
an aggregated process may outweigh the costs of losing one's day in
court. Benefits of an aggregated settlement for claimants include not
needing to individually prove concepts such as the failure to warn
and negligence that may disappear in the subjectivity of hearing a
single plaintiffs story in individual litigation; avoiding redundant
litigation costs ;540 permitting objective proof that applies to claimants
in the aggregate; and equalizing bargaining power.
In all types of mass tort settlements, the judge should determine
whether the settlement's proposed compensation scheme is
reasonable,"' and whether, in practice, the claims process will provide
fair and equitable compensation. 43 Like the requirement in Rule 23(e),
ideally, parties should disclose side agreements, agreements to settle
"inventories" or catalogues of claims, 544 agreements by plaintiffs'
attorneys not to bring similar future claims against the defendant,545
Vairo, supra note 375, at 130-32.
537. See Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth), supra note 36, § 22.922, at
454.
538. See Hensler, supra note 452, at 1622; Priest, supra note 248, at 559-69
(listing the failings of the procedural approach).
539. See generally Erichson, supra note 6, at 540.
540. Rosenberg, supra note 440, at 397.
541. See Erichson, supra note 6, at 542 ("Scale economies result from the
sharing of information and divvying up of work among coordinating lawyers. The
pooling of resources permits greater investment in the litigation. To the extent
lawyers coordinate their negotiation efforts, enhanced bargaining leverage may
result as well."); Rosenberg, supra note 443, at 237, 256-57.
542. See Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 356 F.3d 781,786 (7th Cir. 2004);
In re The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 324 n.73
(3d Cir. 1998) (citing Schwarzer, supra note 440, at 843-44 ); In re Gen. Motors
Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig. 55 F.3d 768, 806 (3d Cir. 1995);
Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'l I11. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 834 F.2d 677,682 (7th Cir.
1987); In re Traffic Executive Assoc.-E. R.R., 627 F.2d 631, 633 (2d Cir. 1980).
543. See Prudential, 148 F.3d at 324 n.73.
544. See Tidmarsh, supra note 336, at 40-41.
545. An agreement of this type would violate Rule 5.6(b) of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. This rule states: "A lawyer shall not participate in offering
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and agreements about attorneys' fees.5 46 The judge should ensure that
similarly injured claimants receive equal treatment;5 47 scrutinize
settlements with heightened attention to the amount of litigation that
preceded them;548 and determine whether all of the claimants are
adequately and properly represented and that the attorneys do not have
conflicting obligations in representing various types of claimants with
a range of materially different claims. 549 He should also evaluate the
reasonableness of attorneys' fees by examining the amount and type of
services rendered and the assumed risks;"' ascertain whether the
proposed settlement will significantly impact potential claims of
similarly situated individuals with non-aggregated actions pending in
state or federal courts;55' and require an estimate of the amounts
individual group members will receive, when they will receive it, and
the costs of distributing settlement funds.552 The judge should establish
and uncover the settlement's effects on potential claims of group
members for loss or injury arising out of similar circumstances but
excluded from the settlement (including the effects of res judicata and
collateral estoppel)." 3 He should uncover and prohibit the use of strict
eligibility criteria for receiving settlement proceeds from a claims
or making an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is
part of the settlement of a client controversy." Model R. of Prof 1 Conduct 5.6(b).
A restriction of this sort limits access to competent attorneys and relates less to the
merits of the claim than it does to buying off counsel.
546. See Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth), supra note 36, § 22.923, at
455.
547. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610,630-31 (3d Cir. 1996)
(comparing the treatment of various types of present and future claims), affid sub
nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997);
Manuel L. Real, What Evil Have We Wrought: Class Action, Mass Torts, and
Settlement, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 437,448-49 (1998); Resnik, supra note 12, at 843
(recommending that settlements reveal the "different aspects of the alleged injuries
suffered"); Schwarzer, supra note 440, at 843.
548. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620, 117 S. Ct. at 2248; Resnik, supra note 12, at
852.
549. See Schwarzer, supra note 440, at 843. The settlement should not split
claims for injuries or losses arising out of the same or related incidents. See In re
Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prod. Liab. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 323, 339-41
(S.D.N.Y. 2002). The settlement should not allow attorneys to settle their inventory
of cases at a premium level and other cases at a lesser value. See, e.g., Georgine
v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 295-304.
550. See Cooper, supra note 38, at 1992; McNeil & Fanscal, supra note 19, at
519; Schwarzer, supra note 440, at 844; see generally Manual for Complex
Litigation (Fourth), supra note 36, § 22.927, at 461-63. Theodore Eisenberg and
Geoffrey Miller propose a simple methodology for courts to use in evaluating the
reasonableness of fee requests. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Attorneys Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J. Empirical
Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2004).
551. See Schwarzer, supra note 440, at 844.
552. Resnik, supra note 12, at 858.
553. See Real, supra note 547, at 448-49; Schwarzer, supra note 440, at 844.
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center that prevents valid claimants from collecting settlement funds554
and prevent collusion between defense and plaintiffs' counsel during
the settlement process.555
Judges should examine settlements with the heightened scrutiny
required by the Supreme Court, in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,
for class action settlements.556 Consequently, judges should not
approve settlements that (1) provide illusory benefits, such as coupon
settlements; 57 (2) permit defendants to select certain plaintiffs' counsel
willing to provide the least benefits, the so-called "reverse auction"
technique; or (3) allow counsel to calculate attorney fees on the basis
of set aside benefits rather than on amounts actually distributed. 8
As in class actions, judges should conduct a preliminary hearing
to make findings on the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the
proposed settlement, and if warranted, a final fairness hearing before
making an ultimate determination.55 9 Judges may want to require the
attorneys to notify their claimants of the fairness hearing in the plain
language required by class action notices.56°
The court should consider several factors in evaluating fairness,
including:
(1) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the
litigation... ; (2) the reaction of the class to the settlement.
.. ; (3) the stage of the proceedings [including the maturity of
the mass tort] and the amount of discovery completed... ;
(4) the risks of establishing liability... ; (7) the ability of the
defendants to withstand a greater judgment; (8) the range of
reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best
possible recovery; and (9) the range of reasonableness of the
settlement fund to a possible recovery in light of all the
attendant risks of litigation. 6
554. See Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth), supra note 36, § 22.924, at
456.
555. Real, supra note 547, at 448-49.
556. AmchemProds., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,620, 117 S. Ct. 2231,2248
(1997); see also Resnik, supra note 12, at 852-53.
557. If passed, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2004 would specifically limit
coupon settlements within class actions, but it does not address coupon settlements
in non-class aggregation. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2004, S. 2062, 108th
Cong., 2d Sess. (2004); supra Part IV.B.
558. Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth), supra note 36, § 22.924, at 456.
559. See id.
560. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B); Elizabeth Cabraser, New Developments in
Mass Torts and Class Actions: "Issues" Certification; Mass Torts Top Ten of2003;
Rule 23's New Provision and Action Trial Plans; and the FJC "New Plain
Language" Class Notice, SJ035 ALI-ABA 997, 1036-50 (2004).
561. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 317
(3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 1975) (internal
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The fairness hearing should afford litigants the time to present
witnesses, experts, and affidavits.5 62 The court may benefit from
including some trial type procedures such as receiving sworn
testimony subject to cross-examination if it is skeptical about the
settlement.163 After determining whether the settlement meets the
prerequisites of fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy, the court
should issue a written opinion of its findings and legal conclusions."
Should the parties disagree with the determination, they could appeal
to the circuit court assigned to the district court.
Amending section 1407 to include judicial oversight of all
settlements at the Panel's discretion ensures that concerns about
collusion in aggregated settlements receive equal judicial
supervision. The amendment restores the balance between efficiency
and fairness that the current process lacks. It empowers those with
the most knowledge about the litigation, the Panel and the transferee
judges, with the authority to protect defendants from unwarranted
settlement coercion and claimants from having to choose between
inadequate settlements and individual litigation.
VII. CONCLUSION
In many respects, aggregated mass tort settlements epitomize a
win-win situation for all of those involved. The court quickly
disposes of burdensome, complex litigation with a solution that
satisfies the attorneys.565 Plaintiffs' attorneys receive a hefty
contingency fee from each individual client, but have to negotiate
only one settlement.566 Defendants using the reverse auction
technique minimize the value of the settlement and deter future
claimants from filing by settling meritorious claims and litigating
weak ones to garner favorable press coverage.
Yet, the judicial system's impulse toward accepting the efficient,
quick settlement has caused claimants to receive marginal payments
that reflect their attorneys' future need to negotiate with the same
defendants rather than the merit of their claims. It has also caused
defendants to declare bankruptcy and to settle even weak,
citations omitted)).
562. See Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth), supra note 36, § 21.634, at
322.
563. See id. § 22.924, at 459.
564. See id. § 22.924, at 461.
565. See Weinstein, supra note 40, at 521 ("Even though bulk settlements may
technically violate ethical rules, judges often encourage their acceptance to
terminate a large number of cases.").
566. See id. at 522 ("Plaintiffs' counsel like [bulk settlements] because they
generally do not reduce their percentage fee per case so that, because of the large
settlement amounts, the lawyer's hourly fee jumps spectacularly.").
2004] 247
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
unmeritorious claims that they might prefer to litigate. At their core,
settlements substitute adjudication for private agreement.5 67  In
individual litigation, settlement occurs only with the client's consent.
In aggregated mass tort litigation, clients with an attenuated attorney-
client relationship must choose between settlement and independent
expensive litigation, which offers the client little meaningful choice.
Given the benefits of collective representation, the lack of choice
may be a valid tradeoff so long as the settlement is fair. Yet, only
class actions and bankruptcy provide the necessary judicial review to
safeguard the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of mass tort
settlements. This creates a system of second-class justice for
defendants and claimants with issues suited for aggregation but not
certification.
To provide collectively represented parties with equal protections
of fairness in settlements and restore a balance between the goals of
efficiency and justice, Congress should amend section 1407 to permit
judicial oversight of all aggregated settlements. All federal courts
faced with class action allegations should read Rule 23 in light of its
purpose to assure fair conduct and in light of the tort system's goals
of compensating injured persons and deterring future wrongdoing.
These goals promote a liberal reading of Rule 23 that permits courts
to approve collective settlements with class allegations regardless of
their certification status. So long as courts continue to use their
judicial integrity, 68 these measures will instill the fairness aspects of
the tort system into mass torts and will stabilize and offset the
momentum toward efficiency. Encouraging judges to take a more
active role in managing mass torts allows those with the most
experience in handling complex litigation to ensure that settlements
embody the goals of the tort system (to compensate and deter), the
goals of aggregation (to promote efficient resolution of claims), and
the goal of justice (to make fair decisions).
567. Cooper, supra note 38, at 1980.
568. When assigned a complex mass tort, judges should become involved.
Judge Jack Weinstein, who presided over the Agent Orange litigation, appropriately
recommends, "involvement must include concern over the various communities
which may be affected by the court's decisions." Weinstein, supra note 40, at 540.
To do this, the judge need not "put aside all sense of emotion and concern when the
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